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ABSTRACT
This dissertation focuses primarily on potential
explanations for bank common stock abnormal returns, and
their patterns, coincident with the announcement of bank
capital issues. Potential influences considered include
increased regulatory pressure, conflicting regulatory and
market views of bank capital adequacy and the relative
predictability of security type. Where possible, the
dissertation is set in both UK and US contexts.
The dissertation has four principal research components;
(1) a review of historical and contemporary bank capital
regulation in the UK and US. Historical analysis indicates
that the definition of capital, as determined by its
functional properties, is dynamic and qualifies the
consistency of its measurement over time. The regulatory
control of absolute levels of capital is seen to have
influence on bank structural development, costs and risk.
The regulatory control of relative bank capital (ie in
terms of balance sheet structure) is found to have a long
and controversial history in the US and is effective
progenitor of the current methodology of bank capital
measurement and assessment, such as the Basle Agreement,
and contains a number of potentially costly deficiencies.
(2) an examination of bank capital issue announcement
effects in the UK. Following similar work in the US (eg
Keeley 1989) negative abnormal return effects are found
associated with the announcements of UK ordinary share
issues. Also, evidence hints that an imposed increase in
regulatory capital pressure (viz the introduction of a
minimum capital ratio regime) causes a reduction in issue
announcement effects for ordinary share issues.
(3) assessment of the capital adequacy of UK and US banks
from a market perspective and in terms of a number
definitions of capital; namely equity, regulatory primary
capital (US), and the 1992 Basle Agreement capital.
Conflict between market and regulatory views of capital
adequacy are observed in certain years for primary capital.
In terms of the capital structure relevance hypothesis,
this suggests particular costs which may influence issue
announcement effects.
(4) modelling the predictability of UK bank capital issue
security type (viz ordinary share and debt) and assessing
the hypothesis that it is inversely related to the
announcement abnormal returns.
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CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION
1.1	 DISSERTATION OVERVIEW
This dissertation is concerned with the analysis of bank
capital in terms of several themes which, in varying forms and
degrees, are interdependent and complementary to each other.
Bank Capital Regulation:
Bank capital regulation commonly is justified in terms of the
prevention of bank system failure. But questions emerge as to
its efficacy and cost. The dissertation considers bank
capital regulation in historical and contemporary terms and
identifies both its absolute and relative control forms.
Capital Market Environment:
In terms of capital market environment, the dissertation
considers three dimensions of market quality; perfection,
efficiency and freedom.
1
PERFECTION
PERFECT
TABLE 1.1
CAPITAL MARKET QUALITIES
EFFICIENCY FREEDOM
COMPLETE*	 FREE
IMPERFECTIONS
- Taxation
- Bankruptcy
Costs
- Agency Costs
- Information
Asymmetry
- Regulation
RATIONAL
EXPECTATIONS
INFORMATION
ARBITRAGE
(-(REGULATION)
FAILURE
- Free Rider
- Information
Asymmetry
- Externalities
* Apart from full insurance efficiency in the Arrow-Debreu
sense, Tobin (1984) also identifies a functional efficiency -
the service the financial industries provide for the economy
as a whole.
Empirical Evidence:
Empirical analysis focuses on the reaction of a bank's common
stock (ordinary share) price to the public announcement of an
impending capital issue. Other assessments include a market
view of the adequacy of bank capital, and the predictability
of the security type of bank capital issues.
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Questions:
Following a sketch of relevant theory in Section 1.2, four
basic question areas are identified in Section 1.3. The
dissertation accommodates an international dimension, being
set primarily in the UK and US contexts.
1.2	 THEORY
The dissertation draws upon a body of corporate finance (or
financial economics) knowledge which has developed markedly
with the post 1950 formulation of several major theories
concerning portfolio efficiency, equilibrium asset pricing,
corporate capital structure, agency theory, and rational
expectations; Jensen & Smith (1984).
Jensen (1983) observes that the vast economic literature on
the theory of the firm is not a positive theory of the firm
but rather a theory of markets in which the firm, like a black
box, acts in a value or profit-maximising way. Nevertheless,
the insight these theories have allowed into corporate finance
behaviour is relevant to organisation theory which, Jensen
anticipates, is likely to enjoy major development.
3
1.2.1
	
Corporate Finance Theory
It is convenient to identify three strands of corporate
finance theory; these are identified for ease of exposition
and are interconnected to varying degrees.
a. Firstly, the normative portfolio selection theory of
Markowitz (1952, 1959), which defined mean-variance efficient
asset portfolios for risk averse investors, provided the basis
for the development of a positive theory of the determination
of equilibrium asset prices, namely the capital asset pricing
model (CAPM) (1). Also, mean-variance models are used in
banking models (2).
b. Secondly, observations (dating from at least the turn of
the century) of a pervasive randomness, or unbiased fair game
nature, in consecutive price movements of assets attracted
renewed attention in the post 1950 era. This precipitated an
explanatory theory based on the idea of market efficiency
Samuelson (1965) and was later adapted for empirical testing
Fama (1970, 1976). While this theory has found support at
least in terms of historic price, and publicly available
information sets, it has suffered criticism. In essence, the
efficient market hypothesis comprises two elements, the
rational expectations hypothesis and efficient arbitrage
hypothesis; eg Tobin 1984, Begg (1982 p206).
The rational expectations hypothesis developed by Muth (1961)
has an independent literature, and postulates the equivalence
of individuals' subjective expectations of a random economic
variable to their mathematical conditional expectations. Major
implications of this hypothesis flow from the properties of
the conditional expectations of forecast error (namely zero
and orthogonal). This hypothesis, coupled with an assumed
4
information asymmetry, provided new insight into
macroeconomics and the problems of the business cycle. The
efficient market hypothesis may be viewed as a particular
application of the rational expectations hypothesis.
C.	 Thirdly, subsequent to the capital structure irrelevance
hypothesis of Modigliani & Miller (1958) which obtains in
perfect and complete capital markets (3), the introduction of
market imperfections has provided hypotheses of capital
structure optimality and thus relevance. Imperfections
considered include taxation, financial distress/bankruptcy
costs, and agency costs.
Also, by assuming information asymmetry between management and
the market, hypotheses have emerged which envisage management
arbitraging the information via various signals including
capital structure decisions. This latter genre of signalling
hypotheses may be viewed as a hybrid of capital structure and
information (strand b) theory.
Despite development in corporate finance, major questions
still surround the choice of security type in finance raising
capital issues. Myers (1984 p575) comments, ...
'We do not know how firms choose the debt,
equity or hybrid securities they issue. We
have only recently discovered that capital
structure changes convey information to
investors. There has been little if any
research testing whether the relationship
between financial leverage and investors'
required return is as the pure MM
(Modigliani & Miller) theory predicts. In
general, we have inadequate understanding
5
of corporate financing behaviour, and of
how that behaviour affects security
returns.'
1.2.2	 Banking Firm Capital Structure
Models of the banking firm are prefaced by the question of why
banks exist (4) and those focusing on capital structure are
normally distinguished by the element of exploitable financial
market imperfection and some degree of regulatory constraint.
Reviews of banking firm models have been undertaken by
Baltensperger (1980) and Bantomero (1984); Adekanye (1992)
provides a recent survey.
While knowledge about corporate financing behaviour has
advanced post the MM foundation by the ordered recognition of
(perfect) market imperfections the advancement of capital
structure theory in the particular case of the banking firm is
by contrast neglected and fragmentary. Pringle (1974)
noted,...
'There has been little theoretical or
analytical research on the bank capital
decision, and there exists no theory of
bank capital based on optimizing behaviour
on the part of the individual bank. Models
of bank decision-making that are based on
optimizing behaviour have been concerned
primarily with other questions and have
not treated capital as a managerial
6
decision variable. The role of capital in
bank financial management remains vaguely
defined and, in the opinion of some
writers, relatively unimportant.'
The 1980s saw little to alter Pringle's prognosis. As
Santomero (1984 p595) observes in his review of modelling the
banking firm "...In all, this literature on optimal bank
capital is a bit vague and very model specific" ; he notes
that the literature has used techniques including bankruptcy
factors and models from corporate financial theory. He
comments, ...
'The capital decision of the financial
firm is more complicated than it may first
appear. This is true because the optimal
choice of scale and leverage is determined
by the assumed financial environment and
the raison d'etre of the firm ...
Accordingly, to derive an optimal capital
structure, one must determine, first, the
role played by the financial institution
and, second, the extent to which one
wishes to deviate from the perfect market
paradigm.'
Apart from focusing on the relaxation of perfect financial
market conditions, much of the body of bank capital structure
model literature tends to acknowledge, to some extent, the
regulatory constraint. The micro, or prudential, regulation of
banks, of which capital regulation is part, may have direct
macroeconomic implications, namely for money aggregates and
policy (5).
7
1.3
	
QUESTION AREAS
1.3.1	 Bank Capital Regulation
The idea of a "free" market, and the role of regulation
generally, have received increased critical assessment in
recent decades. In a "free" market context, regulation may be
justified to prevent market failure stemming from sources such
as information asymmetry and the free rider problem.
In the particular context of banking, the topic of "free"
banking is under renewed scrutiny; Goodhart (1985). The "free"
banking evidence appears controversial in part due to matters
of definition; also it tends to focus on monetary rather than
capital regulation. Benston (1991) reaches the challenging
conclusion that regulation tends to disrupt financial
stability.
The role of capital in the banking firm has received much
increased attention from prudential regulation authorities
around the world in the past couple of decades (6). Steps have
been taken, eg via the Basle Committee, to improve and
converge bank capital definition and standards in order to
better control risks and reduce "unfair" competition based on
diverse national capital standards. The accounting profession
also is seeking a degree of international harmonisation in
standards.
The regulation of US and UK bank capital in the form of
absolute control has a history stemming from the roots (7) of
modern commercial banking. Underpinned by absolute capital
regulation, relative (in terms of balance sheet structure)
8
bank capital regulation has a long history in the US but has
suffered criticism as a failure risk control instrument during
the economic exigencies of the 1920s and 1930s.
Modern relative bank capital regulation, as epitomised by the
1988 Basle Agreement, may be seen as having evolved from
intuitive and ad hoc rules of thumb to a more scientific,
formal and unified basis. This type of regulation uses a
function based definition of bank capital, which emphasises
its risk bearing capacity, against which risks may be matched,
monitored and controlled. The Basle Agreement acknowledges
certain of its shortcomings; eg risk accommodation is limited
largely to credit risk.
Other criticisms include the Basle regime's methodology; eg
the setting of a minimum capital standard (following the
precedence of the 1981 US and 1987 joint US-UK regimes) and
the inherent arbitrariness in selecting a particular level.
Also the integration of the Basle Agreement with management
and market disciplines is unclear. Disquietingly, survey
evidence suggests the Basle Agreement regulatory standards
will influence bank management attitude towards capital
allocation management despite the fact that it is deficient as
a management tool; Coopers & Lybrand (1988). Also, the
market's view of capital standards is ignored by the
Agreement.
Guided by the underlying questions of the effectiveness and
cost of bank capital regulation in general, question areas
specifically considered include:-
i. What is bank capital?
ii. What justification exists for bank capital regulation?
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iii. How has the regulatory definition of bank capital evolved
and what forms has it taken?
iv. How has capital regulation development influenced
- bank market structure
- capital market efficiency
- risk
- management and costs?
v. Do historic bank capital series require qualification in
terms of changing risk bearing attributes?
vi. Have periods of "free" banking, vis a vis capital
regulation, existed and if so, have they exerted a
discernible influence on bank risk?
vii. Critically assess contemporary bank capital regulation
methodology with particular reference to the Basle
Agreement.
The question of cost of conflict between capital regulation
and the market discipline is raised in Section 1.3.3.
1.3.2	 Bank Capital Issue Announcement Effects
Development of Study Genre:
Capital event empirical studies focus on capital market
pricing phenomena (abnormal returns) defined at a time and/or
over a period relative to the event. These studies may be
categorised according to various characteristics such as
corporate type (industrial, utility, bank) and the event
nature; major event categories include "pure" leverage change
(security exchange, and no change in the funding level), and
10
capital issue for cash. Defining the public announcement of
the intended capital transaction as an event itself provides a
further study category.
In general chronological terms, early capital event studies
emphasised testing of the EMH using monthly data surrounding
the transaction, eg stock splits analysed in terms of monthly
data around the split date; FFJR (1969). Consideration of the
announcement date and the immediacy of price reaction
developed later.
"Pure" leverage studies developed as a major category from
around 1980, eg Masulis (1980a), and as noted by Kolodny &
Suhler (1985), were followed by capital issue announcement
studies in the industrial and utility sectors. More recently,
capital issue announcement studies have been extended to the
banking sector - at least in the US.
Overall, "pure" leverage change announcement studies in the
non-finance sector provide conflicting evidence on the
validity of tax shield, bankruptcy cost and wealth transfer
hypotheses but tend to support agency cost and signalling
hypotheses.
Capital Issue Announcement Studies:
a. Non-Finance Firms
As noted by Smith (1986), the studies of common stock abnormal
returns associated with capital issue announcements are on
average negative with a magnitude patterned according to
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security type and the nature of the firm (industrial or
utility) (8).
The occurrence of a common stock abnormal return coincident
with the announcements represents an anomaly in terms of the
semi-strong form of the EMH.
Evidence for the capital structure irrelevance and relevance
hypotheses appears mixed and in aggregate conflicting.
For instance, the overall negativity of announcements effects
challenges the validity of both the capital structure
relevance (imperfect) market hypotheses and the capital
structure irrelevance (perfect) market hypothesis: eg Smith
(1986).
Nevertheless, the pattern of abnormal return negativity
associated with security type appears relatively well
accommodated by hypotheses built on assumptions of information
asymmetry in conjunction with capital financing decisions -
the so called signalling hypotheses in which management has an
incentive to arbitrage their information advantage via
financing policy; Myers & Majluf (1984) who assume asymmetry
of information provide an explanation for both negativity,
and abnormal return patterns for common stock and debt. But
their model does not explain the announcement effects of other
security type issues and, by incorporating optimal managerial
incentive contracts in the model, Dybvig & Zender (1988)
reassert conditions of capital structure irrelevancy.
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b.	 Bank Firms
Empirical studies of bank common stock abnormal returns
coincident with bank capital issue announcements are
relatively small in number and recent, compared with similar
studies in the industrial and utility sectors. Key papers
include Wansley & Dhillon (1989), Wall & Peterson, P. (1988),
Isberg & Brown (1987), Polonchek, Slovin & Sushka (1989) and
Keeley (1989).
The pattern of announcement effects is similar to that of
industrial and utility firms but, like utilities, the absolute
magnitude of the abnormal returns are lower than those for
industrials (9).
The banking studies tend to focus on regulation based
explanations for observed issue announcement effects. Some
evidence emerges to support the hypothesis that increased
regulatory pressure, namely imposing a monitored minimum
capital standard, reduces information asymmetry and the signal
content of the issue announcement.
By simultaneously viewing increased regulatory environment
pressure and bank regulation capital status (ie capital
adequate or inadequate), Keeley (1989) finds contrary evidence
which suggests the non-exclusive validity of information
asymmetry (signalling) and capital structure relevance
hypotheses; the latter concerns a hypothesised reduction in
the value of deposit insurance.
Noting a lacuna in similar analysis of bank capital issue
announcement effects in the UK context, this dissertation
asks,
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i.	 Do UK banks exhibit ordinary share pricing phenomena
(abnormal returns) coincident with ordinary share
and debt capital issue announcements?
▪ Are announcement effects, if any, influenced by changes
in regulatory rigour including,
- the 1979-80 change; ie from informal to formal (ie
with statutory backing) power of the prudential
regulating authority, and/or the promulgation of
regulatory capital measurement methodology?
- the 1987 regulatory impost of a minimum capital
standard, in relative (ie balance sheet structure)
terms?
1.3.3	 The Adequacy of Banks' Capital from the Market's View
This question area focuses on the assessment of banks' capital
adequacy from a market perspective. Also, assuming the
relevance of capital structure, it is hypothesised that
conflict or agreement between the market and the regulatory
(ie based on a minimum capital standard) views of capital
adequacy may further explain issue announcement effects.
The market view is assessed using an equity valuation model
developed by Shome et al (1987); assessment is made by
reference to the parameter of an independent financial risk
variable which is defined in terms of capital structure. The
adequacy of different capital definitions is facilitated; le
by defining capital as equity capital, primary capital, or
Basle Agreement capital.
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Specific questions include,
i. What is the market's assessment of bank capital adequacy
in both the UK and US?
ii. What is the market's adequacy assessment of capital for
- banks which are capital adequate in regulatory
terms, and
- banks which are capital inadequate in regulatory
terms?
iii. Does a conflict exist between the regulatory and market
views of the adequacy of bank capital observed in
ii. ?
Question ii. is applied to US banks and to capital defined as
regulatory primary capital, and Basle Agreement capital.
1.3.4	 Security Type Issued Predictability
Finally, noting that observations suggest a pattern of issue
announcement effects based on the security type to be issued,
the dissertation focusses on the hypothesis that the pattern
reflects the predictability of the security type to be issued.
More particularly it is hypothesised that an inverse
relationship exists between the absolute magnitude of bank
capital issue announcement abnormal returns and the
predictability of the security type of the issue. The testing
of this hypothesis in the industrial sector has provided at
best, weak evidence; Schadler (1987) (10).
Assuming the existence of information asymmetry, an element of
pre-announcement repricing may have occurred from information
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available in the public domain such as accounting and market
variables. To some extent, investors may have predicted the
announcement which consequently may contain little or no
information. Otherwise, if the announcement is contrary to
prior information and investors rational expectations the
information content, and price reaction may be large.
While there appears to be no extant study on bank capital
security type predictability, over the past couple of decades
a number of studies have pursued this objective in the non-
finance sector. Based on probit, logit and multivariate
discriminant analysis models, they estimate the predictability
of security type to be issued, given the need for external
finance. Notable studies include Baxter & Cragg (1970), Martin
& Scott (1974), Taub (1975), Taggart (1977), Marsh (1982), and
Schadler (1987).
In effect, the studies identify predictor variables which
stand as suitable proxies for publicly available information.
Major predictor variables utilised in Marsh (1982) and
Schadler (1987) include proxies for a target capital
structure, deviations from it, and market conditions. The
proxy variables include factors such as current capital
structure, firm size, and bankruptcy risk.
Although predictability models have been developed in the
banking sector over past decades to indicate early warning and
failure, eg Sinkey (1979), Sinkey et al (1987), there appear
to be no extant issue security type predictability studies.
Potential predictor variables for bank security type studies
may be derived from adaptations of industrial study predictor
variables. Also bank failure prediction models may provide
suitable risk variables.
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1.4	 SCOPE AND QUALIFICATIONS
This dissertation is set in the UK and US contexts and is
directed towards a critical assessment of bank capital
regulation, and extending analysis of bank capital issue
announcement effects.
The costs of bank capital regulation are assessed
qualitatively and in terms of issue announcement effects,
including the influence of changes in regulatory regime and
its conflict with market discipline. Bank capital issue
announcement effect analysis is extended by both the above
factors and an assessment of the security type predictability
hypothesis.
Although the cost of potential conflict between bank capital
regulation and management discipline are not directly
considered in this dissertation, the assessment of market-
regulation conflict may provide information useful to
management. Also, evidence of costs of regulation policy may
be useful to regulators in policy development and
implementation.
Apart from the dissertation text and footnotes, annexes are
used to house expanded reference to theory and literature;
this includes a number of key papers and books presented in
abridged and paraphrased form.
Data availability and validity form a particular constraint in
this dissertation. The empirical analyses are applied to large
banks in the UK and US. This represents 6 banks in the UK. US
bank observations were obtained from two sources. The one,
IBCA, provides a bank specific balance sheet and income
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statement account format over 1983-87 for 103 banks; the
other, Datastream provides market data but only very limited
account data. Consequently the basic 103 US bank observations
were reduced due to a lack of complete account and market
data, and/or incompatible account data (compatibility of
equity accounts was used as the matching criterion).
UK capital issue announcement dates were confirmed from two
sources, newspaper ('Financial Times' and 'The Times') indices
and Extel News Cards. Sources for US capital issue details,
used by US researchers, proved unobtainable here; some details
were available from 'Moodys Bank and Finance Manual' but issue
announcement confirmation in the 'Wall St Journal Index'
effectively reduced US capital issue announcement observations
to a handful of common stock issues and a desired distinction
of preference stock type (non-redeemable from redeemable)
proved difficult on a consistent basis.
1.5	 DISSERTATION STRUCTURE
Following this introductory chapter, Chapter 2 examines
relevant corporate finance theory. This includes the rational
expectations
and efficient market hypotheses, corporate capital structure
theory and its coincidence with assumed information asymmetry
in the form of signalling hypotheses.
Chapters 3 and 4 focus on the constraint of bank capital
regulation. Chapter 3 considers bank capital regulation within
the argument for "free" banking and provides a critical
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assessment of the development of both absolute and relative
capital regulatory controls. Chapter 4 extends the critical
assessment to contemporary bank capital definition and
regulation, and reviews market based methodologies of bank
capital adequacy assessment.
Chapter 5 reviews US empirical studies of bank capital issue
announcements effects. The original empirical analysis of the
dissertation is contained in the following three chapters.
Chapter 6 assesses UK bank capital issue announcement effects
and the influence of regulatory changes. Chapter 7 focuses on
market assessments of the adequacy of banks generally, as well
as banks grouped adequate or inadequate by regulatory capital
criteria.
Chapter 8 assesses the predictability of capital issue
security 'type from public information and the possibility of
its inverse relationship with issue announcement effects.
Finally, Chapter 9 draws conclusions from the results and
provides recommendations for further research.
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FOOTNOTES
(1). The CAPM is normally attributed to Treynor (1961) and
Sharpe (1963, 1964) with further major development accorded to
Lintner (1965), and Mossin (1966); some of the basic
assumptions upon which the basic CAPM rests have been relaxed,
eg Lintner (1969) introduced heterogeneous expectations, and
Black (1972) was able to dispense with the need for a no-risk
asset. Its use in empirical tests of capital market efficiency
has been qualified, eg Roll (1977).
The CAPM may be viewed as a special case of the more general
equilibrium asset arbitrage pricing theory (APT) which allows
numerous factors to explain the equilibrium return on a risky
asset. APT, developed by Ross (1976a), views the return on any
risky asset as a linear combination of various common factors
that affect asset returns.
(2). Mean-variance portfolio models also are applied to the
balance sheet in models of bank capital structure; eg Pringle
(1974), Kahane (1977), Koehn (1979), Koehn & Santomero (1980),
Keeley & Furlong (1990). Earlier models, adapting to the
intermediary balance sheet, include Parkin (1970), Pyle
(1971), Hart & Jaffee (1974). Pyle (1971), by considering the
dependence between the securities bought and sold by financial
intermediaries, shows that asset (liability) portfolios cannot
in general be chosen independently of the parameters of the
liability (asset) yields. The major result of the paper is
contained in the specification of the yield relationships
which are conducive to financial intermediation.
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Because of assumed imperfection in the financial market,
namely a differential between borrowing and lending rates,
adaptation of the mean-variance model is required in
application to the financial intermediary. Hart & Jaffee
(1974) derive the separation theorem without assuming that the
intermediary can borrow or lend at the same risk-free rate.
(3). "A perfect capital market should be defined as one in
which the MM theory holds" ; an off-the-cuff comment
attributed to Ezra Solomon: Brealey & Myers (1988 p397).
Also, the MM theory, set in perfect capital market conditions,
has been shown to hold in a state-preference framework of
complete capital markets; eg Hirschleifer (1966, 1970).
(4). Santomero (1984) comments that there at least three
approaches to the question of why internal financial
institutions exist in the financial markets; the role of asset
transformer (ie diversification potential and asset
evaluation), the nature of the liabilities issued and their
central function in a monetary economy, and that the two-sided
nature of the financial firms is critical in explanation of
their behaviour.
(5). For instance, the inter-relationship between bank and
bank system failure risks, eg Revell (1975), Mason (1979),
Gilbert & Wood (1986); system failure carries the implication
of sharp money supply contraction. Prudential and monetary
regulation policy may also be in conflict, eg tight monetary
control policy versus more liberal prudential control policy;
Federal Reserve Bulletin (1984 July).
(6). A degree of universality may be ascribed to the role of
bank capital. Wilcox (1979) for instance, comments that, ...
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'Though differences in emphasis may exist,
the basic role of capital in banking does
not vary from country to country ... it is
fundamental that all banks need capital to
cover and extend fixed assets and business
investments, to enable trading to continue
and increase, to maintain the confidence
of depositors and ensure viability in the
face of loss arising from inevitable
business and political fluctuations and
uncertainty, particularly in an
inflationary climate.'
(7). This is a matter of definition choice; in this
dissertation the 1600s and specific national experiences.
Banking has a much earlier history. In a Persian context,
Olmstead (1948 p83) notes that,
'Private banking as a commercial
proposition first made its appearance in
Babylonia in the reign of Kandalanu (648-
626). At the very beginning we find
members of two great banking families of
Babylon, that of Egibi and of the less
important Iranu.'
'Preceding times had witnessed no such
large-scale use of credit. The loan
business was in the hands of the one great
economic unit - the temple - and loans
were made principally to temple
dependents. Assyrian landlords, however,
had made regular advances of grain to
their peasants.'
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Also in the much earlier Mesopotamian context of the
transition from copper to bronze age, Childe (1954 p118) notes
the development of a money economy during the urban
revolution, which was characterised by standardisations,
generalisations and quantizations.
(8). Smith (1986) suggests four generalisations about
abnormal returns (ARs); also see his table in Annex 2.4D.
i.	 The average ARs are non-positive.
ABS1. 	 associated with announcements of common stock sales
are negative and larger in absolute value than those
observed with preferred stock or debt.
ARs associated with announcements of convertible
securities are negative and larger in absolute value
than those for corresponding non-convertible
securities.
iv. ARs associated with sales of securities by industrials
are negative and larger in absolute value than those
for utilities.
(9). The lesser magnitudes of issue announcement effects for
both banks and utilities, vis a vis industrials, is attributed
to their relatively strong regulatory environments. The
mitigation of announcement effects for utilities is believed
attributable to the reduction of information asymmetry, and
greater predictability of issue announcement, facilitated by
the regulatory environment; eg Smith (1986).
Keeley (1989) notes negative announcement effects for bank
common stock issues which appear smaller than those found for
industrials but larger than those found for utilities;
generally he notes negative announcement effects for issues of
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common stock and securities with risk characteristics similar
to common stock such as mandatory convertible debt, although
he found a positive announcement effect associated with
perpetual preferred stock.
(10). Smith (1986 p7) hypothesises that the patterns of
abnormal returns reflect the predictability of the issue
announcement, ...
'Because stock price changes reflect only
the unanticipated component of the
announcement, the magnitude of the stock
price change at the announcement will vary
inversely with the degree of
predictability of the announcement if
other effects are held constant.'
He believes that, .
'In general a new debt issue is likely to
be more predictable than a new equity
issue because principal repayments are
more predictable than earnings.'
Also, in recognition of the significant differences between
the price reactions of industrials and utilities to new equity
sales he notes the latter's more extensive use of external
capital markets which, if associated with a greater
predictability of security issuance, should result in
utilities experiencing a smaller price reaction to
announcements of new security sales.
Smith also observes that while hypotheses about the
predictability of announcements help explain the observed
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differences in announcement returns of common stock versus
debt issues and utilities' versus industrials' offerings, they
do not appear to explain differences in announcement returns
between common and preferred stock or between convertible and
non-convertible issues.
Schadler (1987) tested the hypothesis that abnormal returns
are inversely related to the predictability of the security
issue type (common stock, convertible debt and straight debt)
within the context of the industrial sector, but found at best
weak evidence of a systematic relationship.
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CHAPTER 2
REVIEW OF THEORY
2.1	 INTRODUCTION
This chapter examines major theories, and their assumption
fields, relevant to empirical observation of common stock
abnormal returns coincident with the announcement of capital
issues. Major theories include the rational expectations (and
more specifically efficient market) hypothesis, capital
structure theory and signalling hypotheses.
2.1.1	 Capital Market Perfection
The seminal capital structure irrelevance theory of MM (1958)
is cast in terms of assumptions necessary for perfect capital
market conditions (1), while capital structure relevancy
hypotheses are based on relaxation of one or more of the
assumptions. Banking firm models of capital structure
generally involve an exploitable capital market imperfection
and, to varying degrees, the constraint of regulation which is
considered in Chapters 3 & 4.
Imperfections recognised in the area of capital structure
relevance theory include taxation and bankruptcy costs, as
well as agency costs. Also, the relaxation of the perfect
information assumption has generated hypotheses incorporating
information asymmetry and its arbitrage in both the capital
structure and rational expectations-efficient capital market
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theory areas.
In the capital structure area, information asymmetry, namely
management's superior information about investment prospects
and firm value, coupled with an appropriate arbitrage
incentive provides the rationale for signalling hypotheses.
These include hypotheses utilising capital issue decisions,
and choice of security type issued, as signals; eg Myers &
Majluf (1984), Myers (1984).
2.1.2	 Capital Market Efficiency
The notion of capital market efficiency may be housed in
conditions less restrictive than those required for a perfect
capital market (2). A comprehensive taxonomy of capital market
efficiency is provided by Tobin (1984) who discerns four
distinct meanings. Such efficiency may be defined in an
information-arbitrage sense in which it is impossible on
average to gain in trading on the basis of publicly available
information. Also the market may be efficient in a deeper
fundamental-valuation sense if an asset's price is determined
by rational expectations of its future payments entitlement;
these two meanings are particularly relevant to the idea of
capital market efficiency used in this dissertation.
The other meanings of efficiency relate to the completeness of
financial markets in terms of the provision of insurance
services in the Arrow-Debreu context and, fourthly, Tobin
identifies functional efficiency which concerns the service
provided by the finance industry to the economy as a whole
(3)-
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The Rational Expectations Hypothesis (REH):
The rational expectations hypothesis (REH) developed by Muth
(1961) asserts, in essence, that economic agents do not on
average make systematic errors in predicting an economic
variable, and that any forecast error should be uncorrelated
with information. The REH facilitated revolutionary insights
into the business cycle area following papers in the early
1970's, eg Lucas (1972) Sargent (1973). The REH, coupled with
an assumed information asymmetry concerning the distinction
between real and inflationary price changes, enabled the re-
assertion of classical equilibrium doctrine that markets
clear; Lucas & Sargent (1979).
The rational expectations hypothesis (REH) and the efficient
market hypothesis (EMH) are nominally distinct due to separate
developments, and literatures. Nevertheless during the 1970's
the latter was perceived to be a special case of the former
(4).
The REH, or "Muthian Rationality", marked a radical change
from previous treatment of expectations as being exogenous or
formed adaptively in dynamic models (5). Muth departed from
the conventional view that theories based on rational
behaviour were inadequate to explain observed behaviour; he
reasoned that existing economic models did not assume enough
rational behaviour. Muth's hypothesis, in essence, postulates
the equivalence of two distinct concepts; economic
individuals' subjective, psychological expectations of
economic variables are equivalent to the mathematical
conditional expectation of those variables (6).
Major implications of this hypothesis flow from the properties
attached to information conditional expectations of an
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economic random variable. More particularly, the conditional
expectation, which is effectively the forecast of a random
variable, is subject to a forecast error which possesses two
key properties, namely that the conditional expectation of the
forecast error is zero, and orthogonal (7).
Thus the REH acknowledges individual economic agents and their
separate subjective expectations which on the average, and in
terms of a given information set, adhere to the stochastic
behaviour of the system determining the variable under
consideration. In other words, on average, individuals do not
make systematic mistakes in forecasting the future; their
expectations of economic random variables are correct on
average.
Expectations will diverge from actual values only because of
some unquantifiable uncertainty in the system. If there were
no unquantifiable uncertainty, expectations of variables would
coincide with the actual values - there would be perfect
foresight.
The REH does not require individuals to have identical
expectations although the individuals' expectations should be
distributed around the true expected value of the variable to
be forecasted; the average of individual forecasts would be
the expected value of the true variable although individuals
could certainly differ in their beliefs.
By abandoning the idea of identical individuals, the REH may
be viewed from an arbitrage perspective, but it is not
synonymous with arbitrage. If economic profit may be gained
from gathering and analysing information to predict the
future, some individuals may be expected to follow this
strategy. Ordinarily in markets, not all individuals have to
respond to price signals in order maintain a vibrant price
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system, some individuals may be passive. If enough arbitrage
activity takes place, the market may behave as if it is
rational, even though many individuals are passive (8).
Criticisms, tests and (macroeconomic) applications of the REH
are considered in Annex 2.1A.
The Efficient Market Hypothesis (EMH):
Generally, the function of the capital market is to transfer
funds between borrowers (producers) and lenders (savers)
efficiently. The efficiency of the capital market may be
viewed in terms of allocational and operational efficiency
(9).
Putting efficiency in the context of the functional rationale
for the stock market, Koh (1989) notes, ...
" The primary function of a stock market
is to allocate ownership of the economy's
capital stock. If stock prices provide
accurate signals for resource allocation,
firms are able to make correct production-
investment decisions, and investors are
able to choose the most suitable stock for
investment. These choices are only
possible if the market is efficient, that
is, if stock prices fully reflect all
available information."
Efficiency in the EMH sense is explained in terms of
information, eg as typified by Lone et al (1985 p77),
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"An efficient market is one in which a
large number of buyers and sellers react
through a sensitive and efficient
mechanism to cause market prices to
reflect fully and virtually
instantaneously what is knowable about the
prospects for the companies whose
securities are being traded."
The basic hypothesis of market efficiency is that financial
markets use the true information conditional probability
distribution in the determination of prices. Also, as noted by
Tobin (1984), in a shallower sense the EMH jointly
incorporates a hypothesis about market behaviour, namely rapid
information arbitrage and requires the nomination of an
equilibrium pricing model for empirical testing. While market
efficiency can be regarded as implying rational expectations,
rational expectations does not imply market efficiency. Market
efficiency is a joint hypothesis about expectations and the
market behaviour of participants. Minford & Peel (1983 p122).
The EMH emerged as an explanatory response to an acceleration
in the accumulation of empirical evidence of a seemingly all
pervasive independence, or randomness, in sequential stock
market price movement (10). Subsequently the EMH came to be
recognised as a particular application of the REH.
The first rigorous specification of an efficient market is
generally attributed to Samuelson (1965) who proved that
random price movement is to be expected in ideal market
conditions. Samuelson's proof (see Annex 2.2A) is cast in
terms of the futures prices for commodities and rests on a
fundamental property of conditional expectations; essentially,
today's forecast already embodies the best guess as to what
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tomorrow's forecast will be, so expected profits cannot be
made on the change in price; Samuelson (1973) also derived the
martingale property of stock prices;(See Annex 2.2B).
As noted by Lone et al (1985 p63), . ..
'If a market has zero transaction costs,
if all available information is costless
to all interested parties, and if all
participants and potential participants in
the market have the same time horizons and
homogeneous expectations with regard to
prices, the market will assuredly be
efficient and, as Samuelson has proved,
prices in such a market will fluctuate
randomly.'
A model of informational efficiency, allowing less stringent
conditions than those of the ideal market and in a form
suitable for empirical testing was developed by Fama (1970,
1976) and is still adopted by most empirical researchers; Koh
(1989). Fama's empirical form perceives a three tiered
information set; the assertion of the hypothesis, that
security prices are freely flexible and reflect all available
information, is qualified in terms of a particular information
tier.
A fundamental criticism of the EMH is based on the fact that
its traditional empirical testing is a joint test with the
specified model of equilibrium returns. This problem is
compounded when the capital asset pricing model (CAPM) is
specified as the equilibrium returns model - such a test is
effectively a joint test of the validity of the CAPM, le a
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joint test of the mean-variance efficiency of the market
portfolio (see Roll 1977). Other criticisms stem from the
microeconomics of information as explored by Grossman &
Stiglitz (1976, 1980); Stiglitz (1984) notes that information
first achieved prominence in economic analysis in the late
1970's.
More recent major criticisms focus on the need for stochastic
system stability, stemming from volatility tests initiated by
Shiller (1981a), and evidence of mean-reversion, eg, Poterba &
Summers (1988). Overall, Samuelson (1989) is inclined to
accept the evidence of financial market efficiency at the
micro level but, acknowledging the evidence of Shiller et al,
doubts efficiency at the macro level. Samuelson (1989) also
draws two conclusions from the mean-reversion evidence.
Firstly, if the evidence is truly significant, modification to
certain dogmas of rational behaviour is required. Secondly,
such evidence provides
a basis for supporting conventional wisdom on long-run equity
investing - which Samuelson previously had been unable to
accept; see Annex 2.2C.
The formal derivation of the EMH and its major criticisms are
considered in detail in Annex 2.1.
2.1.3	 Capital Issue Announcements
Capital issue announcement abnormal returns suggest an anomaly
in terms of the efficient market hypothesis, and the
Modigliani & Miller (1958) capital structure irrelevance
hypothesis.
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The acknowledgement of taxation (corporate), bankruptcy and
financial distress costs suggest the existence, and therefore
relevance, of an optimal capital structure. But these so
called "static" hypotheses (Myers 1984) ignore the explicit
role of capital issues in terms of issue decision and security
type. The recognition of agency costs, a further source of
"relevance" hypotheses, does better acknowledge the role of
capital issues, in terms of relative costs of security type,
in the context of achieving optimal capital structure (eg
Jensen & Meckling 1976). The role of capital issues is more
formally and comprehensively recognised under the relaxation
of information symmetry and the suggestion that management
policy decisions regarding items such as capital structure
change may be a means of communicating, or signalling,
information to the market; more particularly these hypotheses
consider the choice of security type issued (eg Myers & Majluf
1984, Myers 1984).
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2.2	 CORPORATE CAPITAL STRUCTURE THEORY
2.2.1	 The Capital Structure Irrelevance Hypothesis:
A fundamental reference point in the theory of corporate
capital structure is the seminal work of Modigliani and Miller
(1958) who concluded, in their famous 'proposition I' that
under the conditions of a perfect market, capital structure is
irrelevant to firm value (11).
Previously advocated capital structure theories, eg Durand
(1952), generally envisage an optimal (minimum weighted
average cost of capital) debt-equity ratio. In comparison with
the MM model these demonstrate a return on equity which rises
(with increasing leverage) initially slower, then faster, than
the MM model. Brealey & Myers (1988 p393) suggest these
traditional views may be supported by two arguments. Firstly,
investors react not to 'moderate' but to 'excessive' debt and,
secondly, while MM'S proposition may be acceptable in perfect
markets - in the actual imperfect markets levered firms may
borrow at a cheaper rate than individual investors and thus
provide a valuable service which allows the shares to trade at
a premium to their theoretical value.
MM's (1958) study influenced profoundly subsequent capital
structure theory (12). As well as representing the first
formal research on the relevance of capital structure to firm
value, the model's rigorous perfect market conditions,
necessary for its result, have provided a benchmark from which
subsequent analysis has been able to examine the ordered
impact of market imperfections. These include the introduction
of taxation (both corporate and personal), costs of financial
distress and bankruptcy, agency costs, and information
asymmetry with associated signalling hypotheses.
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2.2.2	 The Capital Structure Relevance Hypotheses
a. Taxation
The tax shield hypothesis was initiated by Modigliani & Miller
(1963) who acknowledged corporate taxation and the
deductibility of (debt) interest payments; this results in a
tax shield asset which implies that firms have an incentive to
use debt for 100% of their financing structure. This extreme
conclusion is at variance with empirical observation, but may
be better accommodated by including factors which offset the
present value of the tax shield. Such offsetting factors have
been derived from a closer examination of the taxation system
to include personal taxation (Miller 1977), and consideration
of costs that arise as borrowing increases (eg financial
distress and bankruptcy).
Miller (1977) challenged the MM (1963) hypothesis, and
re-asserted the Mm (1958) claim of no optimal leverage for the
individual firm, with the use of more realistic assumptions,
viz the combined effect of corporate and personal taxes and
the variety of investor tax brackets. In his model these
factors influence the aggregate corporate sector leverage but
leave the individual firm value independent of its own
particular capital structure.
A middle ground view, between the extremes of MM (1963) and
Miller (1977), may be considered by relaxing the assumption
that the corporate tax shield on debt is constant (13).
DeAngelo & Masulis (1980) extend Miller's work by analysing
the effect of tax shields other than those based on interest
payments on debt (eg non-cash charges such as depreciation and
investment tax credits). Given that depreciation etc. serve as
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tax shield substitutes for interest expense, the DeAngelo &
Masulis model predicts that firms will select a level of debt
that is negatively related to the level of available tax
shield substitutes. DeAngelo & Masulis also demonstrate that
the use of more debt increases the probability of zero or
negative earnings, and thereby causes a decline in the
expected value of the interest tax shield. They also show that
if there are positive bankruptcy costs (see next section)
there will be an optimum tradeoff between the marginal
expected benefit of interest tax shields and the marginal
expected cost of bankruptcy.
b. Financial Distress and Bankruptcy Costs
Myers (1984) notes the bankruptcy and agency cost dimensions
of financial distress, .
'Costs of financial distress include the
legal and administrative costs of
bankruptcy, as well as the subtler agency,
moral hazard, monitoring and contracting
costs which can erode firm value even if
formal default is avoided."
Schadler (1987) notes that Baxter (1967) first formally
considered that the probability of bankruptcy and associated
costs may be an important variable in the capital structure
decision. If a firm increases its debt to a level considered
excessive by the market, stock prices will fall from the
increased probability of experiencing a state of nature where
bankruptcy occurs. Also, bankruptcy costs are incorporated in
the state-preference models of Kraus & Litzenberger (1973),
and the mean-variance framework of Kim (1978). Both models
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express the role of bankruptcy costs in the capital structure
decision.
While bankruptcy costs are acknowledged by a number of
theorists as an important variable in capital structure
determination, the question whether the magnitude of the costs
is large enough to drive an equilibrium condition remains
unresolved.
Bankruptcy costs are both direct and indirect. The former are
thought to be minor and the latter significant but difficult
to assess. Warner (1977b) considered direct costs of
bankruptcy (eg lawyers and accountants and other
professionals' fees, management time administering bankruptcy)
of railroad bankruptcies, and found them to be trivial. Also,
he noted they decreased (as a percentage of value) as a
function of the size of the bankrupt firm. Copeland & Weston
(1988) comment that Warner's evidence suggests that the direct
costs of bankruptcy may not be sufficiently large to be an
important determinant of optimal leverage.
Indirect costs, such as opportunity costs, are difficult to
calculate. Altman (1984) assesses average indirect bankruptcy
costs. Copeland & Weston (1988) comment that in the light of
Altman's evidence, total bankruptcy costs (both direct and
indirect) appear sufficiently large to give credibility to a
theory of optimal capital structure based on the trade-off
between gains from leverage induced tax shields and expected
bankruptcy costs.
The value of assets passing from through a bankruptcy, or
reorganisation, may diminish depending on the type of the
asset. As noted by Brealey & Myers (1988 p431) intangible
assets linked to health of the firm as a going concern (eg
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technology, human capital and brand image) may be severely
reduced in value. Long & Malitz (1985) provide empirical
evidence that confirms that firms holding largely intangible
assets borrow less.
Brealey & Myers (1988) point out that a firm which gets into
difficulty will not necessarily go bankrupt - it may be able
to postpone or avoid bankruptcy. In these circumstances
stockholders and bondholders who ordinarily are united in a
desire to see the firm recover, may nevertheless be in
conflict on individual interests (see Agency Costs). They
comment that, .
'In times of financial distress the
security holders are like many political
parties - united on generalities but
threatened by squabbling on any specific
issue.'
Writing from an agency cost perspective, Barnea et al (1985)
note that bankruptcy problems are identical to other agency
problems with respect to cost incidence. They comment that
under default, if the transfer of ownership from stockholders
to bondholders is costless, then the mere possibility of
bankruptcy should have no impact on the capital structure
decision. But given the impossibility of writing contracts
which unambiguously establish the rights of claim holders
under all contingencies, dispute may be fostered, and may be
resolved in the formal process of bankruptcy.
Also, Barnea et al stress the difference between the costs of
formal bankruptcy proceedings and the costs of liquidation.
Bankruptcy and liquidation are best considered distinct and
independent events; neither event is necessarily sufficient to
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trigger the other (14). They note that the expected value of
bankruptcy costs, if any, can be said to be borne by the
equityholders if debt is sold to rational investors.
c.	 Agency Costs
Debt was commonly used before the introduction of tax
subsidies on interest payments. This suggests that a theory of
optimal capital structure based on bankruptcy costs in the
presence of tax subsidies fails to capture what must be some
important determinants of the corporate capital structure. If
an optimal capital structure exists, it may be caused by other
factors; (Copeland & Weston p509).
A view of the firm as set of contracts among factors of
production, with each factor motivated by its self interest is
developed by Fama (1980b) who stresses the distinction between
ownership of capital and ownership of the firm (ie a
distinction between risk bearing and management). He notes
that each factor of production is owned by somebody and, ...
The firm is just the set of contracts
covering the way inputs are joined to
create outputs and the way receipts from
output are shared among inputs. In this
"nexus of contracts" perspective,
ownership of the firm is an irrelevant
concept. Dispelling the tenacious notion
that a firm is owned by its security
holders is important because it is a first
step towards understanding control over a
firm's decisions is not necessarily the
province of security holders. The second
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step is setting aside the equally
tenacious role in the firm usually
attributed to the entrepreneur.'
As noted by Barnea et al (1985) agency problems emerge in an
environment with frictions and market imperfections. While
such problems may be reduced by the efficient operation of
markets, and unresolved agency problems may be further reduced
by complex financial contracting (which aligns the diverse and
conflicting interests of parties), ultimately residual agency
problems manifest themselves in terms of reduction in the
value of financial securities. This gives rise to costs
countervailing against the benefits of external financing - a
trade-off leading to optimal corporate finance characterised
by a complex financial structure and maturity arrangements.
In general terms, the costs of an organisation include those
of maintaining contracts between its key contributors. Such
costs are referred to generically as the 'agency costs' of the
organisation and include costs of structuring, monitoring and
bonding a set of contracts between contributors with
conflicting interests. Also they include 'residual loss' - the
value of output lost because the costs of full enforcement of
contracts exceed the benefits. A fundamental assumption of
this approach is that all contributors to the organisation
behave rationally, and as if they expect other contributors to
behave rationally; Strong & Walker (1987 p194).
Studies of agency problems and their associated costs appear
to have developed in a piecemeal manner; nevertheless Barnea
et al (1985) provide a comprehensive, structured taxonomy, see
Annex 2.4.
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Barnea et al note that the delegation of authority may give
rise to conflicts between agents and principals, and that
problems emerge when conflicts of interest between agents and
principals, or among the principals themselves, affect the
operation of the business enterprise. They distinguish between
an economic theory of agency (ETA) and a financial theory of
agency (FTA). The ETA focuses on the relationship between a
single principal (who provides capital and consequently holds
a claim on end-of-period claim firm value) and an agent (the
manager whose efforts are needed to produce the value). The
FTA focuses on relationships between different groups of
securityholders in the context of the optimal financing of the
firm.
External Equity:
Jensen & Heckling (1976) demonstrate what they term, the
'agency costs of outside equity' by considering a firm owned
by a single individual, the owner-manager (0-M), who will
enjoy subsidised perk (eg executive jet, holidays) consumption
if a portion of equity is sold to external investors; the
greater the proportion of external shareholders the greater
the subsidy. Consequently a conflict of interest arises which
will generate agency costs. Monitoring costs will be incurred
by new shareholders to ensure the original 0-M acts in their
interests (15). Watts & Zimmerman (1979) note that agency
costs of external equity may be reduced if management and
shareholders agree to an independent audit.
Debt:
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Strong & Walker (1987 p199) comment that literature on the
agency cost of debt focuses on relaxation of the perfect
market assumption of given, independent investment policies.
This fosters conflicts of interest between shareholders and
debt holders if the firm is unable to precommit itself to a
value-maximising investment policy at the time of debt issue.
Shareholders may be able to increase their own wealth by
either increasing the risk profile of the firm's asset
structure, Galai & Masulis (1976) use the option pricing model
to demonstrate the bondholder wealth expropriation hypothesis,
or rejecting projects with a positive net present value if the
benefit from accepting the project accrues to the bondholders
without also increasing shareholder wealth, Myers (1977),
Brealey & Myers (1988 p429). To guard against this behaviour
bondholders may insist on various types of protective
covenants and monitoring devices to protect their wealth from
shareholder raids on it. The costs of writing and enforcing
such covenants may be significant and debt holders must charge
higher ex ante yields to compensate for possible
expropriations by shareholders. Moreover, these costs may
increase with the percentage of finance supplied by
bondholders.
Jensen and Meckling (1976) indicate an optimum capital
structure based on agency costs alone. Given that agency costs
increase with higher proportions of debt, and similarly with
higher proportions of equity, they suggest there is an optimum
combination of outside debt and equity that will minimise
total agency costs. Copeland and Weston (1988, p 511) point
out that if the agency costs of external equity are low, as
may be expected in a widely held firm, then the optimal
capital structure can result from a trade off between the tax
shelter benefit of debt and its agency cost.
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Other Factors:
Agency costs may also be associated with factors other than
the acquisition of debt and equity capital. Titman (1984)
suggests agency costs are important for contracts, both
implied or explicit, between a firm and its customers and its
employees.
Contractual mitigation of Costs:
Contractual methodology, such as secured or collateralised
debt and leasing, may mitigate agency costs (16).
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2.3 ASYMMETRIC INFORMATION AND SIGNALLING HYPOTHESES
The relaxation of the MM (1958) assumption of symmetric
information may, as demonstrated by Akerlof (1970), cause the
market to break down if potential (lemon) buyers cannot verify
the quality of the product they are offered. Consequently
asymmetric information, and certain other, conditions provide
the basis for hypotheses which directly accommodate
management's financial policy decisions (eg capital issue
behaviour)
to signal information to the market; eg Ross (1977), Myers &
Majluf (1984), Myers (1984) (17). Nevertheless, by introducing
optimally constructed management contracts, Dybvig & Zender
(1988) have reasserted the Modigliani Miller irrelevance
propositions.
Ross (1977) considers 'financial incentive signalling' in
which a manager's employment contract causes him to convey
information about the firm's prospects through capital
structure choice. Ross assumes management knows more about the
firm's future returns than do investors, but the schedule of
incentives and remuneration for management is known to all
participants. Management's choice of capital structure is a
means of signalling their inside information to outsiders.
Ross's signalling equilibrium concept is of an equilibrium
function relating the inferred market value of the firm to
management's choice of capital structure from which the market
inference is drawn.
Leland & Pyle (1977) focus on the entrepreneur seeking
additional equity financing for a single venture, and who is
better informed about the expected value of a project than
outside potential investors. The fraction of equity the
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entrepreneur retains in the project is the means by which he,
or she, can signal project quality to potential investors. The
greater the personal stake the entrepreneur is willing to take
in the venture, the more investors are willing to pay for
their share of it.
Miller & Rock (1985) consider dividend policy under asymmetric
information. If investment and external financing are held
fixed, the cash dividend reveals the firm's operating cash
flow: a larger-than-expected dividend reveals larger-than-
expected cash flow and the stock price increases and
similarly, a lower-than-expected dividend is bad news for
investors. Consequently, by extension, the Miller & Rock model
predicts that announcements of new security issues will, on
average, depress the stock price (as does Myers & Majluf,
1984) but does not specifically consider security type choice,
nor their differential effect on stock prices (as does Myers &
Majluf).
During the 1980's hypotheses emerged which directly
accommodate management's capital issue and security selection
behaviour; eg Myers & Majluf (1984) and Myers (1984). In a
model combining financing and investment decisions, Myers &
Majluf (1984) assume management is advantaged in asymmetric
information about the value of the firm, and its shares, ie
about the value of assets in place and potential new
investment opportunities. Also, it is assumed that management
acts in the interest of existing shareholders who are passive;
ie will not rebalance their portfolios in response to what
they learn from firms actions (18).
Faced with an investment opportunity, management weighs up the
value which may be given up to new shareholder if shares are
undervalued, against the net present value (NPV) of the
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investment. Consequently management may not issue shares even
if it means passing up good investment opportunities. Aware of
their firm value information disadvantage, investors will
reason that a decision not to issue shares represents 'good'
news while a decision to issue is 'bad' news, or at least less
good.
But the decision not to issue, and not to invest, misallocates
real capital investment, and reduces the value of the firm.
Myers & Majluf reason that management would try to rearrange
its capital structure to avoid being caught in this 'financing
trap', and this explains some financing choices.
The model concludes that, under asymmetric information, if
stock is issued to finance investment, the stock price will
fall; but this is in the interests of old shareholders. If the
firm issues safe (default-risk-free) debt to finance
investment, stock prices will not fall. Also, it is generally
better to issue safe securities than risky ones; if possible
firms should raise equity from retained earnings, but if
recourse to external capital is necessary the bond markets
should be used in preference to the equity market (19).
Myers (1984) expounds a descriptive 'Pecking Order' hypothesis
which acknowledges Myers & Majluf (1984) which gives similar
predictions. The hypothesis contends that firms prefer
internal to external finance, and, if external finance is
sought, prefer debt to equity (20). He allows that his model
is 'too extreme' and in need of refinement before capturing
actual behaviour; nevertheless, he argues that it shows how
models based on asymmetric information can predict these two
central ideas of the pecking order hypothesis. Baskin (1989)
notes that the accumulated evidence in favour of the pecking
order hypothesis is substantial.
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Myers outlines a pecking order 'story' which makes four
points; almost verbatim, it says;
1). firms prefer internal finance;
2). they adapt target dividend ratios to investment
opportunities while trying to avoid sudden changes in
dividends;
3). sticky dividend policies, plus unpredictable fluctuations
in profitability and investment opportunities, mean that
internally generated cash flow is sometimes more than capital
expenditure and sometimes less. If more, the firm pays off
debt or invests in marketable securities; if less, the firm
first draws down its cash balance and sells its marketable
securities;
4). if external finance is required, the firm issues safest
securities first; ie. start with debt, then possibly hybrids
then equity as a last resort. Consequently, there is no well
defined target debt/equity ratio because there are two types
of equity, internal and external, one at the top of the
pecking order and one at the bottom. Each firm's observed debt
ratio reflects its cumulative requirement for external
finance.
Myers acknowledges the potential for an explanation via issue
costs; ie internal finance avoids issue costs and, that if
external finance were needed, debt avoids the still higher
issue costs of equity; but he reasons that ..
'issue costs in themselves do not seem
large enough to override the costs and
benefits of leverage emphasised in the
static trade-off story'.
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In terms of the cost of external finance, Myers notes that
while traditionally considered in terms of administrative and
issuing costs (and underpricing for new issues), the
introduction of asymmetric information allows the possibility
that the firm may incur the cost of deciding not to issue and
pass up a positive NPV investment opportunity; this latter
cost may be avoided if the firm can retain enough internally
generated cash to cover positive NPV opportunities.
Concerning the advantage of debt over equity issues, Myers
argues that the way to reduce the amount by which a security
issue is over or under valued is to issue the safest possible
securities; ie those whose value changes least when
managements inside information is revealed to the public.
Myers says the decision rule seems to be, issue debt when
investors undervalue the firm, and equity or some other risky
security when they overvalue it.
Nevertheless, investors know the firm will issue equity only
when it is overpriced, and debt otherwise. Consequently, the
investor would refuse to buy equity unless the firm had
already exhausted its 'debt capacity' - ie had issued so much
debt already that it would face substantial additional costs
in issuing more. Under these circumstances, investors would
effectively force the firm to follow a pecking order.
Dybvig & Zender (1988) assume an optimal managerial contract
(in substitution for the sub-optimal contract commonly assumed
by asymmetric models), and thereby demonstrate that the MM
irrelevancy proposition still holds in many reasonable models
with incomplete information. Dybvig & Zender note that in
moral hazard situations (such as the shareholder-manager
relationship with asymmetric information) the incentive
contract is of primary importance; but many models focus on
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the moral hazard and ignore the matter of the optimality of
the contract.
Dybvig & Zender focus their criticism on Myers & Majluf as a
chief representative of the asymmetric information, sub-
optimal contracting model genre. Dybvig & Zender note that the
rejection of profitable projects is the inefficiency in the
Myers & Majluf model; ie the manager refrains from making new
investment because of his (or her) incentive to protect
original investors from an underpricing loss on the issue of
new shares.
Although Myers & Majluf consider a choice of managerial
contracts, and select one in which the manager cares about the
degree of dilution and not just about the profitability of
investments (see Footnote 18), they do not consider an optimal
managers' incentive contract as do Dybvig & Zender (21).
Dybvig & Zender demonstrate the separation of incentives and
financing, ie 'the "real" set of feasible contracts to the
manager does not depend on financing'. Also, they show that
evidence of stock price reaction to debt and equity issues is
consistent with their model; they illustrate by example that
in very good states, the existing project generates sufficient
funds for any new project, and therefore the requirement for
new financing is bad news. They comment that, .
1 ... even if empirical evidence agrees
more or less with Myers & Majluf, this is
not convincing proof that their story is
correct; the same empirical evidence is
consistent with optimal investment in a
world consistent with the Modigliani &
Miller irrelevancy propositions.'
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Dybvig & Zender also challenge the value to investors of
signalled "superior" information from the firm, and thus the
motivation of many of the signalling models (22).
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2.4	 CAPITAL ISSUE ANNOUNCEMENT EFFECTS
2.4.1	 Introduction
As noted in Chapter 1, the focus of empirical capital related
event studies in the industrial and utility firm sectors has
shifted from the transaction to its announcement and, in the
past decade, from "pure" leverage change announcements to
seasoned capital issue announcements. In another dimension
too, the initial emphasis on semi-strong market efficiency
evidence yielded to interest in capital structure change (with
i pure l leverage) and more recently signalling hypotheses; major
studies from these genres are detailed in Annex 2.4.
In overall terms, studies of non-financial firm seasoned
capital issue announcement effects show common stock abnormal
returns (ARs) which are on average negative and in absolute
magnitude terms are best explained in terms of the security
type issued, and the status (industrial or utility) of the
issuing firm. These patterns are noted by Smith (1986); see
Chapter 1 (Footnote 8) and in tabular form in Annex 2.4D.
Attempts to explain the negative abnormal return in terms of
transaction costs have shown them to be significant yet
inadequate. Kolodny & Suhler (1985) calculate that transaction
costs account for around 23% of the negative return; Asquith &
Mullins (1986a) calculate that the negative price reaction on
issue announcement represents around 31% of the planned issue
proceeds for industrials (12% for utilities) which appears too
large to be explained by transaction costs.
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2.4.2	 Capital Structure Hypotheses
The general non-positivism of the AR results confounds the
prediction of both the capital structure irrelevance and
relevance hypotheses. Maximising behaviour by firms suggests
that in voluntary transactions such as capital issues, the
firm should structure the transaction to yield the highest
possible value for the firm. Thus a movement along a leverage-
value function should result in no AR associated with the
issue announcement (irrelevance hypothesis), or non-negative
ARs (relevance hypothesis).
This challenge to the validity of the capital structure
hypotheses may be mitigated if the issue announcement is
coincident with a shift in the leverage-value function.
Smith (1986) notes the theoretic difficulty of distinguishing
between a movement along, and a shift in, a given leverage-
value function, and consequently the difficulty of testing the
hypotheses. Smith concludes that studies of financing
decisions provide relatively weak tests of optimal capital
structure theories.
2.4.3	 Information Based Hypotheses
The role of non-positivism appears to be much better
accommodated within the context of the information based
hypotheses.
Firstly, non-zero abnormal returns on security issue
announcements represent an anomaly in terms of information
efficiency; ie semi-strong market efficiency as formulated by
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Fama (1976).
If information asymmetry exists between management and
investors then negativity may be explained in terms of
management's relative advantage in specific valuation
information, Myers & Majluf (1984) and Miller & Rock (1985),
and capital issues signal bad news.
Non-zero abnormal returns may also be viewed in terms of a
more general asymmetry, the inability of investors to
anticipate management's issue announcement, although this in
itself says nothing about the pervasive negativity.
2.4.4	 Relativity According to Security Type Issued
Relativity of abnormal return, based on issue type, is
accommodated to some extent by Myers and Majluf (1984) in
terms of equity and (default-risk-free) debt. Miller & Rock
(1985) do not distinguish between security issue type. The
relative degree of investor anticipation provides a further
explanation.
Signalling Hypotheses:
Smith (1986) comments that the Myers & Majluf (1984)
hypothesis, provides a potential explanation for the
relativity of abnormal return based on security type issued.
While the evidence across equity and debt securities is
consistent with this information asymmetry hypothesis, some
data within the debt class is apparently inconsistent. Both
Eckbo (1986) and Mikkelson & Partch (1986) disaggregate their
bond data by rating class, but do not find higher rated, less
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risky (and less sensitive) bonds to be associated with smaller
ARs. Moreover, Eckbo also finds more negative ARs to mortgage
bonds than non-mortgage bonds. Stultz & Johnson (1985) argue
that secured debt should be less sensitive to firm value than
non-secured debt.
Degree of Predictability:
In the information asymmetry sense, as abnormal returns
reflect only the unanticipated component of the announcement,
the magnitude of the stock price change at the announcement
will vary inversely with the announcement's predictability.
Smith (1986) suggests that debt issues are relatively more
predictable than equity issues, and that utility issues are
more predictable than industrial issues.
Concerning the relative predictability of issue type Smith
(1986) argues that, in terms of maintaining a target capital
structure and unchanged cash flow, the more predictable the
debt principal repayments the more predictable are the debt
issues.
Similarly, earning predictability, and thus internally
generated equity, determines the predictability of new equity
issues. And given that in general, principal repayments are
more predictable than earnings, a new debt issue is more
predictable than a new equity issue.
Smith also supports the predictability of debt issues on the
basis of relative cost structures of public versus private
debt issues. The larger fixed component and more pronounced
economies of scale of publicly issued debt, versus bank debt
causes a firm to use the bank credit until an efficient public
Issue size is reached, whereupon the bank debt is retired and
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the public debt issued. Investors' observation of bank
borrowing and the pattern of public debt issuance should
facilitate an enhanced predictability, and a smaller price
reaction to debt issue announcements. Marsh (1982) provides
evidence on the use of short term debt to predict public debt
issues.
2.4.5	 Relativity According to Organisation Type
Signalling Hypotheses:
Management of utilities generally petition their respective
regulatory authorities for permission for new security sales.
Smith (1986) notes this petitioning process could reduce the
price reaction of utilities announcements relative to
industrials for any of three reasons; it may reduce the
information asymmetry between managers and outsiders, it could
limit managers' discretion as to what security to sell, and it
could reduce managers' ability to time security offerings to
take advantage of any differential information.
Degree of Predictability:
In terms of the significant difference between the price
reactions of industrials and utilities to new equity sales,
Smith explains this in terms of a relatively higher frequency
of use by utilities of the external capital markets which is
associated with a greater predictability of security issuance,
and consequently a relatively smaller stock price reaction to
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announcements of new security issues.
Smith's hypotheses about the relative predictability of
security issue type provides an explanation for the observed
differences in announcement returns of common stock versus
debt issues, but
not for those between other issues, such as common and
preferred, or convertible and non-convertible.
2.4.6	 Other Hypotheses
Security issues may involve important changes in ownership,
and or control in the firm, which may be reflected in the
observed price reaction to their announcement. In surveying a
number of papers, Smith (1986) notes that evidence suggest
that organisational restructuring on average benefits
stockholders. Also, announcements of transactions that
Increase ownership concentration raise share prices, while
those that reduce concentration lower share prices.
In respect of organisational restructuring, Schipper & Smith
(1986) note that in contrast to the negative abnormal returns
for common stock sales, a company selling stock in a
previously wholly owned subsidiary, an 'equity carve-out',
experiences significant positive returns around the
announcement. Such 'carve-outs' are normally associated with
the adoption of management incentive compensation plans based
on the subsidiary's stock. Smith (1986) notes that the result
is also consistent
with the information asymmetry hypothesis; if management
believes the subsidiary is undervalued, by segregating the
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subsidiary's cash flow and selling separate equity claims, the
firm can capture that gain.
Concerning ownership structure changes, Masulis & Korwar
(1986) consider a number of equity sales in which firm
management organises the primary issue to be accompanied by a
registered secondary issue; this results in a negative AR
higher (-4.5%) than that recorded for average industrial
equity offerings (-3.1%).
2.4.7	 Summary of Industrial-Utility Evidence
In overall terms, non-zero abnormal returns on security issue
announcements represent an anomaly in terms of both capital
structure theory and the Fama (1976) formulation of semi-
strong market efficiency.
Individual studies tend to endorse informational signalling
and agency cost hypotheses while the explanatory power of tax
benefits, wealth transfers and bankruptcy costs appears
diminished by mixed, contradictory evidence.
The negativity of the abnormal returns is accommodated by
hypotheses of information asymmetry between management and
investors. Evidence of relativity of abnormal return based on
issue security type supports Myers and Majluf (1984) in terms
of equity and debt; but relativity based on intra-debt
relative riskiness lacks empirical support. Smith (1986)
argues for equity and debt relativity on the basis of issue
• predictability but this does not consider other observed
differences, such as that between common and preferred stock
or convertible and non-convertible.
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2.5	 SUMMARY
In perfect market conditions, Modigliani & Miller (1958)
hypothesised the irrelevance of capital structure to the cost
of capital.
Capital market efficiency, which may hold in conditions less
than perfect, has been defined in terms of the coupled
hypotheses of investors' rational expectations and rapid
arbitrage. Evidence of market efficiency in terms of historic
and public information sets generally has been confirmed in
developed stock markets such as the UK and US. Nevertheless
criticisms, particularly of the methodology (namely of the
CAPM equilibrium pricing model) and contrary evidence
(particularly from volatility tests) have tended to diminish
the quality of the market efficiency hypothesis and evidence.
The weight of evidence appears to support the market's micro
efficiency, but not as yet macro efficiency.
The introductions of specific imperfections including
taxation, bankruptcy costs, and agency costs into the MM
framework has allowed hypotheses of minimum capital cost and
thereby capital structure relevance.
The introduction of the imperfection of information asymmetry,
coupled with a managerial incentive to signal this information
through financing policy has been hypothesised to result in
negative market reaction to announcements of external
financing issues, particularly of equity; Myers & Majluf
(1984). Nevertheless, by introducing optimal managerial
incentive contracts, Dybvig & Zender (1988) have reasserted
the modigliani & Miller (1958) capital structure irrelevancy
proposition even with asymmetric information.
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As noted by Weston (1989),..
'Departures from the MM propositions are
driven by imperfections, not by errors in
the logical structure of their model. Some
models depart from MM because of different
assumptions. These models can be
reconstructed to be consistent with MM and
with the data. Future progress will come
from relating the competing models to
cumulating empirical evidence.'
FOOTNOTES
(1).	 More precisely, the MM theory has been cast in terms of
a perfect and complete capital market. Copeland & Weston (1988
p331) succintly define perfect capital market conditions,
under which both product and securities markets will be both
allocationally and operationally efficient, as, ...
'a. Markets are frictionless, ie there are no
transaction costs or taxes, all assets are perfectly
divisible and marketable, and there are no
constraining regulations.
b. There is perfect competition in product and
securities markets. In product markets this means
that all producers supply goods and services at
minimum average cost, and in securities markets it
means all participants are price takers.
c. Markets are informationally efficient; ie,
information is costless, and is received
simultaneously by all individuals.
d. All individuals are rational expected utility
maximisers.'
(2)	 Capital market efficiency is a necessary, but in itself
insufficient, condition for a perfect capital market, and may
coexist with imperfections such as frictions (eg transaction
costs and taxes) and imperfections in the product market (eg
monopoly competition): Minford & Peel (1983 p120), Copeland &
Weston (1988 p331).
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( 3 ) .	The problem of an inadequate risk-shifting market are
considered by Arrow (1963); see Annex 2.3B. The formulation of
a complete financial market, in which economic agents may
insure themselves in all future contingencies (ie full
insurance efficiency), draws upon state-preference theory, and
the concept of a pure security first specified by Arrow
(1964) and Debreu (1959) - and sometimes called an Arrow-
Debreu security. The complete market allows the creation of a
complete set of pure securities from which any security may be
formed; pure securities and complete markets are defined in
Annex 2.3C.
The fourth specification of capital market efficiency
identified by Tobin (1984), functional efficiency, relates to
the economic functions of the financial industries. Tobin
notes that such industries do not provide services directly
useful to producers or consumers (although some individuals
enjoy gambling and prefer the security market to casinos).
Resources allocated to financial services are usually
justified on other grounds including, for instance, the
pooling of risks and their allocation to those most able and
willing to bear them (a generalised insurance function in the
Arrow-Debreu sense). Tobin also identifies other grounds such
as the facilitation of transactions by providing mechanisms
and networks of payments, and the mobilisation of savings for
investment in physical and human capital - and the allocation
of savings to their more socially productive uses. (See
Footnote 9 for the distinction between operational and
allocational efficiency).
(4).	 Begg (1982, p207) notes that in the late 1960's and
early 1970's macroeconomists were irrational in modelling
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expectations by failing to take account of all available
information (namely the development of the EMH - a special
application of the REH) on how this task may be approached.
( 5 ) .	 Previously, expectations had been accommodated as
exogenous in the short run in the 'General Theory' of Keynes
(1936) and the later development of the adaptive expectations
hypothesis, Cagan (1956) and Nerlove (1958), postulated that
individuals use information on past forecasting errors to
revise current expectations.
But, while adaptive expectations allows the modelling of
unobservable expectations purely in terms of past observations
on the relevant variable x, without the need to specify the
process by which the initial level of expectations is
determined, there are criticisms from a RE perspective. More
particularly,
adaptive expectations considers only past values about the
variable about which the expectations, are to be formed and
ignores the effect of other variables. Also, mechanistic
backward looking extrapolative rules allow the possibility of
systematic forecasting errors for many periods in succession.
The sub-optimal use of available information is hard to
reconcile with the idea of optimisation which is the
foundation of most microeconomic analysis: Begg (1982 p26).
(6). Muth (1961) in using the certainty equivalence
proposition assumed for simplicity that rational economic
agents need only focus on the mean, or expected value, of
future variables.
The more general statement of the REH, namely the equivalence
of the subjective probability distributions of economic actors
to the objective probability distributions in the system, has
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been illustrated in later work; eg Lucas (1978a) shows a model
in which people's entire subjective probability distribution
would coincide with the true objective probability
distribution governing the system.
(7).	 The formulation of conditional expectations and
properties of the forecast error are noted, eg, by Sheffrin
(1983 p7).
Generally, an economic actor makes probability assessments
based on the information available at the time; conditional
expectation may be defined in terms of the conditional
probability density for a random variable Xt , given the
information available at time t-1.
Conditional Expectation =E[xtli-t_j= IC:xt-r[xtlit_]ax,
The conditional expectation of a random variable is just the
expected value of the variable formed by using the conditional
density.
Conditional expectations may be viewed as forecasts of random
variables, in order to understand major properties. The
forecast error, associated with any forecast is defined as
forecast error =
	
-
	 E[Yt\
and has two important properties; namely that the conditional
expectation of the forecast error is (a) zero, and (b)
uncorrelated with any information available to the economic
actors (orthogonality). More particularly, these properties
follow from noting that
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(a). At time t-1, the conditional expectation (or the
forecast) is known so that its conditional expectation is just
the forecast itself. Thus the conditional expectation of the
forecast error is
= E [x t 1 i t  - E[)C\ I i:1 1 = 0
(b). The orthogonality property; forecast errors should also
be uncorrelated with any information that is available to
economic actors. Otherwise it would be possible to improve
the forecast by incorporating this correlation into the
forecast. In other words, any subsequent forecast errors
should be inherently unpredictable and hence unrelated to any
information available at the time the forecast is formulated
E [E t • 1.6 _, i I,1 = 0
Muth's rational expectations hypothesis equates, in essence,
two distinct concepts; the subjective, psychological
expectations of economic variables are postulated to be the
mathematical conditional expectation of those variables.
E
Symbolically, withd( t as the subjective , psychological
expectation for a variable Xt, Muth's hypothesis asserts that
subjective expectations = conditional expectations
t-11
In other words, there is a connection between the beliefs of
the individual economic actors and the actual stochastic
behaviour of the system.
X = *diE
t-i	 t
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(8).	 Sheffrin (1983 p10) notes that when arbitrage is
relatively costless (as in financial markets) the REH may be
especially applicable (although the REH is not synonymous with
arbitrage and may prevail even when arbitrage activities are
costly). Also, he notes that survey evidence measuring
average, rather than marginal, beliefs or behaviour may
provide a misleading perspective on the applicability of the
REH.
(9).	 Copeland & Weston (1988, p331), Minford & Peel (1983,
p119) distinguish between allocational and operational
efficiency. Allocational efficiency obtains when prices equate
the marginal rates of return (adjusted for risk) for all
borrowers and lenders with scarce savings optimally allocated
to productive investments in a way that benefits everyone.
Operational efficiency concerns the cost of transferring
funds.
The distinction of informational efficiency, the extent to
which prices reflect information, from the direct welfare
orientation of allocative, or Pareto, efficiency of market
regimes is noted by Strong & Walker (1987 p121) who comment
that, . . .
"..at the current stage of theoretical research
into these concepts, the precise relationship
between the two is not clear".
(10).	 The early development of the EMH is noted by Lone et
al (1985). The roots of the market price 'random walk'
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doctrine are often traced back to the Frenchman L. Bachelier
(1900) who studied commodity prices and concluded they
followed a 'random walk' (though not using that term) and that
commodity speculation in France was a 'fair-game'. The term
'random walk' was coined in an exchange of correspondence in
"Nature" magazine in 1905. Subsequently, isolated papers from
Working (1934) Cowles & Jones (1937) and Kendall (1953)
characterised a long gestation period before the papers of
Roberts (1959), who observed the similar patterns of random
number generation and stock market price changes, and Osborne
(1959), who noted the similarity of stock price movements to
"Brownian motion", appeared to herald the notable development
of full academic interest; eg Moore (1962), Fama (1965) and
Granger & Morgenstern (1963).
(11). Barnea et al (1985) noting the intuition behind the MM
theorem, comment that arbitrage opportunities exist when the
law of one price is violated - an arbitrageur purchases an
item in one market and immediately sells it in another market
for a higher price. Given the assumed perfect market
conditions, two firms which are identical in terms of the
assets they hold should conform to the law of one price, and
sell at the same price despite differences in the liabilities
issued to finance the assets; the "moral" of this arbitrage
argument is that capital structure per se has no inherent
advantages or disadvantages in altering the real aspects of
the firm.
MM's proposition II, follows directly as a corollary; viz the
required rate of return on equity increases linearly with
financial leverage (and maintains the existing price per
share). In other words in the MM world, the price per share
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and the value of the firm are unaffected by altering financial
leverage.
By introducing the state-preference framework, it has been
shown that sufficient conditions for the MM independence
thesis are complete and perfect capital markets; eg
Hirshleifer (1966), Robichek & Myers (1966).
Kraus & Litzenberger (1973) summarise this point, noting that
individuals may create primitive securities in complete
markets; ie if the number of distinct complex securities (eg
common stocks and bonds) issued by firms equals the number of
states of nature; see Annex 2.3C. They comment, . . .
'Since in a perfect market the firm is a
price taker, the market price of these
primitive securities are unaffected by the
firm's financing mix. Therefore, given the
firm's capital budgeting decisions which
determine the firm's returns in each
state, the firm's market value is
independent of its capital structure.'
also,
' ... the proof of the MM independence
thesis in a state-preference framework
does not depend upon the assumption that
the firm will earn its debt obligation
with certainty. The firm may not earn the
"promised" return on its bonds in some
states of the world and would be bankrupt.
In these states the firm's bonds are
claims on the residual value of the firm.
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Although the firm's financing mix
determines the states in which the firm is
insolvent, the value of the firm is not
affected since bankruptcy penalties do not
exist in a perfect market.'
(12). Recent criticisms include Gordon (1989) who comments
that,..
'It seems to me that there is something
fundamentally wrong with a theory that
reduces our great financial and non-
financial corporations to legal fictions
at best, and at worst to barriers for the
realization of perfect capital markets...
for a theory of corporate finance to
explain and advance practice and guide
public policy it must go beyond reducing
these great institutions to legal
fictions.'
More accommodatingly, Weston (1989) notes that,..
'MM ushered in the modern theory of
finance. Their irrelevance propositions
have stimulated a stream of important
theoretical and empirical literature. As a
come
result we have4to understand better the
forces that influence financing decisions
and the methods of returning cash to
suppliers of funds 	  Departures from
the Mm propositions are driven by
imperfections, not by errors in the
logical structure of their model. Some
models depart from MM because of different
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assumptions. These models can be
reconstructed to be consistent with MM and
with the data.'
(13).	 Brealey & Myers (1988 p418-419) comment that the
difference between MM (1963) and Miller (1977) centres on
additional taxes paid by debt versus equity holders.
'MM implicitly assume that personal taxes
are the same on debt and equity ... (and)
... the corporate tax shield always
exceeds the extra taxes paid by the
marginal lender, and companies should
borrow to the hilt ... (while) ... Miller
assumes that investors are subject to
different tax rates. Therefore, as the
total amount of corporate debt increases,
investors with higher tax rates must be
bribed to hold debt. ... The equilibrium
amount of debt in Miller's model is
reached when the corporate tax benefit to
the borrower equals the personal tax cost
to the marginal lender. As long as
companies pay the same rate of tax it is
immaterial which firms supply this debt.'
Brealey & Myers note that for a compromise theory to work, it
seems necessary to reconsider the assumption that the
corporate tax shield on debt is a constant (34%) regardless of
the amount borrowed. (ie how else can the additional tax paid
by lenders ever reach 34 cents per dollar when the marginal
tax rate for the wealthiest investor is 28%). See also Myers
(1984).
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In practice, the possibility of a loss (and the inability to
carry it back against past taxes) involves the carrying
forward of the tax shield with the hope of using it later; but
the firm loses the time value of money. Thus, ...
'If there is a chance that firms will make
a loss, the expected corporate tax shield
is less than 34%. The more firms borrow,
the higher the probability of loss and
therefore the lower the expected tax
shield.'
(14).	 Barnea et al (1985 p37) note that bankruptcy costs
include a legal process which may consume a portion of the
remaining assets, and potential disruptions to the normal
activities of the firm which may cause a deterioration in long
standing customer and supplier relationships.
In contrast, the firm liquidates only if the market value of
the firm as a going concern falls below its dismantled value
under liquidation. It is inappropriate, they add, to attribute
the costs associated with the distress sale of assets to the
event of bankruptcy, because while the proportion of debt in
the capital structure affects the probability of bankruptcy,
it does not affect the probability of liquidation. Liquidation
is a mere capital budgeting decision; there is no necessary
link between the decision to liquidate and the ability to pay
off debt claims. A firm on the brink of bankruptcy should be
liquidated only if the value of its assets as a going concern,
net of reorganisation costs, is below the dismantled value
under liquidation. On the same basis, a nonbankrupt firm that
fits this same test must be liquidated.
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(15). Strong & Walker (1987 p195) note that the perk subsidy
will lead to excessive expenditure on perks by the O-M. But,
under the rationality assumption, the losses from excessive
perk consumption is anticipated at the time of external share
issue by the external investors and discounted from the amount
they are willing to pay. This implies the firm's decline in
value from excessive perk consumption will be borne by the O-
M. In this case the gross agency cost is the difference
between the value of the firm if the O-M could costlessly pre-
commit to an agreed level of perk expenditure and the value
without precommitment. The net agency cost is the gross agency
cost less the O-M's willingness to pay for the extra perk
consumption with an external shareholding and the O-M, who
bears this cost, will act to minimize them as necessary.
(16). A number of studies are noted by Copeland and Weston
(1988). Scott (1976) shows that the optimal leverage may be
related to the collateral value of the tangible assets held by
the firm. In bankruptcy, the bondholders' loss is limited by
the salvage value of the firms assets. The bondholders'
monitoring costs may be reduced by simply requiring the loan
be tied to the salvage value of specific assets. Leasing
represents a further avenue for reducing monitoring costs;
leased assets are fully secured as they remain the property of
the lessor and can be repossessed in the event of default;
Copeland & Weston (1988 p511). Stulz and Johnson (1985)
demonstrate that secured debt may increase firm value as it
makes it more advantageous for shareholders to undertake
positive NPV projects. Copeland & Weston (1988 p512) comment
that this suggests secured debt will generally be preferred to
unsecured debt, a result consistent with Myers & Majluf (1984)
- see next section. Stultz & Johnson also note secured debt
decreases monitoring costs, ie collateral can't be paid out as
dividends nor exchanged for another (riskier) asset, and
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secured creditors are less likely to require restrictive
covenants.
(17). From the agency perspective, Barnea et al (1985 p38)
comment that the resolution of asymmetry through signalling
represents a unique agency problem which, unlike others,
cannot be resolved costlessly through arbitrage in the
financial markets; and ...
'Consequently, this problem may be more
significant than the others in terms of
inducing yield differentials between
securities and optimal capital structure'.
(18). Myers & Majluf note three possibilities for
management's behaviour under asymmetric information none of
which can be theoretically justified over the other two, but
each one of which yields substantially different empirical
predictions. In lieu of a supporting theory of managerial
behaviour, they use the assumptions' positive empirical
implications as criteria for assumption selection. The
assumption selected explains why, on average, stock prices
fall on the announcement of a new issue, and debt issues have
less price impact than stock issues.
The other assumptions considered include; (a) management acts
in the interests of all shareholders, and ignores any conflict
of interest between old and new shareholders, and (b)
management acts in the old shareholders' interests, but
assumes they rationally rebalance their portfolios as they
learn from the firm's actions.
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(19). Krasker (1986) models the relationship between the stock
price and the issue size by modifying the assumption that the
firm has a single all-or-nothing investment opportunity whose
cash requirements are fixed and known by all investors in the
Myers & Majluf model. Krasker allows the firm to choose not
merely whether to issue stock, but also how much stock to
issue.
His model shows that the stock price following the
announcement of a stock issue should be inversely related to
the issue size. Also, Krasker finds the rate of decrease in
the stock price as the issue size increases can be so rapid
that the product of the two (ie the total proceeds of the
issue) is bounded; and ...
'Under these conditions - called 'equity
rationing' - there is an upper limit to
the amount of money that the firm can
raise by stock issue, irrespective of how
many shares management issues. Intuiting
suggests that equity rationing is most
likely to occur when the firm's investment
prospects are poor, but paradoxically the
opposite is true.'
(20). Myers acknowledges the hypothesis has earlier roots. He
notes that Donaldson (1961) observed, in a sample of large
firms, that management favoured internal funds to external
funds and that when funds in excess of internal generation
were unavoidably needed, dividend cuts were generally
unthinkable to most management except as a defensive measure
in a period of extreme financial distress; and if external
finance were needed, managers rarely thought of issuing stock.
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Financing according to a pecking order schedule was previously
assumed to run contrary to shareholder interests, but this is
challenged by current asymmetric information hypotheses. Myers
notes that in the 1960's, a firm's reliance on internal
finance was generally viewed by 'managerial capitalism'
writers as an outcome of the separation of ownership and
control; managers avoided external finance as it subjected
them to the discipline of the capital market, Berle (1954),
Berle & Means (1932). Also, Myers comments that Donaldson
(1969), who was not concerned primarily about managerial
capitalism, observed that the financing decisions of the firms
he studied were not directed toward maximising shareholder
wealth, and that explanations of financing decisions would
have to start by recognising the 'managerial view' of
corporate finance.
(21). The Dybvig & Zender model is initiated by the
entrepreneur choosing a managerial compensation scheme and
resultant optimal decision rule, and rational equilibrium
price functions, to maximise the proceeds from the initial
public offering.
A possible interpretation of the contract is that the manager
is paid a constant plus a term proportional to the portfolio
of the initial stock plus a pro rata purchase and
participation in new issues. Consequently, they note
'if the price is out of line, the effect
of mispricing on existing shares is
completely offset by the effect of
mispricing on the pro rata purchase of new
shares. For example, if the manager knows
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that the profitability of assets in place
is very large, the prospective capital
loss on the existing shares (the dilution
effect) is exactly offset by the windfall
gain on the implicit purchase of new
shares. The net effect is to make the
manager indifferent about the price at
which the share issue is made, which leads
to optimal investment. The share price is
correct on average, but does not fully
reflect the manager's information in each
state of nature.'
(22). Dybvig & Zender believe it reasonable to view signalled
information as entirely firm-specific idiosyncratic
information.
Also, they note that Ross (1985) has shown the timing of
release of idiosyncratic information is a matter of
indifference to investors in the firm as information is
diversifiable. They comment, ...
'Rational investors will therefore not pay
more for a firm with earlier information
release, and therefore entrepreneurs have
an incentive to set up a firm in a way
that maximises productive efficiency,
without regard to the information
release.'
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CHAPTER 3
BANK CAPITAL DEFINITION: HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENTS
3.1
	
INTRODUCTION
The definition of bank capital is a complex problem. In large
part this is due to its intrinsically dynamic and plural
nature; le reflecting an active and reactive evolution through
social and economic change, and significance to groups of
individuals each with a distinct viewpoint. The nomination of
a particular group viewpoint (1) is necessary in specifying a
definition of bank capital and its adequacy; in the regulatory
context, the notion of bank capital's adequacy suggests a
functional capacity matched against a functional requirement.
This chapter critically examines the historical development of
bank capital regulatory constraints and their influence on
factors including bank market structure and risk. In one
sense, this represents a component of the general "free"
banking argument. The exercise is essentially descriptive, in
part due to the fragmentary, largely qualitative, nature of
historical evidence; and the difficulty of isolating the
influence of bank capital regulation from other facets of the
regulatory regime. Also, consideration of bank risk focuses on
its elemental forms, such as bank failure; the refined view of
a structure of bank risks is considered in Chapter 4.
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In another sense Chapters 3 and 4 also analyse, at least
implicitly, four other inter-related dimensions of bank
capital definition. One examines capital "matter",
acknowledging factors such as the composition, structure and
measurement of bank capital. A second, national approach, is
being mitigated by moves to international convergence of
capital definition and measurement. A third dimension concerns
the theme of long term financial innovation; this is manifest
in the primary development of bank capital's characteristics
under the aegis of equity capital and the secondary spread,
particularly in recent decades, of capital characteristics to
non-equity instruments, the so-called "hybrid" instruments.
Finally, the dimension of time recognises the dynamics
underlying definition development and plots its evolutionary
path.
Preliminary to the historical analysis, general facets of bank
capital definition are considered in Section 2, and Section 3
places bank capital prudential regulation in overall context.
Section 4 examines the evolution of the absolute bank equity
capital regulatory constraint. Section 5 analyses the
evolution of bank capital in terms of balance sheet structure,
and its long established formal regulation in the USA.
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3.2	 GENERAL DEFINITIONS OF "BANK" AND "CAPITAL"
While the term "bank capital" enjoys wide currency its
definition requires particular qualification, even in the
general linguistic sense. Separate consideration of the terms
"bank" and "capital" emphasises the potential definition
diversity and the lack of any absolute, universal definition.
The classification of a corporation as a bank is essentially a
statutory or bureaucratic judgmental process and represents an
important instrument of regulatory control of finance markets
and participating institutions. Generally, the choice and
specification of discriminator variables are designed to imbue
the title "bank" with a positive or substantive connotation
denied "lesser" finance sector corporations. The carrying of
the title "bank" is significant yet inherently arbitrary (2).
Also the qualities associated with the term "bank" accentuate
the free rider problem in banking (3).
It is possible to distinguish at least three distinct genres
of corporate capital. In the context of the overall balance
sheet the term "capital" may be used to represent,
a). A sub-set of assets defined by fixed and long term
maturity, and more specifically termed "real" or "physical"
capital (4).
b). At the short end of the balance sheet and within a set
maturity limit, an excess of assets over liabilities is termed
"working capital" (5).
C). A sub-set of the liability side. Among the more narrow
uses in this context is "equity (or owners') capital"; wider
uses include other liability side items possessing one or more
79
characteristics in common with, or similar to, those of
equity; eg permanent or long term maturity (6). At the
extreme, the total mix of liabilities, that is equity and
debt, is referred to as capital by economists examining the
financing structure (eg Modigliani & Miller 1958). This third
genre, the liability side approach, is specified in this
dissertation.
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3.3	 BANK CAPITAL PRUDENTIAL REGULATION IN CONTEXT
3.3.1	 General Regulation
Regulation and the Free Market:
The desirability of regulation is commonly considered in the
context of the argument for a free market. As noted by
Schotter (1990), the free market argument (as distinct from
the moral and political elements of the 'conservative
argument') possesses a number of intellectual roots and has
been justified by Hayek (1948) who views the market as the
most efficient mechanism capable of processing the huge
amounts of disparate information necessary to coordinate the
plans of individual economic agents. Nevertheless, the very
individual rationality which allows the market to work may
destroy the optimality of its results due to information
asymmetry, externalities, and the free rider problem (7).
Regulation may be justified in terms of a remedial activity to
reduce costs associated with some market failure; nevertheless
criticisms may arise (8). Gardener (1986) observes that
fundamental questions requiring analysis include, is
regulation necessary (does the market resource allocation
achieve maximum social welfare) and, if so, there stands the
operational question of determining the best method of
regulation.
Government regulation policy is often aimed at correcting
'market failures' such as natural monopoly, incomplete
information and restricted market entry. The policies comprise
rules which restrict or direct action by the market
participants. In practice regulation and the market process
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interact and often cannot be disassociated and assessed
independently.
Theories of Regulation:
It may be argued that the perfect market regulates; firms that
are inefficient may ultimately fail. Otherwise, in an economic
context, regulation appears to lack a universal, or widely
accepted definition. Extant definitions tend to be varied and
purpose specific, depending on the context of the analysis.
Regulation has diverse forms, most obvious is the intervention
of the government, or some authoritative body, employing a
legislative framework. Also, cartels and agreements may serve
as a form of self-regulation. Regulation may be categorised in
terms of the power of the regulator as well as the degree of
formality employed (9).
(Cee Annei. 3 i)
Stigler (1971)provides a theory of regulation based on trade
between industry and government; this involves analysis of
contrasts between the processes of the market and politics.
Stigler acknowledges two major alternative views of industry
regulation. The one sees regulation as being instituted
primarily for the protection and benefit of the public or some
subclass (eg the cost of petroleum quotas are the cost of
defense, a social goal), while the other considers the
political process as an imponderable which defies rational
explanation, . . .
'a constantly and unpredictably shifting
mixture of forces of the most diverse
nature, comprehending acts of great moral
virtue (the emancipation of slaves) and of
the most vulgar venality (the congressman
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feathering his own nest)'.
Stigler observes that the central task of the theory of
economic regulation is the explanation of ...
'who will receive the benefits or burdens
of regulation, what form regulation will
take, and the effects of regulation upon
the allocation of resources'.
His theory is advanced by assuming political systems are both
devised and employed rationally (ie appropriate instruments
for the fulfillment of desires of members of society - but not
necessarily a concept of the public interest).
Stigler notes that regulation may be either sought by an
industry or thrust upon it although, as a rule, it is acquired
by the industry and designed and operated primarily for its
benefit; regulations with an onerous net effect on an industry
are the exception but may be explained similarly.
In posing the question 'why does an industry solicit the
coercive powers of the state rather than its cash?', Stigler
notes that an industry may seek to increase its profitability
through various avenues facilitated by the power of the state,
but subject to certain characteristics of the political
process.
In considering the costs of obtaining the legislation, Stigler
notes that the nature of the political process in a democracy
must be examined to explain why many industries are able to
employ political machinery to their own ends. Like the market
process, the political process involves information costs
(10). The industry seeking regulation pays with resources and
votes. Stigler also notes that the financing of industry-wide
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activities such as the pursuit of legislation raises the usual
problem of the free-rider.
Nevertheless, as noted by Gardener (1986 p31),
'Many contemporary theories of regulation
are specific to particular countries and
systems. Because regulation is
fundamentally a politically induced
process, the ability to generalise any
theory of regulation across country
boundaries is often inappropriate and
misleading. Values, institutions and
political and social cultures differ
greatly between countries. Even within a
single country and for similar reasons,
generalizing a theory to different stages
of its development may be just as
difficult.'
Kane (1977) argues that the introduction of political power
into economic affairs 'initiates a dialectical process of
adjustments and counteradjustments'. He sees a market process
of 'reflex action' to rechannel regulatory power, as
regulatees
'short-circuit regulator intentions both
by finding and exploiting loopholes and by
the simple expedient of disobeying the
law. Avoidance and evasion absorb
resources (especially lawyers and
administrators) from other uses, raising
the costs of performing the previously
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unregulated activities. All this
frustrates the coalition sponsoring the
regulation and puts pressure on
bureaucrats and legislators to seek new
administrative remedies. The dialectical
conflict can resolve itself in numerous
ways, but seldom before the nation
experiences a wasteful cycle of
political/economic reaction.'
Environmental Development:
Regulation has developed, observes Gardener (1986 p25), 'as a
significant growth industry' over the past couple of decades.
He notes that this has been accompanied by a growing feeling
that there is too much government regulation, particularly in
view of mainly USA evidence that many regulatory schemes fail
the cost benefit test, and may exacerbate rather than solve a
problem.
Gardener also notes that prior to 1960, government regulation
generally was believed somehow costless but this has yielded
to a view that all types of regulation have some effect on
costs. These costs include, the provision of data and
information to regulators, and the maintenance of internal
information systems by those regulated to ensure that
regulations are being met. Also, potential costs include,
reduced competition, the wastes of non-price competition, and
some regulation may have hidden costs like reducing the
flexibility and reactive capabilities of the regulated
institutions to change and opportunities. Other regulation
problems include a possible effect on management style; eg
managements may become more orientated towards satisfying the
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regulators than meeting their proper business demands and
objectives. Institutions subject to regulation may innovate to
avoid the burdens imposed by regulations.
86
3.3.2	 The Definition of Free Banking
Debate about market freedom has emerged in recent years
in the context of the banking industry. In a general sense
freedom is taken to mean the absence of market constraint of a
regulatory nature. Nevertheless, in terms of historical
argument, the debate is clouded by an element of confusion
centred on the definition of free banking. There appear to be
two main points of confusion.
Historical Precedent - Degree of Constraint:
A major point of confusion centres on the degree of
regulation, or more specifically its absence, necessary to
define free-banking. The definition of free-banking eras in
both the US and Scotland appears controversial.
In the US context "free-banking" is commonly used to refer the
state banking period between the lapse.of the charter of the
Second Bank of the United States and the initiation of the
National Banking System; ie the 1837-1863 period. Nevertheless
the application of the title "free-banking" has been described
as a misnomer (11).
Scotland provides a relatively pristine example. As noted by
White (1984 p23), Scotland experienced free-banking during the
18th and early 19th centuries, during which it had
'... no monetary policy, no central bank,
and virtually no political regulation of
the banking industry.'
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More recently, White (1991) has acknowledged criticisms of the
traditional view that the pre 1844 Scottish system warranted
the label "free banking" (12); he concludes (p59) that, . . .
'At least from 1810 to 1844, then, the
traditional free-banking model is valid
for understanding the Scottish banking
system. Correspondingly, the Scottish
experience provides useful - and
favourable - evidence on the performance
of a competitive banking system without a
central bank.'
Central Banking Function Argument:
Goodhart (1985) distinguishes between the macro (monetary) and
micro (or prudential regulation housing capital regulation)
constraints imposed by central banks. He notes the free
banking argument is recurrent, at least in the context of
criticism of the macro function. Goodhart observes that the
debate arose in the previous century and, that form of the
debate, has re-emerged in terms of rules versus discretionary
monetary management (13). Goodhart assesses that historical
studies of free banking experiences generally suggest that it
was 'not so bad after all', at least in the context of a
monetary system without a central bank. See Annex 3.2.
Nevertheless, because discretionary monetary management
appears to assume the existence of a central bank this debate
has become confused with that concerning the need for a
central bank for the micro management (ie regulation and
supervision) function.
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Bank Capital Regulation:
A further problem emerges in the identification of the
influence of a particular regulatory constraint, capital
regulation for the purposes of this dissertation, from that of
other constraints. In a broad sense this requires distinction
between macro and micro regulation (as noted by Goodhart
above) and, at a more refined level distinction between the
micro regulations (ie the identification of capital regulation
effects vis a vis, say, those of deposit insurance).
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3.3.3	 Bank Regulation Rationale and Structure
The relatively heavy regulation of the banking industry,
noted by Dale (1984a, p53), occurs due to factors such as the
role of bank deposits as money (controlled via monetary
regulation) and the central role of banks in the payment
mechanism, and the politically sensitive allocation of
financial resources within the economy. Also, as major
repositories of public savings, banks attract consumer
protection regulation.
Prudential regulation may be characterised as a fairly
uncommon type, found in areas where the cost of system failure
is high both in social and political terms; eg the nuclear
industry. The prudential regulation of banks seeks financial
system stability, a macro objective, through micro policy
aimed at the individual banks. More particularly, prudential
regulation of banks is justified fundamentally in terms of the
market mechanisms inability to recognise or accommodate the
cost of bank system failure, the seeds of which are carried in
individual bank failure; ie contagion risk.
As noted by Grady & Weale (1986 p35)...
'It has gradually been recognised that,
while competition and the operation of a
free market generally may be desirable
objectives, banking is somehow or other
different.... It is believed that the
social costs of failure outweigh any
advantages that untrammelled competition
might bring,'
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Bank prudential regulation, while legitimised in terms of the
solvency of the banking sector, focuses on the containment of
insolvency risk for the individual bank. The rationale for
prudential regulation integrates to some extent with that for
both monetary and consumer protection. The potential for
multiple bank failure carries with it the spectre of an abrupt
contraction of the money supply, and severe dislocation of the
real economy, as evidenced in the 1930's depression. Also, the
risk of loss of depositor confidence is a key factor in the
bank insolvency process. See, eg Dale (1984a p53-55), Revell
(1975), Gilbert & Wood (1986).
An argument supporting the role of the central bank in its
micro function is provided by Goodhart (1985). He contends
that the problem of information asymmetry and the consequent
free rider problem, provides a rationale for the existence of
an institution such as a central bank providing micro (or
prudential regulation). He observes that history demonstrates
that such an institution tends to emerge "naturally".
Nevertheless, the desirability of such an institution is
qualified by necessary constitutional/behavioural qualities
(14).
More recently, Goodhart (1991) reasserts the need for a
central bank. He notes that the standard argument for a
central bank is open to criticism; ie the banks' asset
portfolios simply could be restricted to control their
vulnerability. Goodhart (1991) supports central bank existence
from another tack - based on the inevitable need to support
"true" banking institutions holding risky asset portfolios
incapable of being objectively valued in conditions of
asymmetric and limited information (15).
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The assumption that bank regulation is primarily justified in
terms of enhanced financial stability is challenged by Benston
(1991). He notes that bank regulation predates concern for
financial stability by 'hundreds of years'; and observes that,
in the US context, 'regulation has tended to exacerbate rather
than promote stability'. Benston argues that the fundamental
reason for bank regulation is government taxation of
seigniorage; this was traditionally achieved through
restriction on entry into banking, but is now controlled
through non-interest-bearing reserves (16).
Dale (1984a) categorises prudential regulation in two broad
areas, preventive regulation and protective regulation.
Capital regulation is included in the former as well as other
elements including anti-competitive, liquidity, interest rate
risk, loan limits, permissible business activities, and bank
examinations; the latter comprises deposit insurance and
lender of last resort support. See Annex 3.3.
A further distinction may be drawn between regulation and
supervision; the former entails the imposition of rules and
restrictions while the latter concerns the monitoring of the
banking and financial system to ensure that the rules are
complied with; eg Mullineaux (1987)
Dale (1984a p56; see Annex 3.3) notes three inter-related
rationales for preventive regulation; ie based on the
connection between market discipline, regulation, and moral
hazard. More particularly regulation may be viewed as, ...
1). a surrogate for market forces; ie 'compensating for the
lack of information available to depositors by seeking to lay
down the kind of conditions that depositors would themselves
wish to make were they in a position to do so',
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ii). to counter the moral hazard problem; le to rule out the
additional risk-taking that may be encouraged by the
protective regulation (ie liquidity and other support)
extended to banks and depositors.
iii). 'to take account of the social costs of bank failure by
placing a ceiling on risk-taking lower than that which would
prevail in a free market environment where depositors are
fully informed about, and therefor able to control, the levels
of risk incurred.'
Problem of Policy Conflict:
Problems of conflict between prudential regulation and other
regulatory areas may emerge in the application of policy (see
next section for intra prudential regulation conflict). This
is well evidenced in terms of conflict with monetary
regulation. Operational conflict arises when pursuit of the
one regulatory objective is being emphasised more than the
other; for instance, prudentially controlled lending standards
may be criticised as too conservative, or too loose, depending
on whether the monetary policy being pursued is respectively
expansive or restrictive. Conversely, when prudential
regulation is of the moment, monetary regulation may be
criticised. A strong example of this type of conflict was
provided during and after the Great Depression when both areas
of regulation were of the moment and conservative lending
standards conflicted with expansionary fiscal and monetary
objectives (Federal Reserve Bulletin July 1984 p550).
Another dimension of this problem arises in the argument
whether responsibility for monetary and prudential regulation
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should be housed in a single authority. The advantages of
housing both responsibilities in the central bank has been
supported by Volcker (1984) (17), although this view may lack
neutrality given his position as Chairman of the Federal
Reserve Board which houses both functions. The unanswered
question appears to be, does the joint housing in a single
authority of both the micro and macro function require
modification to the conditions called for by the above
Goodhart (1985) critique (18)? Also, how should commercial,
and political, independence be defined?
Regulatory Bodies:
In the UK the Bank of England is the sole bank regulator. The
USA bank regulation process is complex and based on a dual
structure which divides regulatory responsibility between
federal and state authorities, and bears three co-existing
federal agencies.
The USA federal agencies comprise, the Office of the
Comptroller of the Currency (OCC), the Federal Reserve Board
(FRB), and the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC).
The primary (or chartering) regulatory agency establishes
capital requirements for the banks it regulates. In terms of
supervisory authority, the OCC supervises banks with national
charters, the FRB and the states supervise state chartered
Federal Reserve member banks, and the FDIC and the states
supervise state chartered, insured, non-member banks, and
finally the states alone supervise state chartered, non-
member, uninsured banks. Also, the Federal Reserve is a
primary regulatory authority over bank holding companies. The
emergence of these bodies is noted in Section 3.4.
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3.3.4	 Prudential Regulation of Bank Capital
Definition of Adequate Capital:
Prudential regulation of bank capital is concerned with the
maintenance of a level of "adequate" capital. Maisel (1981
p20) defines capital as "adequate" when, ...
1 ... it reduces the chances of future
insolvency of an institution to some
predetermined minimum level or,
alternatively, when the premium paid by a
bank to an insurer is "fair"; that is,
when it fully covers the risks borne by
the insurer.'
Confusingly, in a linguistic sense, the term "Capital
Adequacy" has evolved to describe the functions involved in
the prudential regulation, including supervision, of bank
capital; eg the regulatory definition, measurement,
assessment, monitoring and control of bank capital. Often,
particularly in the US context, "Capital Adequacy" is used
implicitly to refer to capital ratios in a regulatory context,
as in the USA. Dale (1984a, p57) notes that, ...
'Capital adequacy, which is usually
assessed in terms of the ratio of capital
to assets, is the most important measure
of a bank's soundness".
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Rationale for Capital Regulation:
The inter-related rationales for bank preventive regulation,
noted above by Dale (Section 3.3.3) are emphasised in Maisel's
(1981) definition of adequate capital.
Dale (1984a p57) identifies a number of reasons why regulators
cannot safely allow the level of bank capital to be determined
by the market alone. Primarily, the market fails to account
for the social cost of bank failure in an unregulated
environment. Other reasons stem from the imposition of
protective regulation (i.e depositor insurance, lender of last
resort) which removes market discipline and drives down
capital ratios. Protective regulation generally induces both
depositors and investors forgo their own independent risk
analysis and rely on regulatory protection. Dale notes that
banks also may feel protected if their capital ratios are
uniformly low on the basis that the regulators would be
obliged to support the whole system.
The socially optimum level of capital is modeled by Santomero
& Watson (1977). The model presents two off-setting elements;
viz the costs associated with bank failures that result from
the industry being insufficiently capitalised, and the costs
that enforced over-capitalisation impose on both the bank and
society as a whole.
Deposit protection, commonly provided in many countries on a
flat rate basis, represents a substitute for capital; ie banks
are able to lower their capital ratios without depositors
requiring an additional risk premium (19).
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The efficacy of capital regulation in terms of actually
influencing capital levels and, in view of its
interrelationship with other form of regulation, influencing
particular bank risks is considered in Chapter 4.
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3.4 THE EVOLUTION OF ABSOLUTE BANK EQUITY CAPITAL REGULATION
3.4.1	 Introduction
This section (3.4) considers the UK in terms of England and
Wales, and Scotland in its separate free-banking period to
1844; the US analysis involves both state and national/federal
legislation. The direct regulatory constraint of absolute bank
equity, or ownership, capital in the early centuries of modern
USA and UK banking development appears to have been used as a
fundamental control of bank size, risk and market structure.
Less direct, yet nonetheless significant, constraints upon
equity capital (via growth and profitability limitations)
include certain geographic and activity (namely note-issuing
in early banking) regulations; these are acknowledged but not
emphasised in the analysis.
It seems reasonable to view capital in the origins of UK and
US banking as being in the form of simple proprietorship
capital. In the UK context, early banking practice was based
on the provision of safekeeping facilities for specie and
other financial assets by respected merchants (20). The
confidence of the depositor was based upon the merchant's
wealth, or capital, and character. In the early colonial
period of the US, domestic banking was chiefly characterised
by merchant credit for a widely dispersed, generally sparse
population with a barter trade; the first commercial banks
were chartered in the 1780's (21).
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3.4.2	 United Kingdom
Early formal bank capital regulation was a matter for direct
government legislation. The role of the Bank of England as
formal prudential regulator of bank capital is recent, and
considered in Chapter 4.
a.	 Scottish Development
The Bank of Scotland was chartered in Edinburgh by an act of
Scottish Parliament in 1695, one year after the creation of
the Bank of England, and towards the end of a period of
political transition identified by the joining of the crowns
of Scotland and England in 1603 and the union of the
parliaments in 1707.
The bank was founded as a purely commercial venture and,
despite an official sounding name, was unique among European
banks of the period in being not a state institution: the
government neither did business with it (the Act creating the
bank prohibited it from lending to the government) nor
regulated it. The bank possessed a legal persona and enjoyed
limited liability. It was the first joint-stock bank in
Scotland and its charter provided it with a legal monopoly on
public (but not private) banking for 21 years. The bank made
no effort to renew its monopoly rights when they expired 21
years later in 1716 'Apparently thinking one bank was the most
the country could accommodate', White (1984 p24-25); also
Gaskin (1965 p 14), Checkland (1975 p23-25).
Unlike England, where the Bank of England's joint-stock
monopoly continued for over a century, Gaskin (1965) notes
that in post 1716 Scotland, ..
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... there was no legal barrier to the
•setting up of other joint stock companies
for carrying on the trade of banking. In
addition, under Scots law there was, even
at that time, a generally available form
of legal incorporation in the contract of
"copartnery". Thus although over much of
the eighteenth century Scotland banking
was a small-scale, local affair, as in
England, two other powerful joint-stock
banks were established, the Royal Bank of
Scotland in 1727 and the British Linen
Bank in 1746, and their presence prevented
the reproduction of the English pattern of
one large bank dominating all the others.'
Noteworthily, these three chartered public banks were granted
limited liability, but all those which followed were not.
Immediate rivalry between the Royal Bank of Scotland, also
chartered in Edinburgh, and the Bank of Scotland led to
'duelling', based on acquisition and presentation of large
number of the rivals notes for exchange into coin. White notes
that this period of intense competition between the two banks
led to a number of innovations (22). During the 1730's and
40's a number of non-issuing private bank houses appeared in
Edinburgh. White (1984 p27) notes that these were small
partnerships dealing primarily in bills of exchange and
commercial loans, many holding cash credit accounts at the
chartered banks. Other entrants included the Banking Company
of Aberdeen (a short lived joint-stock venture formed in 1747
but retired in 1753 after note reflux pressure). Also the
British Linen Company (renamed the British Linen Bank, noted
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above) ultimately enjoyed the world's first success with
branch banking (initially agents appointed in various cities
to discount bills and circulate the bank's notes). Later
entrants included further small private bankers in the late
1750's, and several provincial banking companies in the early
1760's.
Legislation in 1765 prohibited in Scotland the issue of notes
bearing the option clause, and notes of denomination smaller
than one pound (23); also, all notes were to be redeemable
into gold. White (1984 p30) comments that this raised a
barrier to entry against small-scale banks of issue in
Scotland, but the right of note issue remained universal.
Entry into Scottish banking continued during the 1760's. White
(1984) observes that the number of Scottish banks, both
issuing and non-issuing, rose from 5 in 1740 to 14 in 1750, 23
in 1760, 32 in 1769; the Ayr Bank crash in 1772 brought down 8
small private bankers in Edinburgh and the Scottish banks
numbered 20 in 1773.
Gaskin (1965) notes the early consolidation of the Scottish
banking system in the first half of the nineteenth century
arose from a new group of joint-stock banks emerging to join
the three ancient institutions and, 'to supplant the remnants
of private banking, and to establish branch systems.' More
particularly the 1810-1830 period is noted as 'the zenith of
the Scotch banking system' by Checkland (1975). The 1810
formation of the Commercial Bank of Scotland, followed by the
National Bank of Scotland in 1825 represented a new scale of
joint stock bank characterised by a new quantum of
capitalisation and stockholder numbers, and able to challenge
the two public banks (or three after the British Linen Bank
succeeded in obtaining a new charter in 1813); also 1810
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marked the beginnings of a savings bank movement. Checkland
(1975 p283).
By 1810, Scottish banking was divided among three Edinburgh
based chartered ("public") banks with branches in a few large
towns; 9 private (non-issuing) bankers - 8 in Edinburgh and
one in Glasgow - and 22 provincial banking companies; White
(1984 p33).
Nevertheless Checkland (1975 p283) notes that 'Though a number
of the provincial banking companies were joint stock concerns
rather than small-scale partnerships, none had been large
enough to challenge the two public banks. Most were governed
by terminable agreements, often ending after 21 years.' Also
functional differences existed between the banks (24).
The entry of the Commercial Bank of Scotland in 1810 founded
on more liberal principles (25) and the joint stock of over
650 shareholders, spelled the end of the small private bankers
and ushered in an era of extensive branch banking; White (1984
p33) observes that the Commercial Bank made a public
announcement that no private banker would sit on its board
and, by 1819 it had opened 14 branches compared with 17 for
the British Linen Bank, 14 for the Bank of Scotland, and the
Royal Bank's single branch office in Glasgow. Growth in the
following decades, to the eve of 1845 saw 19 banks of issue in
Scotland with 363 branches.
White (1984 p34) observes that in its "heyday" the Scottish
banking system was cited as an example by free banking
advocates elsewhere; the system had evolved a number of
features, ...
'There were many competing banks; most of
them were well capitalised by a large
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number of shareholders; none was
disproportionately large; all but a few
were extensively branched. Each bank
issued noted for .4:1 and above; most banks'
notes passed easily throughout the greater
part of the country. All the banks of
issue participated in an effective note-
exchange system. All Offered a narrow
spread between deposit and discount (loan)
rates of interest.'
White (1984 p36) deriving figures from Checkland (1975) notes
that 109 distinct bank firms had entered the system and by
1845 20 banks remained, 19 of them banks of issue (nine of the
19 had entered since 1830). Of the others, 36 had failed or
been wound-up, 12 disappeared for reasons unrecorded, 11
retired voluntarily or ended without apparent failure, and 30
merged with other banks.
Freedom of entry in to the Scottish banking system was
terminated by the Act of 1844 and the subsequent Scottish Bank
Act of 1845 which allowed Scottish banks a degree of advantage
over English note issuing banks (26); nevertheless, since 1845
the number of Scottish banks declined steadily, largely
through merger. Effectively the Acts provided for the eventual
extinction of the right of note issue, except by the Bank of
England, in England and Wales; while in Scotland (and Ireland)
an indefinite continuance of the bank's own note issues was
allowed but no new note-issuing bank was allowed to be formed.
Gaskin (1965) notes that
1 ... this distinctive treatment was born
partly of deference to the national
sentiments of these countries but mainly
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in recognition of the firmness with which
the Scots in particular were attached to
the use of small-value notes. In the
1840's powerful political forces could be
fielded in Scotland against any attempt to
abolish the one pound notes while almost
equally strong prejudices against them
existed in England. Peel met this by
dividing the currency realm and in so
doing incidentally provided a legal
reinforcement of the separate identity of
Scottish banking. Before 1900, at a time
when Scottish banks were among the giants
of the British banking world and could
easily have spread southwards, the
separate note issues effectively kept them
within Scotland since they exposed them to
political attack from the less favourably
treated English banks.'
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b. Development in England and Wales
It is convenient to consider the development of UK (namely
England and wales) absolute bank equity capital regulation as
punctuated by two major legislative impacts, namely the right
to joint-stock capital bank formation and the adoption of
limited liability, thus broadly defining three periods.
Private Bank Capital:
Until the Banking Act of 1826, which breached the Bank of
England's 132 year old joint stock bank monopoly status in
England and Wales, other banks were constrained in capital by
limitation on the number of capital contributors; ie private
capital of sole proprietorship or (limited number of member)
partnerships. Consequently this period was characterised by
the development of the Bank of England's size and influence in
contrast to the rest of the banking sector - a set of
necessarily small banks of limited development potential.
The Bank of England was formed in 1694 by an Act of
Parliament. Effectively this represented a deal in which
London merchants and financiers provided the Crown with a loan
and the Bank was granted a monopoly as the first and only
joint stock bank in England and Wales. This monopoly right was
extended and reinforced; Kindleberger (1984 p75) notes that,
'As the end of each (charter) period
approached, it was necessary to renew the
charter, usually at the price of lending
the government more money on a permanent
basis and at an interest rate below the
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market, although a new charter also gave
the opportunity for adding to the Bank's
powers and prerogatives.'
This status was reinforced by the Bank Charter Act of 1708
which set the number of partners in any other bank at a
maximum of 6 persons (27). Also, the Bank Act of 1742 more
clearly expressed the privilege of the Bank's exclusive joint
stock status (28).
While the London goldsmith-bankers (who numbered 44 in 1677)
were not directly affected by the creation of the monopoly,
the note issue circulation of London private bankers was
driven out by the notes of the Bank; nevertheless the loss of
this source of revenue encouraged a wider use of cheques and,
for their own convenience, the London private bankers formed
the London Clearing House around 1770. Also, the private
bankers came to treat the Bank as a customer rather than a
competitor; using it to deposit spare balances which they
regarded as ultimate reserves and, when in need of assistance
they applied to the Bank for accommodation over a period of
particular difficulty. Crick & Wadsworth (1936 p11)
Provincial industrialisation initiated in the latter half of
the 1700's, coupled with the monopoly based complacent
indifference of the Bank to opening branches, brought the
advent of country banking; based on the limited financial and
personal resources of separate localities and typically
operated in conjunction with trade interests by persons
relatively amateur in finance. The number of county bankers is
estimated at 12 in. 1750, 230 in 1797, and 721 in 1810; Crick &
Wadsworth (1936 p13).
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Apart from the capital constraint other key risks of the
banking system are noted by Crick & Wadsworth (1936 p13-14).
Particularly for the country banks, the mixing of banking with
other trades involved 'divided interest and unsound methods',
and in terms of asset diversification risk 'the fortune of
many a country bank was bound up in the success or failure of
one or two large firms' (29), but for all banks 'primitive
means of communication and inadequate cash reserve
arrangements added to the vulnerability ... which was
intensified by lack of contact between them'. Also bank note
issue was unregulated, although after 1808 it was necessary
to obtain a licence (this merely involved an annual fee of 30
and a stamp duty on notes). Accounts were not published, and
even the best of banks were subject to the risk of suspicion;
bank "runs" were a common occurrence and, ...
'at the best of times failures were
distressingly numerous, and in periods of
strain the country banks collapsed in such
numbers as to entail grave disorder and to
undermine confidence over and over again'.
Particular capital related risks include the constraint on
partner numbers and the ability of the depositors and
noteholders to assess the capital position of the bank. The
constraint of partner numbers may not have been significant
for some firms; in 1822, of 552 note issuing banks, 375 had
three partners or less, and only 26 had the maximum number
(30). With no account publication and unlimited liability, the
assessment of a bank's capital involved the assessment of
partners' total wealth (albeit qualified by a doubtlessly less
informed assessment of their liabilities) and probity. Webber
(1989) notes that such factors tended to keep country banks
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localised as the names of partners, and their financial
standing, would be best known in their own neighbourhood.
A period of numerous failures around the time of Waterloo
(1815) was followed by an extreme crisis in 1825 which brought
down 93 banks. This gave rise to public demands for change and
governments began to favour the introduction of open joint
stock banking, particularly in the light of its development in
Scotland and Ireland. The Scottish banking system based on a
smaller number of joint stock banks was perceived as having
weathered the crisis quite well: Webber (1989). Nevertheless,
Kindleberger (1984 p83) notes that, ...
'The failure of 73 out of 770 banks in
England in 1825 was not a very different
ratio than 3 out of 36 in Scotland (as of
1830), but the large absolute number made
a lasting impression, as did the intensity
of the panic.'
Joint Stock Bank Capital:
The right to joint stock banking in England and Wales was
introduced in stages. The Act of 1826 enabled the formation of
banking co-partnerships with any number of shareholders and
the right of note issue but only outside a 65 mile radius
centred on London and with certain restriction on business
with London (31). The Act contained no provision as to share
denominations or amounts to be paid up on shares; Crick &
Wadsworth (1936 p16).
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Nevertheless, the Act also specifically confirmed that the
Bank was entitled to open branches anywhere in England &
Wales, which right it claimed with offices in a number of
provincial centres (32). Initially this acted as a competitive
deterrent, but once it was demonstrated that such new joint
stock banks could compete, formations increased reaching
nearly 50 (with around 10,000 proprietors) by 1833 and over
100 by 1836. Following successful establishments in the
provinces, a further re-interpretation of the Bank of
England's Charter in 1833 enabled joint stock banks to be
established in London provided they did not issue notes; 5
such banks were established there by 1844 despite
constitutional and operational difficulties which they
nevertheless withstood, assisted in part by the innovation of
printing and circulating annual statements of account (33).
Country joint stock banks developed rapidly, helped by the
development of trade and industry, and the relative weakness
of private banks; between 1825-26 and 1841-42, the number of
private banks fell from 554 to 311 while the number of country
joint stock banks rose to 118; Crick & Wadsworth (1936 p21).
In 1836, the number of country joint stock banks doubled
within a 12 month period and several of these hastily
developed ventures failed. A Committee of 1936, enquiring into
the operation of the 1826 Act observed, as noted by Crick &
Wadsworth (1936 p21),
... too frequently wide and misleading
difference existed between share
denomination and the amount subscribed;
paid-in capital was sometimes inadequate,
and additional resources were sometimes
obtained by dangerous extension of
re-discounting; deeds of settlement often
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were loosely drawn, allowing directors and
management excessive power.'
Although no substantial changes resulted from the Committee's
observations, in 1844 two Acts were introduced that severely
impacted on banking operations. The one, the Bank Charter Act
of 1844 established the dominance and control of the legal
tender note issue of Bank of England; it also had the effect
of hindering certain banking amalgamations (34). The other, an
Act specifically designed to regulate joint stock banks (35),
took the form of a Code which provided extremely onerous
conditions for the establishment and conduct of new joint
stock banks while leaving extant ones untouched.
As noted by Crick & Wadsworth (1936 p25) the Act prevented the
establishment of any joint stock bank without obtaining a
charter, with a maximum term of 20 years, through the
burdensome process of obtaining Letters Patent. Also, absolute
capital standards were imposed with a minimum nominal capital
of 1100,000; no share was to be of lower denomination than
1100, and no company could begin business until all shares had
been subscribed and at least one half of their nominal capital
paid up. Also, the deed of partnership was required in a form
approved by the Privy Council and, among other clauses, should
disallow the company to purchase or lend upon the security of
its own shares. The Code also required a statement of assets
and liabilities to be published monthly and the annual
accounts to be examined by auditors elected by the
shareholders.
The stringency of the 1844 Code in conjunction with the
provisions of the 1844 Charter Act, brought the establishment
of new joint stock banks to a standstill (36). Dissatisfaction
with the restrictive Code grew and it was repealed by the Act
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of 1857 which introduced more reasonable provisions. During
the interval between the 1844 Acts and 1857, Crick & Wadsworth
(1936 p27) 'observe that private banks authorised to issue
notes dropped from 208 to 157 (half the drop due to failures,
the remainder due to amalgamations); similarly, a population
of 72 joint stock banks at the beginning of the period fell to
63 (failure accounting for 6, and amalgamation for three).
The 1857 Act included provisions requiring, the retention of a
minimum denomination of shares at $100, and registration under
the Act for all banks established since 1844, as well as all
new banks; the right of note issue was not reintroduced. The
Act also increased the maximum number of persons in a banking
partnership (as opposed to a company) from 6 to 10.
Significantly too, the Act expressly excluded banking
companies from the principle of limited liability of
shareholders which had just been accepted and embodied in
general law; it was reasoned that depositors were offered
greater security by the knowledge that the shareholders were
fully liable for losses, and bankers themselves were in
agreement with this. Otherwise the Act made joint stock banks
subject, in almost all respects (excepting limited liability
in particular), to general company law. Webber (1989); Crick &
Wadsworth (1936 p28).
Generally, the establishment of joint stock banks, or banking
co-partnerships, from 1826 had significant ramifications for
capital growth, capital dispersion and management. While
capital was still likely to be contributed from a bank's
particular operational locale, the potential existed for
expanding the capital base by attracting new investors without
this requiring changes in management as was the case with a
private bank where normally the introduction of an additional
partner had to be a very carefully made choice from within the
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family of original owners, or their close business associates.
By dispersing the investment in a bank through shares, a
greater number of investors were able to provide capital and
especially before the introduction of limited liability, a far
greater and more dispersed source of wealth was callable in
the event of liquidation. Joint stock banks could provide a
greater diversification of risk and the capacity to expand in
support of advancing trade and industry. Webber (1989).
Limited Liability:
Although the principle of limited liability for bank capital
was introduced in 1858 and widened in application in later
years, its adoption by banks was generally restrained until
the City of Glasgow Bank failure of 1878 and subsequent
legislation of 1879.
In 1858 a short bill was introduced enabling new banks to be
formed with limited liability except in respect of note issue,
and existing banks were allowed to take advantage of the Act.
A particular feature of the legislation was the requirement
that banks availing themselves of the Act must publish a
statement of assets and liabilities twice yearly and exhibit
it in every branch of the bank. Previously the publication of
balance sheets was a rarity except among the London joint
stock banks; few of the principal country joint stock banks
printed anything more than an annual statement of capital and
of the allocation of profits; none of the private banks issued
any figures except those concerning note issue. Crick &
Wadsworth (1936 p30-31).
The 1857 and 1858 legislation facilitated far easier new bank
formations and, existing banking co-partnerships to reform
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with a far less cumbersome constitutions with the option of
limited or unlimited liability. Nevertheless existing banks
were reluctant to avail themselves of the legislation; reasons
included fear that much goodwill rested on the unlimited
liability of the partners, the potential for a competitive
disadvantage if other banks maintained unlimited liability,
and a probable reluctance to publish balance sheets. New bank
formations were less hindered by such factors although the
maintenance of the k00 minimum share denomination proved an
obstacle; this was removed by the 1862 Companies Act which
consolidated and greatly simplified the laws affecting
companies generally, including banks. Subsequently, the early
1860's saw the spread of limited liability banking with the
conversion of form among existing banks, particularly from
private banks into limited joint stock banks; private bank
numbers were also diminished by absorbtion into joint stock
banks. Nevertheless many of the larger, older joint stock
banks were reluctant to adopt limited liability (37), although
some abandoned their old co-partnership constitutions and
registered as unlimited liability companies - which also
reduced the liability of a shareholder from three years after
transfer to one year. Crick & Wadsworth (1936 p31-33).
Attitudes against adoption of limited liability strongly
changed with the disastrous failure, involving fraud, of the
unlimited liability City of Glasgow Bank in 1878 which
demonstrated dramatically that even the bankrupting of scores
of shareholders was not adequate protection for depositors
(38).
Consequently a capital flight from bank shares caused a fall
in market price, Crick & Wadsworth (1936 p33); More
particularly support for unlimited liability did not disappear
immediately, increasing numbers of banks wished to convert to
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limited liability and the prices of unlimited stock fell;
Webber (1989)
The reluctance of the older and larger joint stock banks to
accept limited liability was seen as a problem for the
restoration of confidence. A compromise solution was devised
by the Act of 1879 which established a new legislative
principle of "reserved liability". This provided for the
division of the unpaid portion of limited liability bank
shares into two parts; the one callable at directors'
discretion, and the other only in the event of the winding up.
The intention was to create a new kind of liability on shares,
"reserved liability" represented part of the difference
between the nominal and the actual paid-up amount of a share,
being available only in the case of a company being wound-up;
the Act allowed a company with fully paid up share capital to
create a reserved liability by increasing the nominal amount
of capital, others could provide a portion of uncalled capital
as reserved liability. The Act also provided for the election
of auditors by members, and the audit of accounts (39);
Anderson & Cottrell (1974 p312-316).
The principle of reserved liability was widely accepted, the
London joint stock banks changed to the limited liability form
with registered reserved liability in 1882. One result of the
change was to bring into general practice the publication of
bank balance sheets at least once a year. Crick & Wadsworth
(1936 p33-34).
By 1882, out of 114 joint stock banks in England and Wales, 44
banks had been formed with, or converted to, reserved
liability, 53 held limited liability but were not availed of
reserved liability and 17 remained with unlimited liability.
By 1885 of 99 joint stock banks, 68 held reserved liability,
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29 held limited liability only; Webber (1989). Crick &
Wadsworth (1936 p35) comment that by 1884 the number of
private banks had fallen considerably since 1844 while the
joint stock banks had increased in market dominance in terms
of resources and branches, although their numbers had not
increased greatly.
The practice of issuing high denomination shares with only
part of the nominal capital paid-up, as prevailed in the early
days of joint stock banking, gave way to a greater
democratisation or wider market appeal, with a trend towards
issuing smaller denomination shares and the introduction of
fully paid-up shares (40).
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3.4.3 United States
The early colonial role of capital in providing depositor
confidence (41) appears to have gained official recognition
and, post revolution, developed along with the evolution of
banking institutions and practice, to be represented by a
formally required minimum capital stock which also served to
support and control both liabilities (mainly bank note) and
loan growths.
a. Early State Banking
Initial Stages:
After the revolution, the need for additional credit
facilities saw the chartering of early state banks with
specified capital stock, eg the Bank of Pennsylvania in 1780.
Apart from individual state banking legislation, Congress used
bank capital as a measure to limit non-deposit liabilities
(viz notes outstanding) in the chartering of the First Bank of
the United States (1791-1811) followed by the Second Bank of
the United States (1816-1836). These banks represented the
first elements of national central banking, in terms of
monetary control (42).
The charter of the First Bank of the United States provided
for a maximum capital stock of $10m; and the public
subscription was payable in specie (at least a quarter) and
Federal government bonds. The bank's non-deposit liabilities
(viz issued note) were limited to capital stock plus deposits.
The Second Bank of the United States was chartered with a
capital of $35m with the provision that non-deposit debts (viz
notes) could not exceed the amount of capital stock. During
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1791-1811 the number of state chartered banks rose from 6 to
88 while the average capital stock fell from $2.125m to less
than $0.5m. Following the lapse of the First Bank's charter,
and until the establishment of the Second Bank (le the 1811-
1816 period) state bank numbers jumped 158 to 246 banks and
total capital stock of all state banks increased by around
110%, and note circulation more than tripled. Staats (1965
p39-42).
The early period of state bank chartering is characterised as
a political process. The individual charters generally
involved a minimum capitalisation but these were not
standardised but resulted from the political bargaining
process. Capital was used as a control measure for note issue
(43). Staats (1965 p44) comments, ...
'There appears to have been wide latitude
in provisions stipulating the amount of
initial capital stock payment and the
manner of paying the balance of stock
subscriptions.'
Also, Howe (1915 p96) noted that in the early stages, ...
'Bank charters were considered as one of
the spoils of partisan politics and were
often granted by the party in power to
politicians as a reward for party
activity.'
A number of states had standardised capital requirements by
1836. Staats (1965) notes standardisation of minimum capital
stock requirements with a minimum paid-in capital stock; New
York required all the minimum to be paid in before
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commencement of operations, while 50% was required by Alabama,
Massachusetts, Rhode Island and Vermont. Previously,
Massachusetts passed a law in 1822 requiring a surplus
accumulation for new banks with less than 100% paid in
capital; such banks were prevented from paying dividends,
which were maintained in a surplus account until the specified
capital stock had been paid. Staats also confirms that most
states controlled liabilities in terms of paid in capital;
namely, ...
'The maximum legal ratios of liabilities
to capital stock were usually three, four,
or five to one, however, much of the
legislation was not clear as to which
types of liabilities were subject to the
limitation. Some states included only note
liabilities while others also included
deposit liabilities. In addition, by 1836
restrictions on bank loans in terms of a
ratio of loans to paid-in capital stock
were frequently established in the state
legislature.'
"Free" Banking Period:
After the lapse of the Second Bank in 1836, the regulation of
banks was again entirely in the hands of the states. Rockoff
(1991) notes the emergence of "free" banking; ...
'ideas on banking were numerous and
vigorously pressed, and the states adopted
a wide range of regulatory systems. Some
followed the lead established in the
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Independent Treasury and tried to prohibit
all banks, or all new banks, and force
people to deal in specie. But increasingly
the most popular form of legislation was
the so-called free-banking law. This
legislation, first adopted in Michigan and
New York in the late 1830's and then by
large numbers of states in the 1850's, had
two main provisions.
1. Entry into banking was open to all as
long as certain minimum requirements with
respect to capital and other matters were
complied with. Under the old system of
chartered banking (still the dominant mode
in many states), each bank required a
separate charter from the state
legislature.
2. Bank Notes intended to circulate from
hand to hand as money had to redeemable in
specie and backed by government bonds
(typically issued by the state where the
bank was located). These bonds were
deposited with a state official who was
empowered to sell the bonds and redeem all
the notes of a bank if one note was
protested for non-payment.'
Cooper & Fraser (1986) note that by 1860 18 of the 32 states
had passed free banking statutes; see footnote (11). State
insurance plans for banknotes and deposits emerged during this
period; in some states these were operated by the state
governments while, in the others, mutual agreements among the
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participating banks were used.
Staats (1965) observes that the number of banks climbed from
506 to 901 during 1834 to 1840 while average capital stock
remained almost unchanged at over $395,000. By 1843 the number
of banks had dropped 23% following recessionary influences
started with a panic in 1837. By 1863 there existed 1,532
banks with a total capitalisation of $412.2m.
In terms of minimum capital stock, Staats (1965) notes that by
1863, thirteen states had adopted minimum initial capital
requirements for banks with levels ranging from $25,000 to
$100,000. Also several states placed maximum limits on the
amount of capital stock for a single bank.
Also, concerning initial paid-in capital, prior to 1863, the
laws of those states which regulated capital stock contained
varied provisions concerning capital payment. Before
operations could commence, some states stipulated that all a
bank's legal capital had to be paid in, other required less.
Staats (1965 p49) notes that prior to enactment of general
banking legislation, incorporators were required to pay in as
little as 10% of stated capital before beginning business.
The forms of capital payment also varied. While some states
required a capital contribution in specie, others allowed a
portion in the form of real estate mortgages or personal
property. Provisions allowing property as payment were abused
with the use of inflated valuations, and finally the practice
was eliminated.
An attempt to increase effective bank capital through the
assessment of additional liability to shareholders was first
made in 1808 in Pennsylvania. Although it proved
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impracticable, the notion that stockholders should personally
assume banks liabilities remained and was incorporated into
the statutes of several states prior to 1863. Legislation
developed included shareholders being liable for the par value
of stock held, and the concept of 'double liability' made
stockholders personally liable up to an amount equal to the
par value of the stock owned.
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b. The National Banking System:
The post 1836 federal central banking lacuna was broken by the
National Banking Act of 1863 and succeeding legislation from
which emerged the national banking system. Cooper & Fraser
(1986 p48) comment, ...
'The pressure of financing the civil war
proved to be more effective than concerns
about the safety and soundness of the
banking system in prompting Congress to
act.'
The Act initiated the formal federal regulation of banks,
establishing the office of the Comptroller of the Currency to
administer law, and supervise and examine national banks which
could be chartered, subject to requirements, including the
holding of a reserve part of which had to be held in Treasury
bonds. Cooper & Fraser (1986) also note that, ...
'While (national) bank chartering
requirements were liberal (though stricter
than the state free-banking laws) and no
specific authority to regulate bank entry
was included in the act, the Comptroller
soon began the exercise of discretion in
approving or rejecting applications for
national bank charters. Further, the act
placed restrictions on the types and
amounts of loans national banks could make
and established a system of reserve
requirements.
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Despite the stricter chartering conditions, taxation was used
to induce banks to join the national system (44). Cooper &
Fraser (1986 p49) comment that the national system provided a
uniform currency and a more stable banking system, but lacked
a mechanism to provide an elastic money supply to meet the
variable needs of industry and commerce. Consequently, ...
This, coupled with problems posed by
interbank holdings of the required
reserves in 'pyramid' fashion' was blamed
for a number of financial panics in the
late 1800's and again in 1907, and led to
the founding of the Federal Reserve System
(the Fed) which had as a primary goal, the
provision of an elastic currency to end
the periodic bank liquidity crises.
Minimum Capital Stock:
The national banking period initiated in 1863 included
provision among federally chartered banks for a minimum
capital stock dependent on the population of the bank's
domicile city. (National Currency Act 1863: Section 6, and
National Bank Act 1964: Section 7). The minimum capital stock
was later extended by the McFadden Act of 1927 to apply to
bank branches.
Initial Paid-In Capital:
The National Currency Act of 1863 required at least 30% of
capital stock paid before the commencement of business with
the balance to be paid by instalment, each of 10% of the legal
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capital stock and timed in a sequence of no more than two
month periods from the commencement of business.
This requirement was generally less stringent than that
prevailing among the states. Nevertheless, the federal
requirement was hardened by the National Bank Act of 1864
which changed the minimum initial capital payment to 50%, and
required the 10% installments of the balance on a monthly
basis.
Surplus Accumulation:
Surplus accumulation requirements were rare before the Civil
War. Apart from the 1822 Massachusetts requirement
(previously mentioned) Virginia later required banks to
accumulate and maintain a surplus of at least 5% of capital
before dividends could be paid. Staats (1965 p50) notes that
'the accumulation of a large surplus was not generally
encouraged and surplus requirements were not widely imposed
because of the fear of possible concentration of financial
power'. Also, Dewey (1911 cited in Staats 1965) reports that
in 1846 the Connecticut Banking Commission stated, ...
... banks should not be allowed to
accumulate a large surplus, as it would
tempt those who knew the true condition of
the bank to take advantage of the purchase
of stocks of those who were less well
informed.'
Staats concludes that ...
'Apparently, fears of excessive financial
power out-weighed the desire to provide
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more protection for depositors and
noteholders; consequently, surplus was not
an important element of stockholders
equity prior to 1863.'
The National Bank Act 1864 required national banks to carry
10% of its net profits of the preceding half-year to its
surplus fund until the same shall amount to 20% of its capital
stock.
Following the lead of the national bank legislation a number
of states required the establishment of surplus accounts equal
to 20% or more of capital stock and most of these required 10%
of annual profits to be accumulated in surplus until the
minimum level had been attained. Some 19 of the states adopted
provisions identical to those of the federal laws while other
adopted more stringent requirements.
Double Liability:
The National Currency Act of 1863 continued the convention
established in the chartering of the Second Bank of the United
States, that the par value of each bank stock should be set at
$100. A similar provision was included in the Banking Act of
1864.
Par value was significant as each of the major national
banking laws made shareholders liable up to the amount of par
value of stock owned for debts of the bank. In effect, a
shareholder was personally liable for twice the par value of
his shares because, after initially investing in shares at par
value, he could be assessed for a like amount to help satisfy
the banks debts.
126
c. The Federal Reserve System:
By 1913, all but a handful of states had established minimum
capital stock requirements and although there was little
uniformity in the minimum requirements among states, the
provisions in most states were less stringent than those in
federal law.
Also, in terms of initial paid-in capital, by 1913 most states
regulated the payment of legal capital although the
requirements varied among states. Some required all capital to
be paid prior to opening, while other required half and lesser
amounts: some stipulated an absolute amount of capital. The
time allowed for the payment of the balance of the capital
stock also varied widely from 90 days to 2.5 years.
The Federal Reserve System was founded in 1913 to achieve the
macroeconomic objective of monetary stability. Its initial
effect on bank regulation was minor, enlarging only in later
years. Cooper & Fraser (p49) note that, ...
'.... some observers view the failure of
the Federal Reserve Act to include
provisions for strengthening the state
banking system to be the major weakness of
the 1912 legislation.'(45).
Apart from the establishment of the dual state and federal
banking systems further major US legislation tended to
consolidate more power in the federal banking authorities
particularly after the exigencies of the 1920's and early
1930's; the powers included greater control over bank
structure (including absolute and relative capital controls)
and operation,
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These developments are sketched in Annex 3.4; particular
elements include, ..
i). the McFadden Act of 1927, which allowed national banks to
establish branches where permitted by state law; the Act also
eliminated the requirement that national bank stock have a par
value of $100 per share, ie national banks were permitted to
issue stock at par values less than $100.
ii). the Banking Act of 1933 (Glass-Steagall) separated
commercial and investment banking, increased the regulatory
power of the Federal Reserve Board, and created the Federal
Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC). This was closely
followed by,
iii). the Banking Act of 1935, which extended the independence
and power of the Federal Reserve Board. Apart from increased
monetary management power, the Fed was given power of
discretion in the granting of national bank charters. Federal
influence over state bank charters also emerged from the FDIC
via its discretion over the provision of deposit insurance
cover.
The Banking Act of 1935 revised
provisions regarding surplus accumulation which had been in
effect since 1864 and required a surplus equal to at least 20%
of capital stock to be paid in prior to the commencement of
business by national banks. This contrasted with the 1864
legislation which, while requiring ultimately a 20% surplus,
permitted the accumulation of surplus out of earnings.
The Banking Act of 1935 also required each national bank to
increase its surplus account by 10% of semi-annual profits
until the account equalled the par value of capital stock. The
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effect of the 1935 revision was to increase the total amount
of owners' equity in banking institutions because, in the
light of the banking experiences of the 1920's and early
1930's, it was deemed imperative that owners supply additional
protection against insolvency and loss to depositors and other
creditors.
Also, the concept of 'double liability' which was found in
state banking legislation prior to 1863, remained generally in
force in federal and state statutes until 1937. It became
apparent after the banking difficulties in the early 1930's
that the legal provisions making bank stockholders personally
liable for bank debts were hampering efforts to secure
additional capital to strengthen the banking system. Therefore
included in Title III of the Banking Act of 1935 means whereby
a national bank could terminate on or after July 1 1937, the
double liability of its shareholders by publishing notice
thereof in a newspaper one time at least 6 months prior to
termination. Following the change in federal banking laws,
most of the states which had double liability requirements
also eliminated these provisions from their respective
legislation.
iv). the Bank Holding Company Act of 1956, designed to halt
interstate banking expansion.
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3.4.4	 Major Themes of Capital Regulation
The foregoing suggests a number of major themes in the
development of absolute equity capital regulation in both the
UK and the US; key features of bank capital regulation
development concern, ...
(i). Bank Market Structure:
The use of capital regulation as a control of bank market
structure was manifest in minimum and maximum capital
constraints imposed via specific capital amounts or a maximum
number of capital contributing persons in a single bank
entity; and the ultimate liability of the individual capital
contributor.
A polar difference in the application of capital based
monopoly policy in England (an effective monopoly of capital
growth bestowed on the Bank of England) and the US (with anti
monopoly capital constraints), also contrasts with the lack of
capital control in a free banking Scotland.
The English monopoly system which limited banks, other than
the Bank of England, to a maximum number of partners until
1826, contrasts with a fairly consistent focus on a minimum
equity capital standards developed in the individual states of
the USA and later federal legislation (although the fear of
monopolising banks was accommodated largely by non-capital
means such as geographic-branching and activity controls as
well as some maximum capital controls).
A further contrast is provided by the lack of any particular
capital constraint during the free banking era of Scotland
(46); although the three old chartered banks alone enjoyed
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limited liability until its wider availability. This is
somewhat different to the capital constraint in the so called
"free banking" states of the US - in the decades prior to the
Civil War; these states regularised their individual bank
chartering procedures thus replacing the case by case random
specifications which tended to flow from a political process.
(ii). Capital Market Efficiency:
A number of developments led to greater capital market
efficiency; such as improved information, and liquidity
factors based on the democratisation of shares (eg the
reduction of minimum par values and the facilitation of easy
ownership transfer).
Improvement in the information structure; includes the
mitigation of factors such as limited localised knowledge, and
the development of accounting standards and presentations, and
auditing. In a broad sense information structure improvement
came from technological (transport and communication
technology) as well as direct legislative measures. And, in
the case of the early London joint stock bankers, was
voluntarily improved in a relatively harsh competitive
climate.
Another important feature concerns the role of capital
regulation and risk; this includes a number of elements.
(iii). Shift from Uncertainty to Risk:
The transition from unlimited to limited liability of
shareholders, albeit initially in cumbersome measures such as
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"double liability" and "reserved liability" allowed a greater
degree of quantifiable risk to emerge from the haze of
uncertainty; the distinction between uncertainty and risk is
considered in Chapter 4. The development of disclosure and
auditing requirements also would have assisted this trend.
(iv). Failure Risk:
The regulatory control of bank capital maximum levels, for
whatever avowed purpose, also appears to have been associated
with widespread bank failure risk - eg the evidence, albeit
nominal and contestable, of pre 1826 English banking versus
the Scottish experience.
(v). Capital Costs
Particularly in the English bank context, the pre 1826
suppression of capital size ensured a large number of owner-
managed banks; the later emergence of widespread joint stock
banks allowed the development of a specialised or professional
management; it is tempting to view this as facilitating a
general improvement in bank management skills, and economies
of scale (47). Also, it represents the introduction of new
agency (monitoring) costs.
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3.5	 THE EVOLUTION OF RELATIVE BANK CAPITAL REGULATION
3.5.1	 Introduction
This section considers the development of bank equity capital
regulation in its relative, or balance sheet, structure
context.
a. General Regulatory Philosophies
In keeping with the relatively technocratic approach it
historically demonstrated towards absolute equity capital
regulation, the US similarly applied formal regulation of bank
capital as an interactive balance sheet structure control from
the early state period; as noted previously in Section 3.4.3a.
In contrast, the formal use of capital linked balance sheet
structure control for regulatory purposes is relatively novel
in the UK (48); a formal process has been developed only
within the past couple of decades - see Chapter 4. Previously,
the Bank of England performed a less precisely defined role of
informal prudential regulator via its control over banking
'club' membership; ie the exercise of discretionary, indirect
power over bank behaviour (49).
The regulation of equity capital, itself absolutely regulated,
in terms of the bank balance sheet structure represents the
progenitor of modern adequacy of bank capital regulation. Put
in more prudentially aligned terminology, this represented an
early formal manifestation of the matching of a functional
capacity based definition of bank capital against functional
requirements demanded of the various banking risks - see
Chapter 4.
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b.	 The Secular Downtrend In Capital Structure
The phenomenon of a secular downtrend in bank capital as a
proportional component of bank balance sheets is documented in
both the US and the UK. The reasons for the decline are
unclear.
Nevertheless, a number of possible contributory factors
present themselves. Bank regulation not specifically directed
at capital structure may have been influential; ie the
development of capital substitutable bank prudential
protective regulation, such as lender of last resort
facilities and deposit insurance - whether formally or
implicitly, may have provided some impetus to the downtrend.
The long term development of opportunities for risk
diversification also may also have encouraged the downtrend.
Also, fundamental changes in factors influencing capital
structure, as per theory noted in Chapter 2, may have
contributed to a change in optimal capital structure (50).
The development of absolute bank equity capital constraint
regulation represents a fundamental qualification to
observations, in industrial countries such as the UK and USA,
of a secular downtrend in bank equity capital in terms of
balance sheet structure. In other words, on a secular nominal
basis, bank equity capital may not represent a consistent
measure. For instance in terms of risk bearing capacity
capital may need to be qualified by properties of unlimited
liability or more obscure factors such as double liability.
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Nevertheless these qualifications have tended to stabilise
this century. Another major qualification is the fact that the
banking environment and risks have changed dramatically over
time. The further qualification of accounting standards,
including the use of hidden or secret reserves, is considered
in Chapter 4.
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3.5.2	 Capital Structure Development
a. USA
In the USA, which has a long established tradition of using
relative equity capital for regulatory control of balance
sheet size and structure. Lindow (1963), cited in Vojta (1973a
p8), notes that, ...
'Bank capital ratios have been declining
since the early 1800's. Throughout most of
the 19th century, banks were heavily
capitalised. In the early 1800's capital
funds to total assets were in the 70%
range, but moved to about 20% by 1900. The
rapid expansion of bank assets during
World War I and the economic expansion of
the 1920's brought the ratio to just under
13%. From the Depression years to 1945 the
ratio moved to 6%. In the post-war period
the ratio adjusted to just under 10%
through the 50's before reverting to the
present 6-10% range. The ratio of capital
to deposits showed a parallel trend,
running somewhat above the ratio of
capital to total assets. In the 1870's the
ratio was as high as 80%. By 1920, the
ratio had dipped just under the 20% level.
From a low of 6% in 1945, the ratio rose
before adjusting to the present 6-10%
range. The ratio of capital to risk assets
was nearly 60% in the late 1870's, 25% by
1900, 15-18% in the 1920's and in the post
136
war period reached the present 8-12%
range	 	  The historical experience
in this country is that a normative
standard of bank capital in relation to
assets or deposits has not been
maintained.'
A graph of the secular, decline of capital bank balance sheet
structure is illustrated in Graph 3.1. Post World War 2
developments are also illustrated by Maisel (196* in Table
3.1.
In a wider context, Robinson & Pettway (1967) also cited in
Vojta, note that, ...
'the decline in capital ratios in the USA
has had a parallel in almost every foreign
country ... (and) ... Generally, banks in
the Netherlands, West Germany,
Switzerland, Belgium and the Scandinavian
countries have been roughly comparable to
equivalent US banks in size of capital
accounts, whereas banks in the United
Kingdom, France and Italy tended to
maintain much lower ratios ... (and) ...
Major Japanese banks also maintain lower
levels of capital than do US banks.'
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GRAPH 3.1
THE SECULAR DECLINE IN US BANK CAPITAL RATIOS
- 
Bank Capital as a percent of Assets and Deposits -
Source:	 taken from Orgler & Wolkowitz (1976);
primary source, Lindow (1963)
Graph is derived from data for Jun 3C):-
1803-1875: for Massachusetts banks; 1676 Report of the
Comptroller of the C.‘arrency (1876 p98).
1834-1362: for all banks in the US; Historical Statistics of
the US (1949 p263)
1865-1962: for all commercial banks in the US: Annual Reports a
the Comptroller of the Currency (1865-1874); Journal of
Political Economy (December 1947 p559); Historical
Statistics of the US (1957 p631-2); Banking and
Monetary Statistics, Board of Governors of Federal
Reserve System (1962 Supplement p28); Federal Reserve
Bulletin (March 1962 p346).
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TABLE 3.1
US Ratio of Bank Equity Capital to Total Book Assets
(Expressed as Percentage, and for all Banks in the US)
Year	 Ratio
%
1939 10.33
1949 6.86
1959 7.9
1969 7.45
1979 5.75
Source: Maisel (1981 p108) using figures derived from the
Federal Reserve and Comptroller of the Currency illustrates
the post-war decline for all banks in the US:
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b. UK
The United Kingdom has recorded a secular downtrend in capital
ratios in terms of both the private and joint stock banks.
Evidence is fragmentary and varies according to source for the
early days.
Table 3.2, compiled by Collins (1988) provides a general
picture of the downtrend from the mid 1800's to early this
century.
Table 3.3 has been compiled from primary data contained in
Crick & Wadsworth (1936) presented in Annex 3.6. The compiled
Table shows capital ratios for the 1844, 1884, 1904 and 1934
years but lacks figures for the private banks. The ratio
figures available for joint stock banks, in Table 3.3,
indicate a general decline, which became more marked in the
first few decades of this century.
The downtrend in the capital ratios of the joint stock banks
is further chronicled by Wilcox (1979). In the two decades
prior to World War I, Wilcox notes a greater efficiency in the
use of capital during a period of bank amalgamation which
caused a general downward trend in the average published ratio
of capital to deposits. For joint stock banks the ratio was
about 20% in 1880 , dropping to about 13%-by 1990 and,
influenced also by wartime inflation, was no higher than 6% by
1917 and following increases in proprietorship funds, in 1920
the average published ratio of capital resources to deposits
rose from 5.25% to nearly 6.5%. The capital to deposits ratio
for the clearing banks stood at 7% by 1931, declining slowly
to around 5.75% in 1939, and with wartime inflation, reached
3% in 1945 and finally as low as 2.5% by 1951.
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Capital growth via earnings retention proved a problem during
the 1950's due to credit controls. Easier credit control and
generally improved economic conditions from 1958 allowed a
substantial increase in published capital resources throughout
the 1960's. The adoption of a fuller disclosure policy by the
banks (vis a vis hidden reserves - see Chapter 4) in 1969 saw
a jump in published capital ratios. The 1968 average ratio of
capital to deposits of all the parent clearing banks was about
6% - in 1969 on the new and consolidated group basis it rose
to just over 8.5%.
In terms of the private bank sector, Webber (1989) notes that
their balance sheets were published and circulated for the
first time in the 1890's and showed a downtrend during the
First World War; during the interwar years the private bank
sector virtually disappeared. A more detailed exposition of
the private and joint stock bank ratio developments, based on
Webber (1989) and Wilcox (1979) is provided in Annex 3.5.
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TABLE 3.2
UK BANK CAPITAL RATIOS
Decadal Averages: 1840-1909
Source: Collins (1988)
Ratio of Capital Funds* to Public Liabilities
%
A: England & Wales**
1840-49 (8) 35
1850-59 (13) 20
1860-69 (19) 19
1870-79 (20) 20
(*Sample only; number of banks in parentheses)
B: United Kingdom
1840-49 20
1890-99 15
1900-09 13
C: Scotland
1865-69 18
1870-79 16
1880-89 16
1890-99 15
1900-09 15
** Capital Funds defined as Paid-Up Capital and Reserve Funds
Table derived by Collins from the following sources:
A: London Clearing Bank Archives - see Collins (1984)
B: Calculated from D.K. Sheppard (1971)
C: Calculated from S.G. Checkland (1975)
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TABLE 3.3
EDUITY CAPITAL RATIOS* : BANKS IN ENGLAND AND WALES
(1844.	 1884,	 1904,	 1934)
- Bank Nusbers in Parentheses-
1844	 1884	 1904
.,h	 X	 X
1934
1
BANK OF ENGLAND 35.9 25.1 18.6 3.2
1. LONDON BANKS
1.8	 Private na na
(63) (35)
1.b	 Joint Stock 21.9 19.1 15.5 9.5
(5) (21) (14) (3)
2. LONDON AND
PROVINCIAL BANKS
Joint Stock 11.4 10.3 6.1
(6) (12) (11)
3. PROVINCIAL BANKS
3.a	 Private: na na na
(273) (172) (35)
Issuing 	 na na na nil
(208) (100) (18)
Non-issuing 	 na na na
(65) (72) (17)
3.b	 Joint Stock:
(100) (91) (39)
Issuing 	 na 22.0 14.4 8.7
(72) (45) (21)a (1)
Non-issuing 	 na 18.8 15.8 6.7
(28) (46) (18) (1)
Source: Derived from Crick & Wadsworth (1936)
See Annex 3.6 for their source data and qualifications
I Equity Capital Ratio = Capital & Reserves /(Capital & Reserves + Note Circulation + Deposits)
a Includes Channel Islands & Isle of an
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3.5.3	 Development of Relative Bank Capital Regulation
a.	 Origins
In the USA, structural bank capital regulation was apparent
from the early state period and was based on the simultaneous
developments of absolute equity capital regulation (previously
considered) and some notion, however fundamental, of risk
analysis.
The precise dating of the origins of capital ratio usage
appear to be largely a matter of definition. It may be argued
that legislation based on the difference between capital stock
and paid in capital stock, eg surplus accumulation
legislation, is a form of capital ratio control, albeit within
the equity account.
In the wider sense, both the First and the Second Banks of the
United States were subjected to non-deposit liability control
based on capital stock. Staats (1965 p45) also notes that most
states restricted bank liabilities in terms of paid-in capital
and used a maximum limit; nevertheless, the legislation often
was not clear as to which liabilities were subject to the
limitation (51).
During the 1836-63 period, Staats (1965 p52) notes that a
number of states supplanted the capital to liabilities
legislative control by a reserve requirement, expressed in
terms of a ratio of reserves to liabilities, and designed to
maintain liquidity in the asset structure.
The National Currency Act of 1863 limited the indebtedness of
national banking associations in terms of capital stock. As
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noted by Staats (1965 p61),
'Except for deposit and note liabilities,
bills of exchange or drafts drawn against
money on deposit, and liabilities to
shareholders, indebtedness was limited to
the amount of unimpaired capital stock
actually paid in. The National Bank Act
(of 1864) included an identical provision
and also restricted the amount of national
bank notes issued to any national bank to
the amount of its paid in capital stock.'
In the post 1863 era, as deposit creation began to supplant
note issue, the previous capital based control of note issue
was extended to deposits. Staats (1965) notes that by 1910 six
states' legislation required that deposit liabilities must not
exceed a certain multiple of paid in capital (52), and three
states restricted aggregate loans and investments in terms of
capital stock (53).
b.	 Wider Development of a Capital to Deposits Ratio
A wider use of a capital to deposit ratio from the early
stages of the century parallels the earlier development of the
equity-debt ratio used in industrial and commercial
enterprises which relates the volume of capital to the volume
of debt protected by the capital. As the capital deposit ratio
developed as an accepted measure, a rule of thumb emerged,
stipulating that capital should equal at least 10% of
deposits, as a standard for the adequacy of capital. The
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origin of the one-to-ten ratio is unknown but its earliest
legal citation is in the 1909 Californian legislation; and, as
previously noted, some states stipulated different ratio
levels (eg 1 to 15), while others gave no legal backing to a
standard; Staats (1965 p80-81)
The capital-deposits ratio never was incorporated into
national banking legislation despite repeated recommendations
by the Comptroller of the Currency. Nevertheless, Staats (1965
p83) comments that, ...
'The capital-deposits ratio generally, and
the 1:10 standard specifically, were used
to some extent by the Federal Reserve
System, the FDIC, and the Comptroller of
the Currency ... (but) ... the period of
time this standard of capital adequacy was
actually used by these agencies seems to
have been rather brief, possibly extending
from the bank holiday in 1933 to the mid
1940's.
Revell (1975 p29) comments that, ...
'The first time that a general rule of
thumb was adopted was in 1933, when all
banks were closed during the "bank
holiday" and allowed to reopen only on
proof of capital adequacy. From then on a
rough ratio of 1:10 net worth to total
deposits was accepted.'
146
c.	 Shift Towards a Capital to Assets Ratio
Although evidenced in earlier use among some states (see
Section 3.4.3), a capital to assets ratio began to gain favour
during the Second World War. Staats (1965 p84) comments that,
• • •
'The 1 to 10 capital-deposit ratio was
criticised after the late 1930's as bank
deposits increased sharply and the
structure of bank assets changed
substantially. With the decreased
importance of loans and with increased
liquidity resulting from the holding of US
government securities, it became apparent
that a measure of capital adequacy had to
be related to the structure of assets and
not only to the volume of debt.'
Revell (1975 p49) notes that the FDIC moved onto a ratio of
1:10 net worth to appraised value of assets in 1939. This
change of emphasis was justified, notes Revell, on two
grounds, namely ...
'(1) the real risk was asset depreciation
and not deposit withdrawal, and
(2) the net worth/deposits ratio failed to
distinguish between deposit variability
(instability) and deposit velocity
(turnover).'
Revell (1975 p29) comments that, ...
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'The FDIC ratio was suspended during the
war because all new deposits gained went
into riskless government bonds. When the
FDIC re-imposed its ratio in 1945, bankers
drew attention to the fact that their
portfolios still contained a large
proportion of government bonds, and as a
result the ratio was modified to a 1:5 net
worth/risk assets (all assets other than
cash and government securities).
In the post World War II period, a ratio used by both the FDIC
and the Federal Reserve related capital to total assets.
Staats (1965 p84) comments, ..
'No generally accepted standard for
adequately capitalised banks was developed
for this ratio, although the Federal
Reserve System authorities suggested that
an adequately capitalised bank would have
capital equal to at least 7% of total
assets, while the FDIC used the national
average of the ratio for all banks as the
standard.'
Nevertheless, neither the capital to deposit, nor the capital
to asset ratios distinguished between the risk of banks asset
structures. And as the proportion of loans in bank balance
sheets began to revert to normal after 1950, the matter of
asset structure risk came to the fore of thinking on capital
adequacy measurement.
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d.	 Refinement of the Capital Ratios
A key element involved in this development is the distinction
among the degrees of risk involved in several asset
categories, and the idea of "free" capital (54).
In its early refinement, the asset category method viewed
assets such as cash, bank balances, and US government
securities as practically free from risk (particularly during
a prevailing Federal Reserve policy of pegging prices). The
capital to risk asset ratio focused on the remaining "risk
assets". Staats (1965 p86) notes that, ...
'Originally, a capital-to-risk-asset ratio
of one-to-five, or 20 96, was considered
standard for adequately capitalised banks,
although the Comptroller of the Currency
adopted a one-to-six ratio.
Further development involved refinement of the degrees of risk
in the several types of risk assets. The 1952 year appears
something of a watershed year in the development of refined
capital ratios. As noted by Revell (1975 p30), developments
included, ...
(i). Adjusted Deposits to Capital Ratio
The New York State Bankers Association (NYSBA) proposed that
the denominator of the capital ratio should be total deposits
less riskless assets (ie cash and government securities); this
related capital to 'deposits at risk' rather than assets at
risk.
Revell (1975 p30) observes that the change in numeric value
under this formulation; ie in 1965, on the basis of this
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formula, the average insured bank had a ratio of 14.1%; and a
ratio of 11.7% on the FDIC formula.
(ii). Adjusted Assets to Capital Ratio
Adjusted Risk Assets:
The idea of "riskless assets" was expanded to include asset
categories slightly more risky; eg bonds of federal agencies
guaranteed by the US government. Nevertheless this system
resulted in the same simplistic dichotomy of risk categories -
risk or riskless.
Disaster Valuation of Assets:
A 1952 report for the Illinois Bankers Association, by G.
Freeman, recommended that each bank should determine its own
capital adequacy based on its worst past experience; more
specifically it should value each asset type in its portfolio
on the basis of its experience in the depression of the
1930's. In other words, the experienced percentage loss for
each asset type is applied to the respective types of assets
currently held to find the amount of capital required. This
approach was criticised as impractical for use by some banks;
Staats (1965 p90). Revell (1975 p30) notes that this
methodology also recommended an arbitrary, assumed 10% loss on
loan portfolios; he also comments that this was the first
"disaster valuation" approach to the question of solvency.
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Six Asset Risk Categories:
In 1952 the Federal Reserve Bank of New York (FRBNY) Bank
Examinations Department (or more particularly Howard D.
Crosse; according to Revell 1975) developed a method of
determining minimum capital requirements which while similar
to Freeman's method, was standardised and simplified. Bank
assets were divided into 6 categories according to the degree
of risk with an allocated capital requirement assigned to each
category.
The asset categories based on liquidity and credit risk,
ranged from the most liquid of bank assets, called "primary
reserve assets" such as cash on hand against which no capital
is required. Other categories included "secondary reserve
assets" requiring a 5% minimal capital; "portfolio assets"
with 12%; "substandard assets" 20%; "work-out assets" 50%; and
"fixed assets" 100%.
Staats (1965 p94) notes that the aggregate of the capital
requirements for each of the 6 asset categories is compared to
the bank capital comprising, ... 'book capital plus unused, or
excess, valuation reserves less estimated losses and half of
doubtful assets.' He adds that this method allowed the
determination of any required additional capital and, ...
'received widespread acceptance among
commercial bankers and banking supervisory
authorities because of the soundness of
its approach to the determination of
capital adequacy.'
This methodology appears to represent the prime progenitor of
modern international prudential capital assessment, albeit
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with a number of significant developments; this is discussed
in Chapter 4. A fundamental criticism of this methodology is
provided by Revell (1975 p30) who observes the arbitrariness
of the capital margin set for each risk category. He comments,
• • •
'we can see just how arbitrary the margins
are, although they were supposed to be
based on a bank loan officer's approach to
comparable situations when lending to
customers. (It is worth noting this link
between the creditworthiness of a bank and
its own procedures for determining the
creditworthiness of its customers ...).'
Revell also makes the point that, . ..
'The amount of capital determined by the
formula is not supposed to be a measure of
"adequate" solvency, but a minimum below
which net worth is definitely inadequate.
Normally banks will have between 115% and
125% of the minimum capital requirement.'
e.	 Agencies' Methodologies
Federal Reserve Board:
In 1956, the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System
introduced its own ratio formulation which, while similar to
the earlier FRBNY ratio, also incorporated some refinements.
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These included a liquidity factor (ie more liquid banks
require less capital) which was weighted by a disaster
valuation based on the assumption of a repetition of the
experiences of the 1930's. A further refinement involved a
sliding scale of requirements based on the size of the bank's
portfolio (ie providing for relatively greater amounts of
capital for smaller banks).
The Board of Governors revised the ratio formula in 1972. As
noted by Revell (1975 p36) changes adopted included an update
of the reference disaster valuation period to the 1950-71
period which covered the two credit crunches of 1966 and 1969,
and a distinction between credit risk and market risk (55).
Nevertheless, as noted by Moulton (1987), the evolution of the
system brought greater complexity and precision, and it became
more difficult to administer. Finally, the system was dropped
in the mid-1970's because adequate capital levels could not be
agreed. She notes that, . . .
'For the next few years, regulators
persuaded or cajoled banks into increasing
capital when needed and, in extreme cases,
required a bank to formulate a plan to
raise capital.'
The Comptroller of the Currency:
Since 1962 the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency
abandoned arbitrary numerical relationships in favour of a
subjective judgement process involving consideration of 8
factors. These include, 1) quality of management; 2) liquidity
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of assets; 3) history of earnings and retention thereof; 4)
the quality and character of ownership; 5) the burden of
meeting occupancy expense; 6) the potential volatility of
deposit structures; 7) the quality of operating procedures; 8)
the bank's capacity to meet present and future needs of its
trade area, considering the competition it faces.
The Comptroller's Handbook required the examiner to make an
accurate determination of the capital adequacy for each bank,
but in lieu of arbitrary guidelines, the application of the
criteria represented a subjective process. Dince & Fortson
(1972), Revell (1975).
While the Comptroller's approach became known as "non-ratio",
ratios are used as guidelines, particularly in identifying
problem banks. Orgler & Wolkowitz (1976) note that until 1971,
the Comptroller's Manual disclaimed any reliance on capital
ratios in assessing the capital adequacy of national banks.
Nevertheless, while recognising that subjective factors are
helpful up to a point, Dince & Fortson (referring to the
Office of the Comptroller in 1966) comment that, ...
'Ratios alone are not conclusive but they
do have a bearing. The most important
ratio used is the is the ratio of bank
capital to risk assets; le all assets less
cash and government securities ... (this
does not utilize the multigrade risk
classification system of the Federal
Reserve System...).'
Revell (1975) identifies the use of a rule of thumb element,
consisting of the ratio of net worth to gross loans and
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discounts. He comments that this is used as the first quick
test of capital adequacy and ... 'where gross loans and
discounts exceed seven times net worth , the bank is
scrutinised more closely.'
More recently, Orgler & Wolkowitz (1976) noted that, ...
'A notably popular measure ... (in problem
bank identification) ... is total loans to
total capital where total capital includes
equity, loss reserves, and long term debt.
More recently, the Comptroller has begun
to experiment with the ratio of classified
assets (as determined by bank examiners)
to total capital.'
On the basis of this ratio, a bank is classified as A (ratio
below 20%), B (20-40%), C (40-80%), and D (80% plus). Orgler &
Wolkowitz (1976 p70-71) note that at the end of 1973, 85.5% of
national banks were "A" banks; the ratio is then combined with
the deposit size of the bank in order to establish an
acceptable loans to capital ratio (eg for banks with deposits
under $100m the acceptable ratio ranges from 8.5% for A banks
to 6.5 for D banks). Nevertheless these ratio tests are only
guidelines, final evaluation is based on the 8 factors.
Apart from the subjective emphases on management quality, and
earnings and retentions, the ratio approach of the Comptroller
is also notable for the use of a definition of capital which
extends beyond net worth or equity.
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Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC):
The FDIC has tended to use forms of a capital to assets ratio.
These are characterised by use of a wide definition of capital
(le including equity, reserves and long-term debt) adjusted
for the quality of assets as determined by bank examiners.
Orgler & Wolkowitz (976 p71) note that the principal ratios
calculated by the FDIC for all insured banks are,
i). adjusted capital to adjusted gross assets; in which total
capital is adjusted by deducting 100% of assets classified as
"loss" and 50% of assets classified as "doubtful", and
ii). net capital to adjusted gross assets; in which total
capital is adjusted by deducting 100% of all classified assets
('loss', 'doubtful', and 'substandard').
The adjusted gross assets in either ratio is equal to total
assets less 100% 'loss' assets and 50% 'doubtful' assets.
Orgler & Wolkowitz also note that the FDIC also considers a
management rating and an earnings analysis in determining a
bank's overall rating.
Acknowledgement of Non-Equity Capital:
As previously indicated, long-term debt became increasingly
recognised in capital definition by both the FDIC and the
Comptroller.
Orgler & Wolkowitz (1976 p67) observe that since 1962, the
Comptroller has allowed banks to issue subordinated debt up to
one third of their total capital and allowed this debt to be
considered as part of the capital account; this assisted
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competition with other financial institutions and foreign
banks. They observe (p72) that the Comptroller promoted, ...
'the rapid growth of long-term debt by
allowing national banks to use this source
and by considering long-term debt as part
of total capital.
Nevertheless the Comptroller imposed qualifying restrictions
on its use; namely a minimum maturity of 7 years, and a
ceiling of one third of total capital. Moreover, to qualify
for the one-third ceiling required passing two tests (failure
reduced the one-third ceiling) namely,
i) an earnings coverage test: ie earnings before interest and
taxes must be at least three times the total fixed charge on
long-term debt, and
ii). a retained earnings test; le retained earnings over the
previous 5 years must equal or exceed the average pro rata
sinking fund necessary to retire the debt in full by its
maturity date.
The FDIC traditionally accepted long-term debt. Orgler &
Wolkowitz (1976 p67) comment that, ...
'The FDIC has never objected to long-term
debt as long as it did not exceed a
"reasonable" amount. ... This is a
consistent attitude in an agency that
emphasises depositor protection in cases
of failure. Since long-term debt is
subordinated to deposit liabilities, it
provides the same protection as equity in
the case of bankruptcy.'
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The FDIC applied similar constraints, namely the one third
ceiling, the minimum maturity of 7 years, and debt issues must
have a face value of at least $500; nevertheless no formal
tests were applied which accorded with its relatively liberal
attitudes; Orgler & Wolkowitz (1976 p72).
The Federal Reserve Board previously was the most reluctant of
the agencies to consider long-term debt as part of capital.
This was reasoned on the basis that it is an inadequate
substitute for equity in absorbing temporary losses; Orgler &
Wolkowitz (1976 p67). Nevertheless, in 1975 it allowed a
proportion of long-term debt to be counted as part of total
capital, effectively adopting an approach similar to that of
the Comptroller; Orgler & Wolkowitz (1976 p72). The allowed
proportion was based on several tests, including an earnings
test.
Recent developments in the regulatory definition of capital,
which focus on the inclusion of non-equity items, are
considered in Chapter 4. The recent comment of Benston (1991
p223) nevertheless appears appropriate at this juncture, viz
• • •
'For reasons that are unclear to me, the
regulatory authorities also have not fully
counted subordinated debentures as
capital. Subordinated debentures not only
would protect the deposit insurance
agencies from loss, as would equity
capital, but also would be preferable to
equity capital, as long as the debentures
could not be redeemed by the bank for a
period long enough for the authorities to
force its reorganization and
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recapitalization when it is in danger of
becoming insolvent. ... It should be
recognized that subordinated debentures
simply are explicitly uninsured time-dated
deposits. Thus the only cost to a bank of
issuing such liabilities is that it is
forced to give up some or all of the
deposit insurance subsidy it receives from
the government in the form of underpriced
insurance by having to pay a rate for
funds that includes the cost of risk.'
Agencies' Philosophies:
Revell (1975 p37) views the multiplicity of prudential
regulation supervisory agencies as a major criticism of the us
system; he believes it is difficult to justify differences in
their basic approaches. He cites Randall's (1965 p127-30)
observation of an apparent difference in philosophy between
the Comptroller and the Federal Reserve System, and notes that
around 1965 a number of banks whose capital ratios were
declining changed from state to federal charter in order to
come under the more lenient supervision of the Comptroller
(who placed a lesser emphasis on solvency ratios than the
Federal Reserve System).
Orgler & Wolkowitz (1976) comment that it is difficult to
conclusively compare agency orientation although some
inferences may be drawn. They note that because the
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Comptroller's experience is based on supervising the more
stable banks, it is generally considered the least
conservative; and while the FDIC and the Federal Reserve Board
(FRB) have been 'generally more conservative than the
Comptroller in attitudes towards bank capital, in recent years
they have become more liberal'.
Also, they note (p73) that regulatory practices are not tied
to actual legal statutes but depend on the agencies achieving
their goals through persuasion; ie no regulatory agency has
direct legal authority but can apply indirect pressure via for
yf
instance frequent examination, and denialkbranch and
acquisition applications.
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3.6	 SUMMARY
Capital Regulation in Context:
While the "free" market argument justifies regulation in terms
of preventing potential market failure, theories of regulation
are diverse and suggest rationales such as trade between
industry and government, Stigler (1971); and a dialectical
process of adjustments and counteradjustments, Kane (1977).
In the banking sector Benston (1991) challenges the financial
stability rationale for bank regulation; he views it
essentially as taxation by government authorities of
seigniorage, and argues in a wide sense that "regulation has
tended to exacerbate rather than promote stability".
More particularly, bank prudential regulation is fundamentally
justified by the market's inability to account for the cost of
a contagious systemic failure. Although its roots may be found
in early bank regulation, the formal principle of prudential
regulation appears to have been firmly established in the US
after the experiences of the 1920s and 1930's.
It is difficult to isolate and assess the influence of
prudential regulation policy from that of monetary regulation
policy; and similarly bank capital regulation from other forms
of prudential regulation. Ironically, capital regulation
appears to be best justified as a means of controlling the
risk-taking behaviour, and costs, encouraged by another form
of prudential regulation - deposit insurance.
Benston (1991 p226-7) attributes much of the US commercial
bank failure of the 1920s and 1930s to regulation which
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constrained geographic and activity diversification (56). He
comments (p227) that, ...
'Given the existence of governmentally-
provided deposit insurance (de facto or de
jure), capital requirements are necessary.
Other regulations of banks portfolios and
activities have been detrimental to the
goal of enhancing financial stability.'
Absolute Bank Capital Regulation:
The analysis shows the key influence of capital regulation
policy in shaping bank market structure, risk definition,
capital costs, capital market efficiency and, more
controversially, bank failure.
Contrasts between the regulatory developments of the three
geo-political areas also illuminate the influences of
different capital regulation policy. The contrasts between
monopoly policy, and more particularly the role of capital
regulation in that policy, are strong. The selective use of
minimum, and maximum, capital levels represented a distinctive
and key regulatory constraint. A unified ceiling (maximum
capital) policy applied in England and Wales contrasts with a
focus on minimum capital, which evolved from raw political
bargaining, in the states of the US.
In terms of defined "free" banking periods, Scotland was
generally characterised by the lack of capital regulatory
constraint (notwithstanding an uneven distrubution of limited
liability status). It is difficult to draw a strong conclusion
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about the influence of capital regulation in the failure risk
experience of Scotland in contrast to that of England and
Wales. In the pre Civil War States of America "free" banking
was characterised by a regularised chartering procedure rather
than the absence of capital regulation.
Relative Bank Capital Regulation:
The secular decline in capital ratios appears to be a
universal phenomenon. But the preceding analysis indicates
that equity capital has not been consistent in terms of its
qualities in the UK and US. Consequently, such time series
need to be qualified. For instance, the risk bearing capacity
of capital has evolved with absolute capital regulation.
Bank capital regulation in relative, or balance sheet
structure, terms is long established in the US and has evolved
to accomodate a wider-than-equity capital definition. Also the
risk against which capital is matched moved from a focus on
liabilities to assets. Emphasis and development in capital and
risk definition has differed among the individual US
regulatory authorities according to their particular
philosophies. Relative capital regulation became the main
instrument of bank capital prudential regulation.
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FOOTNOTES
(1). Apart from the variety of identifiable group viewpoints,
such as those of bank regulators and accountants, there may
exist intra-group viewpoints; eg the diverse views of the USA
bank regulatory agencies (see Chapter 3.5). This is also
evidenced in the accounting profession which encountered
particular problems in defining capital in recent years when
the problem of measuring capital in inflationary conditions
was of the moment; eg Harvey & Keer (1983 p13) comment,
... Much of the debate was about
maintaining 'capital' or the substance of
the business but accountants have rarely
agreed on what they mean by these terms.
Having considered such definitions as the
equity interest, capital employed, and so
on, the conclusion is finally reached that
the definition of this phrase still has to
be agreed amongst accountants.'
Similarly, among the legal profession, corporate capital may
be defined by reference to both statute and common law, and is
subject to current interpretation. In the UK, emphasis is on
the definition of authorised and issued share capital and the
nature of ordinary and preference shares; Jones & Bellringer
(1984).
(2). The significance of the title "bank" and the element of
arbitrariness underlying its bureaucratic determination were
demonstrated over recent years in the UK. The title "bank" was
emphasised by the Banking Act 1979 which imposed the added
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qualification of 'licenced depositor taker' (second tier bank)
on a number of erstwhile banks. The Banking Act 1987 did away
with the two tier categorisation and provided that there
should be only one category of authorised institution and that
"bank" could be used only by authorised institutions which met
the specified prudential requirements set out in the Act.
The inherent arbitrariness of this bureaucratic process was
noted in 'Banking World' (April 1988, p71);
' ... authorised institutions of the 1987
Act include firms which are not banks and
have never desired to use the name. They
include also firms which are generally
regarded as doing banking business, but
have not described themselves as banks.'
Unlike many countries in which banks are licensed or chartered
(as in the USA) therefore restricting and controlling the
operation of whatever is defined as 'banking business', the UK
previously had no such direct banking law. Writing before the
1979 Act, Revell (1975 p46-45) noted that many laws impinged
on bodies carrying on banking business and there existed
several lists of bodies regarded as banks for the purposes of
different Acts of Parliament. The process of recognition of a
bank was a progressive one, each stage conferring certain
privileges and certain obligations. The price of full banking
status as a 'listed bank', as opposed to a 'statistical bank',
was full adherence to various regulations and the close
supervision of business by the Bank of England. Official
recognition was a powerful factor in inspiring public
confidence. When recognized, banks were under severe official
lending constraints. At the end of the 1960's new banks had
the incentive to obtain only the bare minimum of official
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recognition if they could avoid the obligations imposed on
full status banks - this was the origin of the "fringe" banks.
(3). Goodhart (1985) notes that information asymmetry about
differential risk taking allows banks with a greater
propensity to take risk to benefit from the more conservative
banks; he comments that ....
'"reputation", "name", "trust" is more
important in financial intermediation than
elsewhere: accordingly the free-rider
problem is also felt more acutely'.
The free rider problem is discussed in Chapter 3.3.
(4). Real capital, sometimes confusingly referred to as
"capital", is used to describe corporate fixed or long-term
assets such as land, buildings and plant. These items are
characterised by long maturity. This definition of capital
tends to acknowledge real capital in the classical economics
sense.
(5). A definition of working capital is typified by Greener
(1971), ...
'A vague term for that part of the capital
of the company which is continually
circulating ..(and).. is calculated by
deducting current liabilities from current
assets.'
(6). The range of corporate capital definitions used in the
general context of the liability side of the balance sheet are
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exampled by Hanson (1974), . ..
'The capital of a company is the money
that has to be raised to purchase the real
capital required for starting up the
business ... (and) ... the capital of a
business is taken to be its net worth,
that is, the value of its assets less the
amount owing to creditors.'
and Pearce (1981), ...
'Companies can have a variety of types of
capital. The principal distribution is
between share capital and loan or
debenture capital.'
These definitions exemplify the looseness and multiplicity of
meanings generally accorded to corporate capital. They
identify singly or in combination, a number of liability side
items including share capital, shareholders' funds (net
worth), and debenture/loan stock as representing capital.
These items have in common a perpetual or (initial) long-term
maturity.
(7). When information asymmetry emerges - markets can break
down and create a need for intervention; eg Akerlof (1970).
Also, individual rationality coupled with externalities may
ruin the optimality of market outcomes. A further
qualification arises from the distinction of private from
public goods; the benefits of Adam Smith's 'invisible hand'
apply to private goods. But in public goods markets the
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problem, as noted by Schotter (1990 p59), is the lack of
incentives for rational individuals ...
' ... to reveal their true willingness to
pay for the goods that exist in markets
for private goods, because rational people
know that they can not be excluded from
using a public good provided by the other
agents in society and are tempted to get a
free ride';
(8). Gardener (1986 p30) notes both the public interest (or
consumer protection) and producer protection (or capture)
hypotheses. He observes that the public interest hypothesis
emphasises consumer interest and holds that regulation is
supplied in response to public demand for relief from some
market failure such as inefficient or inequitable market
practice. Criticisms of this hypothesis's explanatory power
include the fact that regulation may sometimes be undertaken
to fulfil objectives which lie outside the strict public
interest, and the lack of a clear mechanism by which the
alleged and defined public interest is translated into the
required legislative action.
Gardener notes that the producer protection hypothesis
explains regulation in terms of demand by groups attempting to
promote their own private interests. The integrity of this
hypothesis is weakened by the existence of several versions,
some of them conflicting. The hypothesis generally indicates a
gain to producers through regulation but fails to acknowledge
that consumer groups often benefit as well.
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(9). Gardener (1986 p29) comments that, ...
'The economics literature does not contain
a universal and widely accepted definition
of regulation. At one extreme is the
strict definition of regulation, like
governing in accordance with the law. At
an operational level, regulation refers to
control over what individual economic
units may do and sometimes how they can
perform these activities. ... Sometimes a
superficial and circular approach is
adopted - regulation is what regulators
do. But regulation is not just what
regulators do; it is how they do it.
Regulation, for instance, may be tight or
lax; it may be paternalistic or
dictatorial; and regulation may be limited
or all embracing. In this setting
regulation may be characterised more
efficiently by its effect on the economic
efficiency of the units or market under
regulation.'
(10). Costs of information appear to be accommodated in
Stigler's assessment of the political process. Characteristics
of the political process (see Annex 3.1) may be moderated, in
part, by having numerous levels of government (the individual
has more incentive to acquire information about local issues
than whole state systems). Also, Stigler notes that.....
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'The voter's expected expenditure to be
informed about the individual policy
proposals, and express his preference (by
individual and group representation as
well as by voting) are determined by
expected costs and returns, just as they
are in the private market place. The costs
of comprehensive information are higher in
the political arena because information
must be sought on many issues of little
or no direct concern to the individual,
and accordingly he will know little about
most matters before the legislature. The
expression of preferences in voting will
be less precise than the expressions of
preferences in the marketplace because
many uninformed people will be voting and
affecting the decision.'
Stigler describes the channels of political decision-making as
gross or filtered or noisy, ...
If everyone has a negligible preference
for policy A over B, the preference will
not be discovered or acted upon. If voter
group X wants a policy that injures non-X
by a small amount, it will not pay non-X
to discover this and act against the
policy. The system is calculated to
implement all strongly felt preferences of
majorities and many strongly felt
preferences of minorities but to disregard
the lesser preferences of majorities and
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minorities.
Nevertheless, this condition may be reduced by, ...
'any reduction in the costs to the citizen
of acquiring information and expressing
desires and by any increase in the
probability that his vote will influence
policy'.
(11). For instance, Cooper & Fraser (1986 p46) note that, ...
'In 1837, Michigan enacted a	 e bank
chartering law. New York and Georgia
followed with similar legislation the
following year. By 1860, 18 of the then 32
states in the United States had passed
free banking statutes. While there were
variations among the states, these laws
essentially allowed banks to be chartered
by any parties providing a prescribed
amount of capital and securing notes of
the new banks with a specified amount of
bonds. The bonds were deposited with an
agent of the states who would sell the
bonds to satisfy calls for note redemption
should the bank fail to do so.'
Nevertheless as cited by White (1984, p139):
'Vera Smith (1936, p44-6) briefly
discusses why "free banking" was a
misnomer as applied to state banking laws
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passed between 1837 and the Civil War.
Those laws made banking "free" only in the
sense that legal barriers to entry were
regularised. Smith (p149) rightly notes
that "the American system was
characterised by certain features which
render it quite inappropriate as an
example of the working of free banking in
the more general sense,"the more general
sense being absence of any special banking
regulation.'
(12). White (1991 p37-38) notes that economic historians such
as Checkland (1968) and Munn (1985) are
'... sceptical of any simple picture of
complex historical experience, (and) have
pointed to features of the Scottish case
seemingly at odds with the free-banking
model. They have offered alternative
interpretations, according to which the
two most important Scottish banks, or the
Bank of England, played certain
controlling roles.
He also notes that monetary economists, eg Cowen & Kroszner
(1989) and Rothbard (1988) in defending visions of the
laissez-faire payments systems (viz the legal restrictions
theory of money and the one-hundred-percent gold standard
respectively), that do not coincide with the Scottish model,
have accordingly argued that it was not laissez-faire.
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Relying on Checkland (1975) and Munn (1981) for historical
facts which the pattern of traditional free banking fits best,
White (1991 p58-59) argues that, ...
'The traditional contrast between the
freer Scottish system and the more
restricted English system is warranted.
The privileges of the chartered Scottish
banks may have generated some small rents
worth protecting, but they did not impede
competition in intermediation or in the
provision of inside money. The chartered
banks may have played a special leadership
role before 1810, but did not control,
direct or cartelize the Scottish banking
industry. The Bank of England was not a
lender of last resort to the Scottish
system before 1844. Nor was it a central
bank in the sense of providing a reserve
base of high-powered money for the
Scottish banks except during the
Restriction period. The Scottish banks
used the London financial market to meet
occasional liquidity needs, but this did
not imply reliance on the good graces of
the Bank of England.
(13). Goodhart (1985) notes that the debate about the
desirability of free banking, le the desirability of having a
central bank, previously flourished in the early and mid 19th
century. Such debate centred on the question of whether market
discipline imposed by a well functioning clearing house would
suffice to keep the banking system in order.
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Goodhart comments that after falling dormant, the subject has
been revived by questions about the desirability of
discretionary monetary policy by a central bank (eg Friedman
1959 and Hayek 1978); and the structural necessity of, and
functions of, a central bank. This latter question arises from
general reconsideration of the need for government
intervention and regulation of the market; and accords with
the current focus of economic analysis, vis a vis rational
expectations advocates, on the influence of different
institutions and policy regimes (particularly those of the
government) on the market.
(14). Drawing on the historical patterns of central bank
development, Goodhart (1985) observes that a central bank
micro function is a naturally occurring phenomena. He is
opposed to free banking, in the context of the absence of a
central bank micro function, on the basis that It depends on
the existence of perfect costless information, or at least on
the availability of much greater information than is
available; ie he acknowledges the problem of information cost
and the resultant free-rider problem.
Nevertheless he qualifies his support for a micro regulator by
prescribing its behavioural critique; viz it should be both
non-profit-maximising and non-commercial in order to avoid the
potential cost of conflicts of interest. See Appendix 3.2.
Also in the context of self regulation, or 'the club
approach', which provides a solution to the free-rider
problem, Goodhart (1985 p75-81) similarly notes the need for
the commercial neutrality of club officialdom in order to
avoid conflicts of interest (eg officials drawn from the
membership may promote undue restraint on competition such as
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harsher barriers to entry).
(15). Goodhart (1991 p18) notes that the standard argument in
support of a central bank is based on, ...
'the view that the combination within
banks of portfolio management together
with the provision of payment services
makes them uniquely vulnerable to
contagious crises involving adverse social
externalities.'
Goodhart believes this argument may be criticised on the
grounds that, ...
'the permissible asset portfolio of
commercial banks could be restricted into
a form which limited such vulnerability.'
Goodhart's new tack is based on the view that financial
intermediaries risk is based on the unique nature of bank
assets - ie mostly non-marketable, and not suitable for
objective market valuation in conditions of information
asymmetry and limited information. And even if the payments
system were hived off to safe financial intermediaries (le
those limited to holding safe asset portfolios), ...
'we would still need a central bank to
support the residual, risky, "true",
banking institutions, which were
undertaking the necessary function of
making loans to borrowers who could not
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otherwise sell their own equity and debt
in extant financial markets.'
(16). Seigniorage, or seignorage, is defined by Cooper &
Fraser (1986 p33) as the difference between the cost of
producing money and its value as a means of exchange.
Benston (1991) comments, .
'Because, governments tended to debase the
money they produced to maximize
seigniorage in the short run, bank-
produced money often came to dominate
state-produced money. Those in power could
increase the tax they could impose on bank
money (for example, via low- or no-
interest-rate loans to the state and to
powerful persons) by limiting entry into
banking, thereby maximising banks'
profits and the amount that could be
taxed. Hence, bank regulation was almost
exclusively limited to restrictions on
entry. In the United States, taxation
often took the form of sale of bank
charters (via contributions to
legislators) and requiring banks to back
their notes with government securities. At
present, non-interest-bearing required
reserves now serve the purpose. If this
still is a reason for regulating banks,
the tax would be enhanced by reducing
restrictions on entry and assets, as this
would increase the public demand for
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reservable bank money.'
Benston also suggests that an important reason for regulation
is the redistribution of wealth to those with political power.
(17).	 Arguing, in a USA context, that the responsibility for
both areas of regulation should be vested in the one
authority, the Federal Reserve Chairman Volcker (FR Bulletin
p550, July 1984) notes that 	
'... fully one-half (of the OECD
countries), including the United Kingdom,
Italy and the Netherlands, place both the
monetary policy and the main supervisory
functions directly in the central bank.
In several major countries including
France, Germany and Japan, supervisory
responsibilities are shared in varying
degrees between the central bank and
either a banking commission or the
ministry of finance. In one country,
Canada, the formal responsibility lies
basically with the finance ministry. The
remaining countries have separate (and
typically very small) banking commissions:
those commissions usually have formal
links with the central bank, and may rely
on it for operational surveillance as well
as for policy input.'
Highlighting perceived advantages in the central bank having
dual regulatory responsibilities, Volcker also noted that...
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'The nature of the Federal Reserve's
responsibilities for the overall financial
health of the economy forces it to weigh
tradeoffs among various goals.
Specifically, conflicts between measures
taken to achieve objectives of monetary
policy and measures taken to achieve those
of supervision and regulation have to be
reconciled; more positively, those
policies need to be pursued in a mutually
reinforcing manner. Indeed, both
regulatory and monetary policy will be
improved if each can take advantage of
information obtained in the execution of
the other. ... On the other hand, the
public interest will not necessarily be
served by the single-minded pursuit of
different - and possibly competing -
policy objectives:
... But experience here and abroad
suggests that a strong central bank, by
the very nature of its broad
responsibilities and its relative
independence, is in a unique strategic
position to take a balanced and long view
• • •
(18).	 Goodhart (1985 p8) notes the practical concern of this
matter and notes opinions both for (eg Revell 1975, Benston
1983) and against (Kareken 1981, Kane 1984) having several
agencies. While favouring a single agency himself, he
acknowledges that the matter has had surprisingly little
academic and analytic attention.
178
(19). Dale (1984a p57) cites Peltzman (1970), who comments
that,
'Deposit insurance fees do not vary with a
bank's capital structure, and the
insurance enables highly leveraged banks
to avoid having to pay more for deposits.
Thus, the bank's private cost of a highly
leveraged capital structure is below the
social costs. The difference is paid for
by the (insurance agency) in the form of a
greater risk exposure'.
(20). In England, Crick & Wordsworth (1936 p11) observe that,
'By the beginning of the nineteenth
century there were banking firms in
England which could claim a history
extending over two hundred years, and the
oldest of them all were the London private
bankers. Some of these originating in
families already specialised in finance,
were firmly established long before the
first provincial bankers made their
appearance, and pre-dated even the Bank of
England (1694) by nearly a hundred years.
As early as the second half of the 17th
century the business of a number of
scriveners and goldsmiths ranged over
current and deposit accounts, advances and
the discount of bills of exchange and
government orders, and included dealing in
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bullion and foreign moneys. The goldsmiths
were quick to adopt credit instruments,
and introduced into England the cheque and
the bank promissory note. An early list of
such goldsmith-bankers records that there
were forty-four in London in 1677.'
(21). Rose (1987 p81) comments that during the colonial period
there were few domestic banks, in the current sense, and
(according to Krooss & Blyn 1971) none appeared before 1750.
Also, ...
'British banks discounted most of the
commercial notes arising from trade with
the colonies and held the deposits of the
large trading companies and wealthy
colonial landholders. In the domestic
economy trade was generally carried on by
barter and, therefore, bypassed local
banks. Moreover the colonial population
was small and widely dispersed, nine out
of every ten persons working on farms.
Lending was large confined to sales on
account with merchants extending credit to
their customers on a short-term basis.'
The further development of the institutional structure is
sketched by Cooper & Fraser (1986, p45) who note that, ...
'The first real commercial banks were
founded in the 1780's. Their "chartering"
required special acts of the state
legislature, a requirement that held until
the until the "free banking" charter laws
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of various states in 18-37 and 1838. Even
so, there were more than 300 commercial
banks by 1830.'.
(22). White (1984 p25) notes that in 1728, when bettered in
duelling with the Royal Bank (which enjoyed the advantage of
sums of cash deposited with it by government agencies), the
Bank of Scotland was faced with illiquidity (but not
insolvency) and was obliged to suspend payments, call in its
loans and make a 10% call upon its shareholders, and close its
doors for some weeks. White (1984) notes that Bank of Scotland
announced compensatory interest payments on its notes for the
period of suspension, a policy it had previously employed
during two run crisis periods.
Also, he notes that the presentation of one bank's notes for
payment by agents of the other provided the genesis of what
was to become a system of note exchange, a central
clearinghouse for cheques. Other innovations from this
strongly competitive period include the cash credit account, a
form of overdraft account by the Royal Bank in 1728, and the
soliciting of deposit accounts by offering interest by the
Bank of Scotland in the same year.
Ultimately the intensity of the rivalry was moderated and the
two banks reached an agreement to accept and regularly
exchange one another's notes as part of an accommodation
reached in 1751. This followed the widening of competition;
each bank had sponsored the formation a banking partnership in
Glasgow and were jointly surprised when these banks started
issuing their own notes. The Glasgow banks were the Glasgow
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Ship Bank supported by the Bank of Scotland in 1749, and the
Glasgow Arms Bank supported by the Royal Bank in 1750.
(23). White (1984 p28) notes that the Act chartering the Bank
of Scotland had provided for 'summary diligence' on its notes;
ie the noteholder's right to immediate payment on Bank of
Scotland notes. In 1730 the Bank of Scotland began printing an
'option clause' into the obligation printed on its notes; the
bank's pound note promised the bearer "one pound sterling on
demand, or in the option of the Directors one pound and
sixpence sterling at the end of six months after the day of
demand".
A petition for summary diligence against the Banking Company
of Aberdeen (1747-1753) by a noteholder was refused on the
grounds that remedy was enforceable on bills but not on
promissory notes such as bank notes; ie the right of summary
diligence on Bank of Scotland notes was not extended to other
bank notes. Nevertheless, White observes that the notes of the
banks continued to circulate despite legal uncertainty until
the 1765 Act settled the matter by outlawing the option
clause, and making summary diligence enforceable.
Pressures for legislation arose in part from the issuing of
small notes (ie for fractions of 1) apparently in response to
a denominational disequilibrium caused by external coin drain.
Some public agitation emerged against small notes issued with
an option clause; eg optional notes for sums of 5s. and is.
Issued by numerous small traders.
(24). White (1984 p33) note that functional differences
existed among the banks, .
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'the chartered bankers served as bankers
to many of the private banks, whereas the
latter specialised in servicing certain
sorts of borrowers not served by the
former. The private bankers also served as
Edinburgh agents of the provincial banking
companies. The private bankers in
edinburgh did not issue notes, whereas
provincial bankers typically were banks of
issue.'
Also, close arrangements existed between the Edinburgh private
and chartered banks as evidence by the private bankers often
exercising considerable control as directors of the Royal Bank
and the Bank of Scotland; White notes a vertical division of
labour arising from the comparative advantage of the smaller
private bankers in dealing with commercial borrowers, and the
economies of scale available in issuing business.
(25). White (1984 p33) also cites Anderson's (1910 p3-5)
observation of a perceived aloofness of the chartered banks
from the working public which gave rise to demand for a bank
of more liberal principles and explains the Commercial's
profession to be the bank of the citizens.
(26). The 1844 Act closed entry into the note issuing
industry throughout the UK. The 1845 Scottish Bank Act allowed
an existing Scottish issue bank to exceed its authorised
circulation (based on a previous circulation average) by
meeting a 100 per cent marginal specie reserve
requirement;thus Scottish banks could exceed authorised
circulation like the Bank of England (which had an authorised
circulation set at b4m); thus in this respect Scottish banks
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were advantaged over English provincial banks which simply had
an authorised circulation based on a previous average; White
(1984 p76).
(27). Crick & Wadsworth (1936 p11) cite the relevant extract
from the Act as, .
... during the continuance of the ...
Bank of England it shall not be lawful for
any body politick or corporate whatsoever
erected or to be erected ... or for any
other persons whatsoever united or to be
united in covenants or partnerships
exceeding the number of six persons ... to
borrow owe or take up any sum or sums of
money on their bills or notes payable at
demand or at any less time than six months
from the borrowing thereof.'
(28). The suppression of any right of banks in general to
joint stock formation was further strengthened by the Bubble
Act of 1720, which was aimed at preventing the free creation
of large stocks of freely transferable shares. Kindleberger
(1984 p76) notes that the Act
... halted formation of unincorporated
joint-stock companies and was a device to
serve the South Sea Company by halting
diversion of cash subscriptions to rival
promotions, not an attack on it, (and)
constituted a barrier to company formation
for a 100 years.'
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(29). Crick & Wadsworth (1936 p15) note that, contact
developed between the counV and London banks during this
period. Country banks often held very small cash reserves, and
held accounts with London private banks, known as a "London
agent", who performed various services (eg foreign business)
and became a form of final reserve providing an avenue for
surplus fund investment and, in stringent times, providing
accommodation usually through rediscount of bills.
Nevertheless contact between the provinces and London was
still perfunctory at best, and some of the small country banks
had no London accounts at all.
(30). This is derived from Webber (1989), with reference to
Pressnell (1956 p229-234). Also, he notes that the potential
for organic capital growth was constrained; more particularly,
in the late 1700's, many banks were formed as adjuncts to
existing trade business and with the objective of providing a
source of funding. The potential for additions to bank capital
from banking profits was apparently rare; the maintenance of a
reserve fund among private bankers does not appear to have
become a normal practice until around the 1820's and later -
an alternative being larger cash reserves and an account with
the Bank of England.
Generally the increase of bank capital beyond initial
investment does not appear to have been common until the
1840's and later;
le from profits retained to build up the business; by new
entrants bringing additional capital - although this was
usually only to replace an outgoing partner unless the number
of partners was being extended to the maximum limit; or by
calling upon existing partners for further capital although
this was highly unusual.
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An emphasis on the adequacy of capital and reserves in the
early 19th century in respect of country banks, is noted by
Pressnell (1956 p234), but qualified by the crude nature of
contemporaneous banking theory. Pressnell comments that
insistence on a large minimum capital, without reform in other
directions, might have resulted in but a slight increase in
security at the expense of an over-capitalised banking system.
The reaction of country banks to public discussion about the
levels of their capital in the second quarter of the 19th
century remains obscure.
(31). More particularly such banks were to be established
only outside a 65 mile radius of London; they were not allowed
to open offices in this defined London area; nor able to draw
bills on their London agents payable on demand or for less
than f50 in amount. Also, while shareholders were to remain
jointly liable for debts of the co-partnership, proceeding
were to be taken by, or made against, two or more members
appointed as "public officers" , and judgement against such
officers were to operate against all partners; Crick &
Wadsworth (1936 p16)
(32). The defined London exclusion zone more than covered the
area in which The Bank of England's notes circulated (as well
as those of around 100 private note-issuing banking firms);
also the Bank had always conducted a purely London business
with no direct interest in the provinces. Post the 1826 Act
the Bank opened branches in Gloucester, Manchester, Swansea in
1826; Birmingham, Liverpool, Bristol Leeds, Exeter (later
removed to Plymouth) in 1827; Newcastle in 1828; Hull and
Norwich in 1829; and Plymouth and Portsmouth in 1834. Crick &
Wadsworth (1936 p17).
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(33). Unlike the country joint stock banks, London joint
stock banks were established as common law co-partnerships
without the right to act through "public officers"; legal
actions '
	
required the quotation of all shareholders
the number of which might run into hundreds. Consequently any
action could be void for any slight inaccuracy on the list;
banks having even one shareholder in common could not take
action against themselves (under common law no man could sue
himself). Apart from constitutional problems, animosity from
the Bank of England and discrimination in favour of private
bankers (vis a vis ability to accept bills at less than 6
months after date). Crick & Wadsworth (1936 p19-20).
(34). As noted by Crick & Wadsworth (1936 p24-25), the Act
prevented the development of note issuing activity by any bank
not currently engaged in it, and prevented any note issuing
bank from circulating more notes than it had outstanding prior
to the Act. Also, ...
' ... it was permissible for two private
banks of issue to amalgamate and retain
the aggregate of their issue, provided the
membership of the new partnership did not
exceed 6 in number - but if an issuing
joint stock bank absorbed a private bank
of issue, or if two joint stock banks of
issue amalgamated, then the new note issue
was not to be the sum of the existing note
circulation, but only the amounts
permitted to the absorbing bank. (Also)
... if any joint stock bank of issue
amalgamated with a bank, whether joint
stock bank or private, having an office
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within the 65 mile radius, or itself
opened a branch there, the right of issue
was forfeited. (And) if any issuing bank
closed its doors its right of issue
lapsed.'
(35). The 1844 Act was influenced by a Select Committee on
Joint Stock Companies of the same year which concluded that
unsound companies were comprised of three types: those founded
on unsound principles; those ill-constituted so that failures
were incident to management; and those of speculative origin.
The Committee recommended that various information about the
companies should be published in order to counter the last two
reasons for failure, namely the names of directors,
shareholders, and the amount of capital subscribed or to be
subscribed; Webber (1989).
(36). During the life of the code, which ended in 1857, no
more than 10 bank establishments were attempted; and only
three established in the post 1844 decade. While some of the
code's provisions were desirable and had been the practice of
London joint stock banks, those covering the formation and
regulating the deeds of settlement, and the minimum share
values, restricted the possibility of formation to all but the
most ambitious of promoters and prosperous towns. The
restraints were even more of a penalty due to competition from
existing joint stock banks not subject to such controls. On
the other hand, existing companies enjoyed a period of freedom
from competition in which they could consolidate their
position. By allowing existing institutions the possibility of
growth free from new competitors it may well have added to
security in banking; Webber (1989). Crick & Wadsworth (1936
p27)
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(37). The 1860's were also characterised by trade expansion,
speculation and, with excessive company formation, many
business failures. Declining public confidence in private
banks was further shaken with the spectacular 1866 Overend-
Gurney crisis (a discount house which had changed to limited
liability a few months before failing with liabilities of more
than 1.10m). Also, the form of the shares of new limited
liability banks provided opportunity for speculation; some
were subject to operations involving rumour coupled with bear
speculation - legislation in 1867 (Leeman's Act) brought this
practice to an end by requiring contracts of share purchase or
sale to quote the distinguishing numbers. Crick & Wadsworth
(1936 p32-33).
(38). Details of the case are noted in Anderson & Cottrell
(1974 p308) citing the Bankers' Magazine XXXVIII (1878 917-
2].). Anderson & Cottrell (1974 p249) note that, ...
... belief in unlimited liability was
overthrown in 1878 by the failure of the
City of Glasgow Bank, an unlimited
concern. Its shareholders were twice asked
for capital to meet the bank's debts; the
first call was for 11500 per i100 stock
held and it fell on 1,800 separate
individuals, resulting in the bankruptcy
of a third of the proprietors. A second
call of 12,250 per i100 held was made and
was met by 269 shareholders.'
Webber (1989) citing Gregory (1929 p.x) notes that the total
holding of shares by the public was 1840,000 and the holders
of i750,000 of this were absolutely ruined.
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(39). Collins (1988 p100) comments that the 1879 Companies
Act,
'... especially eased the transition to
limited liability status by permitting
bank proprietors to acquire a special form
of "reserved" liability. Under this act
unlimited liability was retained for note
issues, but for other liabilities and
debts the amount that shareholders could
be called upon to contribute in normal
circumstances was restricted to a fixed
sum - the liability was no longer
unlimited. However, in the event of
liquidation shareholders would be
responsible for paying up to an extra,
specified amount in order to cover the
company's debts. This extra amount
represented the new "reserved" liability,
a reservoir of capital resources not
available under normal commercial
conditions, but resources which could be
drawn upon only in the last resort. Thus,
a compromise had been devised between
those who argued that full limited
liability (where shareholders were only
liable to the book value of their shares)
might deter the public from placing
deposits with a bank; and those who
stressed that the unlimited nature of a
proprietors liability under old
legislation was restricting the pool of
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potential investors.'
Also, in the Scottish context, as noted by Checkland (1975
p478)
'The Company Acts had made limited
liability available to business enterprise
generally. The banks in Scotland, and the
larger ones in England, had made no move
to adopt it, preferring that the
obligation should continue to rest on
shareholders: they felt that such a step
would reduce public confidence in them,
and so harm their business. Even after the
debacle of 1878, the Scottish banks were
still reluctant to limit liability to
subscribed shares. In a sense they were
right, for limited liability meant that
the public would bear any losses beyond
the capital. The Scottish situation was
complicated by the fact that the three
oldest banks had always enjoyed limited
liability, being creations of the state.
The outcome was a compromise. The
government passed the Companies Act 1879.
... The Act introduced the principle of
"reserve liability". Under it, banks could
acquire subscriptions for additional
reserve capital which would not be called,
except in the case of illiquidity or
failure.'
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(40). These democratisation developments are shown by example
in Crick & Wadsworth (1936 p344-345). The trend to wider share
ownership and limited liability is exampled by the experience
of the Midland; this name was adopted in 1923 following the
period of bank consolidations reflected in previous longer
names - from Birmingham and London pre 1891, to London and
Midland, to London Joint City and Midland in 1918.
Its early capital comprised 2,000 shares of ,50 on which125
was called up. Over the years the uncalled capital was paid-up
out of profits and further shares issued; by 1874 capital
comprised 6,000 .f50 shares fully paid. In 1881 with a change
to limited liability a large amount of uncalled capital was
reintroduced; issued capital then comprised 24,000 shares of
160 on which i12.10s was paid-up, 12.10s was callable at any
time, and the remaining .35 available only in the event of
liquidation.
Largely as a result of amalgamations the number of shares had
grown rapidly, reaching 2.869m in 1918. This, coupled with an
environment in which stability of earnings had brought the
shares' investment quality close to "gilt-edged" class, led
the bank to appeal to a wider, more marketable, share
ownership by creating a new class of capital - fully paid
shares; this was designed to appeal to small investors who
were reluctant to hold the old shares due to the risk, however
slight, of heavy calls. Consequently, nearly 2m fully paid
i2.10s shares were issued - some for cash and the majority in
acquiring the capital of two Scottish affiliations. In a
further step to democratisation, another new class of shares
was created in 1925 and 2.25m f1 fully paid shares were issued
for cash over following years.
Contemporaneous with Crick & Wadsworth (1936) the paid-up
capital of 114.5m was divided almost equally between partly
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and fully paid shares, while the ;11 fully paid were rather
more numerous than those of P.10s.
The increase in number of shareholders reflects both growth
and democratisation. Immediately prior to its 1879 change to
limited liability status the paid-up capital of1300,000 was
held by 290 shareholders - an average of just over f1,000
each. In 1934 the paid up capital of i14.25m was held by
72,900 shareholders, averaging about 1200 each (Crick and
Wadsworth 1936 p345). More recently, in 1990, the Midland Bank
plc share capital comprised 784m 11 shares held by 109,236
shareholders, of whom 102,498 were individuals holding 94% of
the shares.
(41). Among the early organisations formed to issue paper
currency, Staats (1965 p38) notes the role of capital appears
to have been secondary to that of assets. He comments, ...
'Apparently, the amount of notes an
organisation was able to issue depended
upon the assets held and not upon the size
of the owners' equity'.
(42). Staats (1965 p39) notes that in 1781 Congress chartered
the Bank of North America, ' the first bank in the modern
sense - with a proposed capital of $10m. However the bank
began operations with capital stock of $324,000 of which
$254,000 was owned by the continental government'
Cooper & Fraser (1986 p45) note that the First and Second
banks moderated the issue of state bank notes by periodically
presenting the notes for payment in specie; nevertheless,
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pressure from banks and those who feared the national bank's
concentration of financial power contributed to the non-
renewal of each bank's original fixed term charter. A detailed
account of their histories is proviaea by TiTliberlake
(43). Howe (1915 p96) provides a sketch of early state
banking,
'In some instances the state held a
portion of the capital stock. The State of
South Carolina owned all of the capital
stock of the Bank of the State of South
Carolina and its officers and directors
were elected by the Legislature.
The banks received deposits, discounted
. merchant's notes, and loaned money to land
owners on mortgage security and dealt in
domestic and foreign exchange. They had
the right to issue circulating notes to
the amount of two or three times their
capital stock. Their bills were redeemable
on demand in coin - that is, gold or
silver, whichever was most convenient. A
reserve of about 33 1/3 per cent was
maintained by the better class of banks,
but others kept but 10 per cent or even
less.
There was no adequate supervision and the
laws enacted for their control were
loosely enforced. Some of the charters
were secured by unscrupulous men who
ignored or evaded the laws and who issued
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bank notes without the capital stock being
paid in full, and in the case of some
banks no capital at all was provided.'
(44). Cooper & Fraser (1986 p 48-49) note that federal
legislation also "encouraged" state banks to convert to
national charter, with the introduction of a tax on state bank
notes. While initially effective (a balance of 1,600 national
banks versus under 400 state banks by 1866) the tax became
increasingly irrelevant (in accord with a growing preference
for check, ie cheque, accounts rather than bank notes) and
1,500 state banks existed by 1888, thus securing a dual system
of both national and state banks. Theycomment that, ...
A significant measure of noteholder
protection was a provided by the
requirement that the national bank deposit
with the comptroller an amount of
government bonds equal to the amount of
'national bank notes' (printed in uniform
fashion by the Treasury) received by the
banks for issue. If a national bank failed
to redeem its notes, its bonds could be
sold to pay the noteholders.'
(45). Cooper & Fraser (1986) note that as a "sop" to states
rights, membership in the Federal Reserve System was mandatory
for national banks but voluntary for state banks and created
'... a number of problems, some of which persist to the
present day'. An immediate effect was the encouragement of
banks to seek state bank chartering to avoid the costs of
membership of the Federal Reserve System; also this created a
195
system of non-uniform reserve requirements (state banks were
subject to state rather than federal reserve requirements)
which persisted until the DIDMCA of 1980.
(46). Potential confusion between the status of partnerships
and joint stock banks, and chartered and unchartered banks, in
English and Scottish contexts, is considered by a number of
authors. Crick & Wadsworth (1936 p10) note that at the time of
the establishment of the Bank of England (1694) which gained
the sole right to joint stock organisation in England and
Wales by a special charter from the Crown, ...
'There was ... no true joint stock
organisation in the modern sense of a body
operating under a special branch of the
law. When it was desired to pool capital
from numerous subscribers in a common
venture the only means of doing so with
safety and convenience was to obtain a
special charter from the Crown. In
industry and trade the usual commercial
unit was an individual or a small
partnership, with members more often than
not drawn from one family. Gradually,
however, as undertakings grew larger and
called for more extensive capital funds,
partnerships tended to increase the number
of their members, embodying the terms of
their association in a deed of co-
partnership, issuing share capital, and
becoming "common law companies". Large
firms of this description were sometimes
called "joint stocks", but they possessed
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no corporate entities, and their members
were individually liable for all debt of
the firm. Nevertheless, such associations,
though prohibited for more than a century
by the Bubble Act of 1719, in fact
continued to increase in strength and
numbers, forming the direct predecessors
of the modern trading company. In English
banking both these roads to development
were closed, ...'
In the context of Scotland, around 1810, White (1984 p33)
notes that
'Checkland (1975) reserves the term
"joint-stock bank" for enterprises to be
founded later, and Munn (1981) follows
this usage in his history of the
provincial banking companies. ... The law
made no distinction among provincial,
joint-stock, and private banks, as the
rule of unlimited liability made all
nonchartered banks effectively
partnerships. The important distinction
came along financial lines: The private
banks and provincial banking companies
were based on their partners'
contributions, with shares generally not
freely transferable, whereas joint-stock
banks raised capital by issuing a limited
number of transferable shares.
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(47). In a general context, the significance of the
introduction of limited liability has been linked to economies
of scale by Hicks (1983), who comments that, ...
'In so far as one associates economic
progress with economies of scale....it
must be regarded as a major achievement of
limited liability that it has made much of
our economic progress possible.'
Nevertheless, at least in contemporary bank regulation terms,
Benston (1991 p228) notes that, ...
'Enhancement of productive efficiency is
mentioned as another reason for
regulation. If there were significant
economies of scale, these might be
achieved by restricting the number of
banks that could operate. However,
empirical studies do not find such
economies, except perhaps among the giant
banks. Furthermore, banking is a worldwide
market, in which entry by giant banks into
national markets cannot be restrained
successfully.'
(48). The origins of UK ratio control are suggested by Crick
& Wadsworth (1936 p39). They note that the Baring crisis of
1890 provoked widespread debate about banking reserves and,
prior to the First World War, led to regular monthly
publications of statements of account showing cash to deposit
liabilities by several large joint stock banks, ..
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'Thus the proportion between cash and
deposit liabilities was brought into
prominence and the banks began to become
effectively "ratio conscious ... (and
later) ... the cash ratios of the
commercial banks came to provide the
principal medium for the smooth operation
of central bank policy".
Prior to the recent capital ratio developments (considered in
Chapter 4), Revell (1975 p46) notes, ...
'The only publicised ratios for banks in
Britain have been cash ratios, liquidity
ratios and reserve asset ratios. These
have three features: (1) they are intended
mainly for monetary policy purposes; (2)
when imposed, they were based on existing
practices of the banks; (3) until 1971,
they applied only to the London clearing
banks, and in a less rigorous form to the
Scottish clearing banks.
(49). Gardener (1981 p28) notes that, . ..
'The UK system of bank regulation
generally has often been described as one
of "suasion", or moral persuasion. This
system has relied on the idea of
gentlemen's agreements, together with a
respect for the advice and suggestions of
the Bank of England that apparently
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transcended the need for explicit and
detailed rules and laws.'
Nevertheless, formality is distinct from power of enforcement.
The more formal US regulators also had to use "persuasion".
Orgler & Wolkowitz (1976 p73) note that, .. .
'None of the (US) regulatory agencies have
direct legal authority to enforce
practices concerning capital. Requests for
additional capital are supported by
persuasion rather than the threat of legal
sanctions. Of course, the regulators can
be very persuasive by denying branch and
acquisition applications or by frequently
examining an offending bank. In the
extreme case, when a bank's solvency is
jeopardised by lack of capital, regulators
can invoke cease and desist orders, but
they rarely do.'
(50). The specific question of why capital ratios experienced
a secular decline is outside the focus of the dissertation.
Nevertheless potential, influencing factors include the
development of taxation, or more particularly the tax
deductability of interest payments, which may have rendered a
qualified advantage to debt vis a vis equity financing. A
further question concerns the influence of the introduction of
a professional bank management which may have influenced
agency costs.
(51). See the quote from Staats (1965 p45) in Chapter 3.4.3a.
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(52). Staats (1965 p61-2) observed that, in 1909,
legislation in California required that paid-in capital must
always equal at least 10% of deposit liabilities; similarly,
Kansas required that deposits must not be accepted to exceed,
continuously for 6 months, ten times paid-up capital stock and
surplus; Oklahoma required that deposits (excluding inter-bank
deposits) must not be accepted to exceed ten times paid-up
capital stock and surplus; Rhode Island limited deposits to 10
times capital stock; and South Dakota limited deposits to 15
times legal capital. Also Texas imposed a more complex
legislative restriction on deposits in terms of capital and
surplus; this involved more stringent limitations on smaller
banks in recognition of their greater susceptibility to
insolvency.
(53). Staats (1965 p63-64) notes that, in order to limit the
quantity of higher-risk bank assets, Massachusetts limited
loans to twice capital stock, while Nevada and Nebraska
restricted loans plus investments to 8 times capital stock;
Nebraska also limited real estate assets to 50% of capital
stock.
(54). Early manifestations, noted by Staats (1965 p96) were
the concept of "fluctuating" assets, and net "free" capital.
In early 1940 Skinner advocated a ratio of capital to
"fluctuating assets", defined as loans and investments.
Also, Wooster (1943) introduced the concept of "net free
capital" derived from concept of "available" capital proposed
in 1940 by the Institute of International Finance at New York
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University. "Net free capital" is determined by subtracting
fixed investments and substandard loans and investments from
total capital funds. Staats notes that Wooster suggested a
ratio of net free capital to risk assets, while the Institute
of International Finance proposed a ratio of available capital
to total earnings assets.
(55). The early 1952 FRBNY ratio, and the Federal Reserve
Board's 1956 and 1972 ratio formulations, as demonstrated by
the "Analyzing of Bank Capital" or "ABC" forms, are shown in
Revell (1975).
The asset risk category nomenclatures in the 1952 FRBNY ratio
cited in Staats (1965) appear to be derived from Crosse, H.D.
(1962). Revell (1975) citing the methodology actually
published by the FRNBNY uses a slightly different nomenclature
for some categories; these are similarly ranked as riskless
assets, minimum risk assets, normal risk assets (ie the
ordinary portfolio of the bank), sub-standard assets, workout
assets, and fixed assets.
Also, the revised 1972 ABC form methodology is neatly
summarised by Orgler & Wolkowitz (1976), ...
'This (ABC) formula is part of the
screening process used by the Federal
Reserve in detecting those banks that
require close analysis of the adequacy of
their capital. In principle, subjective
weights are assigned to balance sheet
Items to determine the amount of necessary
capital. On the liability side, weights
represent credit and market risks. The sum
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of the liability weights multiplied by the
weights outstanding less liquidity
provided by assets yields the required
amount of capital for liquidity purposes.
The amount of capital required to cover
asset risks is obtained by adding the
products of the amount outstanding of each
asset multiplied by its credit and market
risk factors. This is supplemented by
capital required for other purposes such
as the activities of the trust department.
The total requirements are compared to
adjusted capital (total capital less
classified assets) to determine if the
amount of capital as bank has is
adequate.'
As a forerunner of current capital requirements for off-
balance sheet items (see Chapter 4) Moulton (1987) notes that
off-balance sheet items were accommodated indirectly via a
capital requirement for trust department activities and
expressed as a certain percentage of trust earnings. She
notes, ...
'Though trust activities are not the sort
of off-balance sheet exposure that the new
guidelines are aimed at, trust department
assets are not on the bank's balance
sheet. (Trust income is reported on the
income statement.) A capital requirement
against gross trust earnings reflected the
risk that lower earnings might adversely
affect the bank's earnings.'
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(56). In terms of individual banks in the US context, Benston
(1991 p26-27) believes regulation made banks significantly
less stable by constraining their ability to diversify; he
contends that state and nationwide branching restrictions were
responsible for most of the failures of 1920s and 1930s. He
also criticises restrictions on asset diversification
regulations (eg Glass-Steagall Act separation of commercial
and investment banking).
'Opportunities for and incentives of
owners and managers toward risk-taking or
avoidance have been affected by
regulations restricting the assets banks
can hold and services they can provide, by
deposit insurance, and by capital
requirements. Because banks can take
almost any desired level of risk, it is
unlikely that restraints on their
activities will be effective in reducing
risk-taking. In fact, evidence supports
this conclusion. Deposit insurance on the
other hand, gives banks incentives to take
risks, which they have done. Capital
requirements ... though, are an effective
means of restraining risk-taking. Given
the expectation that deposit insurance
serves to reduce banks' desired levels of
capital, imposition of capital
requirements is necessary.'
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CHAPTER 4
BANK CAPITAL DEFINITION: CONTEMPORARY DEVELOPMENTS
4.1	 INTRODUCTION
Over the past two to three decades a number of factors have
emerged and contributed to significant changes in the
regulation of banks in many industrialised countries.
Generally these factors include harsher environmental
conditions, improved analytic capabilities and concern about
the effectiveness of existing capital regulation. Regulation
changes (1) include a move to convergence in supervisory
capital standards and an increasingly complex methodology.
While the market's failure to account for the cost of systemic
failure remains a fundamental argument for regulation, the use
of market determined risk premia is being advocated as a
supplementary regulatory tool.
The following sections consider contemporary developments
concerning bank capital. Section 4.2 considers traditional
debate about the use of a capital adequacy notion, and
developments in the general banking environment. The
fundamental elements of the notion of capital's adequacy are
also reviewed; namely, the characteristic and functional based
definitions of bank capital and refinements in bank risk
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definition and identification.
Contemporary accounting and regulatory views of bank capital
definition are considered in Sections 4.3 and 4.4
respectively. The latter focuses on refinements in national
(UK and US), and international, regulatory definitions of
adequate bank capital.
Complementing the traditional debate about the use of a notion
of capital adequacy, Section 4.5 provides a criticism of bank
capital regulation and includes both managerial and market
views. Apart from considering general evidence about the
efficacy of bank capital regulation, the specific methodology
of the widely advocated capital to risk-weighted asset ratio,
which has particular ramifications for bank management, is
also reviewed. Market based risk assessment provides an
alternative means of setting capital standards and also allows
assessment of past regulatory practice.
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4.2	 RECENT EVOLUTIONARY ENVIRONMENT
4.2.1	 Past Limitation of the Capital Adequacy Notion
The failure of many US banks in the Great Depression era
prompted research on the relationship between relative bank
capital and bank failure. Early studies contributed to a
traditional view that there was no relationship; Secrist
(1938), Crosse (1962), Cotter (1966). (2).
Secrist (1938) found the ratios were lower for non-failures
than for failures and commented that,
'The assertion that banks in order to
remain solvent must have a ratio of at
least 10% (the prevailing regulatory
standard of capital to deposits to
minimise threat to solvency) is illusory
	  According to this standard, the
safer institutions are those first to
fail'.
More recently, Vojta (1973a p9) noted that
'The weight of scholarly research is
overwhelmingly to the effect that the
level of bank capital has not been a
material factor in preventing bank
insolvency, and that the ratio 'tests' for
capital adequacy have not been useful in
assessing or predicting the capability of
a bank to remain solvent'.
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The inability of this research to link capital levels to
failure may be mitigated to some extent. The observation that
many of the banks which failed during the Depression era had
relatively high capital structures finds a possible
explanation in the fact that capital ratios may have been
boosted by deposit runs prior to insolvency, Gable (1974),
Dale (1984a, p57).
Evidence on more recent bank failures also suggests that
capital ratios were not a significant factor; Santomero &
Vinso (1977), Cates Consulting Analysts (1985) (3).
Nevertheless, a number of studies have indicated a significant
relationship between a bank's capital ratio and its
probability of failure; Bovenzi et al (1983), Avery & Hanweck
(1984) and Short et al (1985) all show a statistically
significant relationship between a bank's capital ratio and
its probability of failure. Also, Korobow & Stuhr (1983) find
that regulators' evaluations of banks are significantly
influenced by capital ratios.
Ehlen (1983) argues for moderation in the perceived role of
capital in bank failure. He notes that...
...'the strength of a financial
institution and its first line of defense
against adversity is earning power, with
the corollary being that capital is of
lesser importance' 	  and that 
	
'capital plays a critical, although
passive, role in maintaining the financial
strength and credibility of a financial
Institution in the market place.'
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Representing a more "definition based" approach to the
relationship, Dale (1984a) stresses the 'essential link
between capital adequacy and bank failures' and comments that
those who seek to deny a connection between capital adequacy
and bank failures are confused. Dale argues that a bank can
only be said to have failed when it has exhausted its capital,
and that much of the confusion surrounding.this issue turns on
the difference between the concept of capital as own funds
available to absorb losses and the published measurements of
capital which may be give an entirely false reading due to
asset overvaluation (eg loan losses have not been taken into
account).
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4.2.2	 Bank Capital and the Recent Banking Environment:
A remarkable state of flux has characterised the banking
industry worldwide over the past couple of decades, and has
focused much attention on the role of capital in bank
management and regulation.
It is difficult to comprehensively define the current period
of banking industry development. While the manifestations of
significant change are apparent at most levels of bank
structure and activity, the factors causing change are diverse
and inter-related. Without the dominance of a single
omnipotent causative factor, or outcome, particularly one of
extreme cathartic quality as in 1929 and the 30's, the current
period lacks the convenience of a single label. "Revolution"
is seemingly apt yet perhaps premature as the period lacks a
definitive end; economic historians ultimately may become the
label-fixing arbiters referring to outcomes as yet unforseen
(4). Nevertheless in a specific context, such as financial
innovation, "revolution" appears a suitable term in the
interim; Miller (1986) observes that, ...
'The word revolution is entirely
appropriate for describing the changes in
financial institutions and instruments
that have occurred in the past twenty
years. The major impulses to successful
financial innovations have come from
regulations and taxes.'
The general complexity and enormity of the process of change
became increasing evident during the 1980's. As noted by the
OECD (1985), .
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'During the past twenty years or so, the
business of banking has gone through a
period of extremely rapid and accelerating
changes under the combined impact of
profound modifications in the economic
environment, technology, market forces and
public policies regarding the regulatory
framework. In many instances, the
causality of these changes has not been
unidirectional and there have been
important feed-back effects in the process
of change.' (5)
The dimensions of regulatory, market and institutional change,
particularly those wrought in the UK, are assessed by Res
(1985) who notes a framework of key causative exogenous
factors including inflation, information technology, the
"Thatcher Effect" (a form of liberalism), the relegation of
sterling from a world currency status, international
competition (London as a world financial centre), and human
behaviour.
Generally, changes in the banking market have originated from
different policy approaches to the financial services industry
as well as shifts in the bank regulatory framework. Other
changes have resulted from the evolution of financial
practices, techniques and strategies. Among the major
developments noted by the OECD stand customers' new demands
for financial services, financial innovations and the
"marketisation" of banking and finance. Also the growing
interpenetration of the financial services industry and
technological advances (6).
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Bank capital management and supervision became increasingly
significant during the 1980's as bank capital, and
profitability, replaced bank balance sheet size as key
measures of a bank's success. Generally, this trend reflected
a growing deterioration in asset quality and a perceived need
to strengthen capital resources.
In the US context, Maisel (1981 p5) observes the problem of
determining whether the post war decline in banks' capital
ratios is the result of benign market forces reflecting, for
instance improved financial techniques, or of weakness in the
regulatory system. He comments (p109), . . .
'Capital adequacy has become a question of
prime concern because some observers,
including bankers, fear that the level of
capital may have fallen too far. ...
forces are at work tending to drive
capital ratios down below prior levels and
under those that regulators believe are
adequate. What are these forces? Do such
pressures arise from the normal operation
of a free market, or are they the result
of the special regulatory environment of
the banks?'
Capital strength became a major market status factor (7) and
capital adequacy became more strategic as banks, under the
combined impact of market forces and supervisory actions, have
attempted to strengthen their capital base by raising new
equity and, in some countries, long-term funds which can be
assimilated to capital; eg convertible securities, various
forms of preference shares and subordinated debt. There also
has been a clear tendency to boost loan loss reserves and
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provisions, including undisclosed reserves, where accommodated
by the tax and regulatory authorities. The OECD notes that
this tendency mainly reflects the perception of a
deterioration in asset quality and a desire to build up a
cushion against potentially adverse developments.
The OECD (1985) notes,
'The need to maintain and strengthen
capital resources has become a major
consideration for both supervisors and the
banks themselves. A strong capital base
makes for confidence in a bank and also
provides a cushion against possible
losses. The need to maintain sound capital
ratios is also a spur to good credit
assessment and control, which is
particularly necessary in the face of
structurally increases riskiness of
banking. Provisions/losses arising from
poor lending can be expected to lead to
pressures from supervisors for more
capital at a time when this may not be
easily raised.'
Regulatory pressure to increase capital standards during the
1980's has been defended by Greenspan (1988). Putting forward
the Federal Reserve Board's policy, he argues for the need for
fortification of,
'the natural "shock absorbers" of the
financial system - capital and liquidity -
and concurrently to make better use of
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market and market-like incentives to
discourage excessive risk-taking at
individual institutions. ... While the
capital ratios of bank holding companies
generally have been rising during the
1880's, they still tend to be considerably
below those at nondepository financial
firms. In many cases, this difference no
doubt reflects real or imagined protection
by the federal safety net. This tendency
towards over-reliance on the safety net by
both owners and depositors has inhibited,
and in some cases may have eliminated, the
private market signals that would have
made much less likely many of the
portfolio problems now facing numerous
depository institutions. Thus, the safety
and soundness of the financial system
require that banks have adequate capital.'
Greenspan acknowledges that some banks not under market
pressure to increase capital ratios may be reluctant to raise
them, but argues that the federal safety net may be distorting
market signals and weakening adequate capital incentives (8).
214
4.2.3	 Characteristic and Functional Definitions of
Bank Capital
a.	 Pressure for Definition Development
In the light of the above developments, the regulatory
definition of bank capital has come under pressure to
transcend pure equity to accommodate other equity like items.
A particular pressure emanates from the increased financial
innovation and its associated spawning of hybrid securities;
these may be viewed as securities which do not possess the
full complement of characteristic qualities associated with
equity capital; on this basis "pure" debt may be viewed as
extreme hybridism.
Ultimately this has precipitated a redefinition of bank
capital which focuses on the properties of capital rather than
the traditional dichotomy of debt and equity components.
Essentially, these properties may be viewed as functional
properties based on capital's characteristics. The OECD (1985)
notes that, ...
'Problems of definition and measurement of
what constitutes capital or own funds have
become increasingly acute with the
proliferation of new equity and debt
instruments. Some of these instruments
present complex legal and technical
features which need to be carefully
assessed to determine the precise legal
status and economic value of the different
elements admitted within the capital
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base.'
b.	 Characteristics of Bank Capital
The bank liability structure may be viewed as a single
structure of components (as per normal balance sheet
presentation) or, alternatively and equivalently, a set of
structures, each representing a characteristic. Maturity
represents an obvious characteristic structure; also, relative
seniority in terms of asset claim in liquidation represents
another; there are many more. Any component may be uniquely
defined by some minimum number of specified characteristic
qualities.
Bank capital thus may be viewed in terms of a number of
characteristic dimensions, each providing an absolute or
proportional measure, rather than the traditional single
structure equity-debt dichotomy which is unable to accommodate
hybrid elements.
The characteristic structures approach also is conducive to
more complex analysis. An early acknowledgement of the
characteristics view of bank capital is provided by Pringle
(1974) who isolates the maturity characteristic; he comments,
• • •
'Of the characteristics that distinguish
capital from other claims issued by banks,
two are of primary importance (to this
analysis): capital bears risk, and it is
of long maturity. The capital decision
thus must be analyzed along two
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1dimensions: optimality from the standpoint
of risk-bearing, and optimality from the
standpoint of the maturity structure of
liabilities. Nearly all of the literature
on financial structure of firms concerns
the first question: risk-bearing and the
debt/equity mix."
Pringle also notes the debate over the use of long term debt
in bank capital structures which should focus he contends, ...
'specifically on differences in the
characteristics of debt and equity claims
and on the functions capital performs from
the standpoint of the various interested
parties.'
Also, the idea of characteristic structures may lend itself to
arbitrage pricing theory which views the equilibrium return on
any risky asset as a linear combination of various common
factors which affect asset returns; ie a more general case
than the capital asset pricing model in which equilibrium
rates of return on risky assets is simply a function of its
covariance with the market portfolio; See Chapter 2.
The representation of a financial instrument as a combination
of characteristics has been used both to define financial
innovation Desai & Low (1985), and to provide a model of the
financial intermediation process Blake (1988). Desai & Low
note that the idea of goods as being combinations of
characteristics is now a familiar one as a result of the work
of Gorman (1980), Lancaster (1966) and others.
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Desai & Low (1985) extend the notion of location theory to
characteristic space which they consider in terms of two
dimensions, namely yield and liquidity; and indicate the
possibility of using more dimensions. They apply this analytic
structural device to the financial product market to determine
the relative closeness and separation between available
products measured by the angle of their individual positions
from origin axes. This process allows the distinction of
routine or trivial from important innovation and indicates
existing innovation gaps in the product market.
c.	 Functional Capital
The functions of bank capital may be viewed as being drawn
from its characteristics, either singly or in combination.
Although the set of characteristics, and functions, is
conceivably extremely large, bank regulators, and authors on
the topic of bank capital, appear to emphasise the importance
of a number of functions (9). Some authors accord pre-eminent
importance to a single function. Typifying these views, the
Reserve Bank of Australia (RBA Bulletin February 1985)
observes that, ...
'A bank requires capital: 1) As a cushion
to absorb losses; 2) To evidence the
willingness of shareholders to commit
their own funds on a permanent basis; 3)
To provide resources free of fixed
financing costs; and 4) To finance
investment in infrastructure and
associates.'; see also Bank of England
(1980)
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Each of the above functions may be viewed as being based on
one or more characteristic of bank capital. For instance,
characteristics implicitly referred to in the above functions
include, seniority (the low seniority of asset claim, eg of
equity and subordinated securities), maturity (permanent),
the discretionary payment of dividends (and perhaps floating
interest).
d. Characteristic Capacity Versus Exclusivity
There appears to be a form of economy associated with
capital's characteristics; namely while each function is based
on one or more characteristic, a single characteristic may
provide the basis for multiple functions. But some regulators
have implicitly challenged this by allocating capital
exclusively to a single function via the concept of "free"
capital eg see Chapter 3.5.3d and its footnote 54; and also
the Bank of England's (1980) definition of "gearing ratio"
capital base.
e. Most Important Function
A number of authors and regulators ascribe a single bank
capital function a "most important" status and distinguish it
from a "most important" function for general industrial
corporations.
Reed (1964 cited in Gardener 1981, p9) comments, ...
'In most business firms, the primary
function of capital is to finance the
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purchase of buildings, machinery and
equipment. Its secondary function is to
protect long- and short-term creditors,
who make funds available to the business.
In banking , however, the function of
capital is primarily to serve as a cushion
or insurance fund to absorb losses that
may occur. As a source of funds for the
acquisition of physical assets, bank
capital serves a secondary function.'
Peltzman (1970) in likening bank capital investment to a
production process notes, ...
'bank capital has two roles: (i) It
. cooperates directly with the other inputs
in the production of bank services, and
(ii) it is used to attract the deposit
input by providing insurance to depositors
against a decline in the value of a bank's
assets; the more capital a bank has, the
more the value of its assets can fall
before depositors incur losses. The
difference between banking (and financial
institutions in general) and most other
industries is in the relative importance
of these two roles. The equity capital of
any firm serves, in part, to guarantee the
value of the firm's fixed obligations, but
that function is usually subordinate to
the provision of assets to the firm.
However, in banking, equity capital (and
equity is the form that almost all
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non-deposit ownership interest in bank
assets has taken) typically accounts for
only about a tenth of total bank
resources, and most of the returns to
equity capital derive from its insurance
function. Bank owners invest capital
primarily to attract deposits, which are
then used to buy assets, and only
secondarily to buy assets directly.'
As evidenced by Staats's (1965) work, commercial bank managers
and state regulators may accord pre-eminent importance to a
single function. Although his survey results indicate some
variety in opinions as to the single most important function,
each response group displayed a majority in favour of 'the
provision of depositor confidence' as the single most
important function of bank capital.
f.	 The Unique Function of Bank Capital
In noting a uniqueness in the function of bank capital,
Gardener (1981 p9) notes, ...
'The unique functional characteristics of
bank capital compared with the role played
by capital in non-financial firms ...
derives essentially from changes in the
emphasis of the role of capital.'
He ascribes this to asset financing, ...
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'in proportionate balance-sheet terms,
banks do not require such a heavy
fixed-asset investment as a typical
non-financial enterprise.'
Pressnell (1956), cited by Webber (1989), appears to emphasise
the distinctive role of deposits as money, as shaping the
unique function of bank capital, le ...
'The capital of a bank stands apart from
that of other enterprises. It is required
to commence business, and to protect
noteholders and depositors against
possible loss; but for its ordinary
activities, a bank acquires resources from
the public. A banker's distinctive
function is not to lend his own capital,
for then he would merely be a species of
money lender; nor is he a mere
intermediary, between lender and borrower,
for that would make him a money scrivener,
or a broker: an agent, not a principal.
What makes a man a banker, and not some
other kind of financial specialist, is the
use of claims upon him to settle debt."
Pressnell (1956, p225-6)
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4.2.4	 Problems of Risk Definition and Identification:
a.	 Risk Definition
There are several dimensions to the problem of risk
definition.
In practice the distinction between risk and uncertainty may
u
not be clear cut (10). In a general linguistic sense, risk"
often serves as a shorthand way of referring to the parameters
defining the probability distribution of an outcome. But the
benefits of conciseness are confronted by the problem of
meaning - what
risk"; greater
"bank earnings
system failure
requires to be
which is being
outcome is referred to by a term such as "bank
specification is normally required such as
risk", "bank insolvency risk" and "banking
risk". Consequently, a definition of risk
qualified in terms of the particular outcome
considered, and by the parameters of its
probability distribution.
While the risk of a particular outcome may be influenced by
the risk of several other outcomes, it may itself also
influence other outcomes; on this basis the risk of an outcome
may be viewed as part of a continuum of risk influence and
dependence the complexity of which may be compounded by the
interdependence of certain of the influential and dependent
risks.
b.	 Risk Identification
Bank management are concerned with risk identification,
measurement and control. This triumvirate of risk management
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elements, has been recognised as a key determinant of
effective bank management by several authors. (Horrigan 1969
cited in Gardener 1981 p71; and Revell 1975 p81).
Revell (1975 p82) notes the importance of risk identification
to risk management and comments that, ...
'all possible sources of risk should be
identified, and probably the most
important service that the development of
risk analysis has rendered to management
has been its insistence on a conscious and
continuous search for all the risks
involved in management decisions and
arising from changes in the environment.'
The chronological sequence of writings on bank risk
identification generally displays an expanding range and
growing refinement. In part this reflects the impact of both
new techniques of risk analysis (viz, portfolio theory) and
the development of new products, markets and the economic
environment (eg floating exchange rates).
There are a number of dimensions to the problem of risk
identification. These include notably inter-risk influence,
risk recognition and the convenience of risk classification.
i). Risk Interdependence
The existence of inter-risk influence is recognised by
Gardener (1981 p72) in terms of "primary" and "secondary"
risks and demonstrated with the example of an initial demand
for liquidity (cash) which may necessitate the sale of say,
gilts at a loss, and adversely affect the bank's market rating
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of its net worth or earnings; in this case the primary risk
(of liquidity) may influence other secondary risks.
ii). Risk Recognition
Uncertainty represents a serious constraint on risk management
effectiveness. As well as the problem of risk non-recognition,
there stands the hazard of low probability high cost risks
which may be overlooked by bank management, a problem
recognised by Guttentag & Herring (1986).
Vojta (1973a p17) commenting on the risk of loss notes that
...'In most businesses, risks of loss are
both known and predictable and unknown and
unpredictable in terms of the frequency of
occurrence and magnitude of exposure. Loss
of both types inheres in each of the
generic categories of risk."
iii). General Risk Classification
Drawing on the general risk classification scheme of Mehr &
Hedges (1963), Revell (1975 p81) notes two fundamental bases
of risk classification
Static versus Dynamic Risks:
Revell also terms these pure and speculative risks,
respectively. Dynamic risk is distinguished by depending on
future change, and more particularly the uncertainty of the
timing and extent of future change which, by its very nature
is difficult to provide against; and,
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Insurable and Non-Insurable Risks:
The straightforward distinction between insurable and
non-insurable risks.
C.	 Key Bank Risks
A number of authors have sought to identify key bank risks.
Vojta (1973a) provided an early work, identifying 6 generic
risks which may occasion loss short of failure. Later works
identified more risks, reflecting in part changing economic
environment; eg Revell (1975),and Gardener (1981) who
identified 11 categories; Liquidity Risk, Profit Risk,
Investment Risk, Credit Risk, Risk from Contingent
Liabilities, Operating Risks, Fraud Risks, Foreign Exchange
Risk, Fiduciary Risk, Financial Risk, and Exceptional Risk.
(11).
Other key bank risks of particular significance to regulators
not highlighted in the above classifications are bank failure
(insolvency) risk and banking system failure risk.
i). Bank Capital Risk
From the foregoing, bank capital risk may be viewed in terms
of both its influence on other risks, and the influence of
other risks upon it. The potential for disaggregating these
risks is of an impractical magnitude, and for the purposes of
this dissertation may best be viewed in terms of the influence
of bank capital risk upon solvency risk, and major risks which
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influence bank capital risk.
ii). Solvency Risk
Regulators are primarily concerned with solvency risk. Key
risks influencing solvency risk include the solvency risks of
other banks via contagion effect (macro banking system failure
risk), liquidity risk and earnings risk.
Solvency may be viewed as a minimum level of bank capital.
Maisel
(1981 p6) views insolvency risk as the interplay between bank
capital and earnings risk. He notes that at the beginning of a
period ...
'The risk that a bank will become
insolvent depends on the level of expected
(total economic) income and payments from
it, the probable variance of this income,
and its initial capital.'
The connection between solvency (based on net worth) and
liquidity is stressed by Revell (1975 p12); both are based on
a common concept of 'free assets' and are distinguished in
terms of time horizon, ...
'liquidity is the ability to settle debts
on the due date, whereas solvency is the
ability to settle debts ultimately.'
The connection is also expressed by Clark (1976) who
distinguishes four notions of insolvency, namely bottom line
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insolvency, traditional equity sense insolvency, accounting
insolvency and Bankruptcy Act insolvency (12).
Revell (1975 p88) comments that earnings risk is closely
connected with liquidity risk (under which classification
Vojta placed it). Also he notes that earnings risk ..
..'arises from changes in interest rates,
changes in asset prices and changes in
operating expenses. Of these changes in
interest rates are the most general case,
since changes in asset prices affect only
those institutions a significant
proportion of whose profits come from
trading in assets rather than holding them
to maturity. Changes in operating expense
are a separate issue, but they have become
a growing risk as the pace of inflation
has accelerated. Earnings risk is
concerned with the factors that can widen
or narrow the margin between the income
received on assets and the interest
payments payable on liabilities or that
affect the residual earnings'.
iii).	 Interest Rate Risk
Maisel (1981 p33) identifies interest rate risk as the
greatest risk influencing bank value (net worth) risk. He
notes the problem of maturity (namely the maturity mismatch of
assets and liabilities with fixed interest) and the use of
duration to study effect of interest rate changes (13).
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4.3	 THE ACCOUNTING DEFINITION OF BANK CAPITAL
4.3.1
	
General Problems of Equity Capital Valuation:
The economist's general definition of the value of net worth,
or equity capital, is the present value of future earnings (or
cash flow). But in practice, such valuation is based on the
unlikely accurate estimation of future earnings and the
selection of an appropriate discount rate; eg Orgler &
Wolkowitz (1976). The use of the market value of capital stock
as a proxy for the present value measure is subject to
assumptions of market efficiency; see Chapter 2.
The fundamental theoretical and practical problems of income
definition have been well identified by Hicks (1946) who
commented ...
'it would seem that we ought to define a
man's income as the maximum value which he
can consume during a week, and still
expect to be as well off at the end of the
week as he was at the beginning.'
Although he explores further refinements of this definition,
eg to accommodate factors such as the risk of prospective
receipts, he is ultimately led back to the generalisation of
the above definition which he acknowledges at best, represents
an approximation; See Annex 4.1.A.
The investor is confronted by the difference between
accounting principles and economic principles relevant to the
determination of earnings. This problem is further compounded
by the variety of accounting principles which may be applied.
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Treynor (1972) notes that,
'The accountant defines it (earnings) as
what he gets when he matches costs against
revenues, making any necessary allocation
of costs to price periods; or as the
change in the equity account over the
period. These are not economic definitions
of earnings but merely descriptions of the
motions the accountant goes through to
arrive at the earnings number'.
Consequently, economic earnings may be misrepresented by the
accounted earnings. While standards of acceptable accounting
procedure are developed, these accounted earnings are
differentially distorted by the asset valuation and income
calculation rules adopted by different firms.
Nevertheless, this problem understates the importance of non-
accounting data in the context of the efficient market. Also,
there is evidence that despite the ambiguity of accounting
data, it may convey valuable information, Ball & Brown (1968),
although this is qualified by Ball (1972) and others (14).
As noted by Rowe (1980) accountants have tended to bow to the
"business utility test", producing answers required by the
market without questioning their own activity. More
particularly, they have induced standards, unwritten until
recent years, of practice and methods of calculation from
observation of the specific demands of their clients.
Commenting that such a pragmatic approach fell short of the
needs of academic discipline Rowe observes that a more
deductive approach was required, and attempts to build a
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general theory, have mirrored those of economists and lawyers,
by beginning with fundamental, or universal, postulates; eg
Hendriksen (1982) proposed a framework based on the ordered
consideration of objectives, postulates, and constraints and,
from which, definitions led to principles and ultimately
accounting applications.
Problems encountered in accounting practice in terms of
earnings measurement, equity capital valuation, and
presentation, have generated a number of alternative
approaches. Despite the problem of changes in currency unit
value, particularly in recent decades, historic cost remains
the traditional basis of asset and profit measurement in
financial statements even though it renders financial reports
not comparable over inflationary periods. In order to express
financial statement amounts in terms of a standard unit of
measurement, a number of methods have been devised, each with
relative advantages and disadvantages; See Annex 4.1.B.
Accountants have recognised the need for the user of financial
statements to be aware of the basis of statement construction,
and accordingly indicated that the concepts of a going-
concern, consistency, conservatism, and matching are utilised
(15). Recently in the UK, under the auspices of the Accounting
Standards Board (1991), discussion about the reporting of
financial performance, and the presentation of financial
information has included use of "comprehensive income" of
which "income" is a component: See Annex 4.1.B.
The further problem of international compatibility of
accounting standards is being addressed within the European
Community (EC). As noted by Giraud & Walton (1990) work has
progressed for many years to create a 'level-playing-field' to
foster a Community-wide investment market but recent surveys
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indicate that there is a 'very long way to go before an
analyst can compare directly between the accounts of companies
from different parts of the community' (16). In the UK-US
context, a survey of differences between the two counties'
generally accepted accounting measurements suggest that US
company accounts show lower earnings but higher value for
shareholders' funds; Walton & Wyman (see Whitelam 1990) (17).
A further survey, undertaken by Choi & Levich (see Whitelam
1990) suggests that investors are influenced to some extent by
accounting differences between countries in deciding where to
invest or raise capital, but cast doubt on the need for
international accounting standards (18).
Anatomically, accountants view equity capital as comprising a
number of items, namely common stock, surplus (ordinary share
capital and reserves in the UK) and minority interests in
subsidiary companies (Annex 4.1.C). Otherwise a bank's
liability side structure includes items not normally
associated with an industrial corporation, and which reflect
the nature of the its activities. These include deposits and
loan loss provisions (both reflecting financial
intermediation), contingent liabilities (reflecting
underwriting) and market securities (which may reflect both a
capital market making book and/or the needs of liquidity).
Also, off-balance sheet items (commitments and contingencies)
tend to be significant for banks, particularly those involved
in trade finance and underwriting. Table 4.1 shows the on-
balance sheet liability side size and basic structure for the
six largest UK banks in the 1970, 1980 and 1990 years.
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4.3.2	 Bank Equity Capital Valuation
Subject to the constraints of the accounting system, and
prudential regulation strictures (eg loan loss provisioning
policy), bank management may influence the presentation of
accounted earnings and net worth - and/or balance sheet
liability (and asset) side size and structure - by the
selective use of various accounting policies. Recently, the
use of a market valuation system of accounting for banks has
been advocated in the US; Morris & Sellon (1991).
Accounting policies which may particularly influence the
balance sheet representation of bank equity capital valuation
include, provisions against bad or doubtful loans, attitudes
to hidden or secret reserves, off-balance sheet liabilities,
intangible assets, and window dressing. These 5 factors,
detailed in Annex 4.1.D, involve,....
i. Provisions: Major provisions for banks include loan loss
(or bad debt) and deferred taxation provisions. Some bank
regulators, including the USA and UK, have established minimal
guidelines in provisioning policy.
ii. Hidden Reserves: These may originate from the operating
account, or automatically as current values of assets and
liabilities change from values recorded in the balance sheet,
Revell (1986).
iii. Off-Balance Sheet Items: Off-balance sheet items
traditionally represent a grey area of disclosure
requirements. Banks often do not disclose the extent of items
such as foreign exchange and financial futures contracts on
the argument that the figures, which may greatly exceed
balance sheet total liabilities, may be misleading.
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iv. Intangible Assets: Failure to recognise intangible assets
indicates an understatement of bank capital. Intangible
assets, namely goodwill, are of undoubted importance to
service industry entities such as banks which rely
significantly on factors such as name, image and depositor
inertia. Nevertheless goodwill is only recognised by
accountants on acquisition or merger and then normally written
off against reserves.
v. Window-Dressing: In practice it is difficult to
differentiate those transactions undertaken for bona fide
commercial reasons from those entered into for purely cosmetic
purposes. While still practiced in some countries,
particularly in order to improve liquidity or to increase
footings, window dressing is being confronted by an increasing
disfavour among the regulatory authorities. Evidence of bank
asset window dressing among US banks is provided by Allen &
Saunders (1988).
Recent US proposals noted by Morris & Sellon (1991) suggest
that banks should replace the historic cost accounting basis
with a market value system; The American Institute of
Certified Public Accountants (1990), the Financial Accounting
Standards Board (1990), the Federal Financial Institutions
Examination Council (1990) and the Office of Thrift
Supervision (1990).
Morris & Sellon comment that this appears a controversial
issue and has been motivated in part by change in the
financial markets (viz, increased interest rate risk). More
particularly, from the point of view of providing an accurate
measure of capital, the historic system reflects banks'
principal risk exposure - credit risk (via losses in book
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values). Nevertheless, it has two disadvantages. Firstly, it
neglects another major banking risk - changes in interest
rates. And secondly it allows banks to manipulate the book
value of capital by selectively realising capital gains (ie
asymmetrical treatment of realised and unrealised capital
gains for most bank assets and liabilities) and consequently
providing potentially misleading information.
As related by Morris & Sellon, the proposed market value
system involves measurement of all assets, liabilities and
off-balance sheet items at current market value (or where
necessary by estimation via a present value model) in order to
determine a market value measure of bank capital. Changes in
this measure of the market value of bank capital will reflect
changes in credit quality and interest rates on the bank's
current and future earnings. Nevertheless, qualifications have
emerged concerning proposals to implement the market value
system (19).
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4.4	 CONTEMPORARY REGULATORY VIEWS OF BANK CAPITAL ADEQUACY
4.4.1	 Introduction
The past couple of decades have been characterised by a move
towards more formality and objectivity in capital adequacy
assessment and control among bank prudential regulators. And,
more recently, by convergence of capital adequacy standards
both nationally (in the US) and internationally in the context
of the Basle Committee (representing the G10 countries and
Switzerland) and the members of the European Economic
Community (EEC).
4.4.2	 USA Development
General:
The introduction, in 1981, of a minimum capital adequacy ratio
regime by the three federal regulators has been followed by
increases in the minimum required ratio level. Also, banks
came under the purview of a bilateral UK-US (between the Bank
of England and the three federal regulators) convergence
proposal (January 1987) later superceded by convergence
proposals of the Basle Committee agreed in 1988.
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CHRONOLOGICAL TABLE 4.A
Development of Common Inter-Supervisory Authority
Minimum Capital Ratio Standards
1981: US Introduction of Minimum Capital Ratio Standards
Joint Federal Reserve Board and Comptroller of the
Currency guidelines on capital to assets ratio
1987: US-UK Bilateral Accord.
Use of minimum, asset risk weighted capital ratio
proposed but level not set; superseded by,..
1988: G-10 Basle Agreement
Use of minimum asset risk weighted capital ratio to
be fully implemented at 8% level by end 1992
1989: EEC Directives
Own Funds and Solvency Ratio Directives closely
aligned with Basle Agreement requirements
1992: Full Implementation
Minimum 8% Ratio level required by end of year by
both Basle Agreement and EEC Directives
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Pre 1981:
Prior to the introduction of the 1981 regime, and as noted in
Chapter 3, no uniform policies on capital adequacy existed
among the three regulators: Federal Reserve System (FED),
Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC) and the Office of
the Comptroller of the Currency (OCC).
Minimum capital requirements were applied only in absolute
terms; le minimum dollar amounts of capital necessary for new
banks. The regulators had no formally stated minimum
requirements for the ratio of capital to assets although they
used this measure to assess capital adequacy. Nevertheless the
definition of capital varied between regulators; a primary
difference concerned the treatment of debt. Also, each
regulator set different ratios for different types of banks.
The Federal Reserve set minimum ratios according to the size
of the bank, whereas the OCC assigned a bank to a particular
peer group and minimum capital ratios were based on each peer
group. Banks with relatively low capital ratios were
encouraged to raise additional capital; Gilbert et al (1985).
Post 1981:
Under the 1981 regime, joint guidelines were issued by the FED
and the OCC covering the definition of capital and minimum
ratios; see Federal Reserve Bulletin (1981: p901-902, Dec).
New categories of capital established included primary and
secondary capital, together representing total capital.
Primary capital: was defined as common stock, perpetual
preferred stock, surplus, undivided profits, contingency and
other capital reserves, mandatory convertible instruments
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(capital instruments with covenants mandating conversion into
common or perpetual preferred stock), and allowances for
possible loan losses.
Secondary capital: was defined as limited life preferred stock
and subordinated notes and debentures, with certain
restrictions; these include an original weighted
average maturity of greater than seven years, the
total qualifying secondary capital cannot exceed 50%
of the amount of primary capital; also secondary
instruments must be phased out of bank capital
starting from the fifth year prior to maturity.
The regime requires the classification of banks into one of
three groups based on (total asset) size; these included
community banks (total assets less than $1bn); regional banks
($1bn to $15bn); and multinational organisations as designated
by their respective supervisory agency (effectively the 17
largest banks).
The assessment of a bank's capital adequacy requires the match
of its capital ratio calculation against a three zone adequacy
measure specified for each size group; eg Polonchek et al
(1988) and Isberg & Brown (1987). For regional banks the
adequacy zone minimums were, ...
Zone 1). acceptable: 6.5% or more of total capital with a
minimum of 5% primary capital;
Zone 2). possibly undercapitalised: 5.5% to 6.5% total
capital; and
Zone 3). undercapitalised: less than 5.5% total capital.
Zone 2 banks are subject to greater regulatory supervision and
Zone 3 banks continuous supervision. For community banks the
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primary capital to total assets ratio minimum was set at 6%.
No specific guidelines were set for the 17 multinational
banks, although the regulators expressed a clear expectation
that these firms would improve their capital positions. They
were to be assessed on an individual basis, allowing for
greater flexibility than in dealing with other banks, and with
a view to raising their capital ratios, in due course, to
levels closer to those of the smaller banks.
The regional bank holding company standards were extended to
the multinationals in June 1983, and uniform standards for
firms of all sizes were adopted in early 1985 (20); these
subsequent modifications to the minimum capital ratio
standards and capital definition are noted in Annex 4.3.
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4.4.3
	
UK Development
Prior to the Banking Act, the regulation of banks was carried
on informally by the Bank of England. Revell (1975 p46)
notes..
'Full details of its methods have never
been given, other than the fact that they
place great emphasis on interviews with
management, and no minimum levels of
certain prudential ratios have ever been
prescribed.
As previously noted in Chapter 3.5.1 (footnote 48) Revell
observed that only cash, liquidity and reserve asset ratios
had previously been publicised and these were for monetary
regulation purposes.
Revell notes that in 1974, and following the fringe banking
crisis of late 1973, the prudential regulation of banks was
carried out by the Discount Office of the Bank of England
whose main function was to influence short-term interest rates
by intervention in the discount market.
Via correspondence and interview with the Bank of England,
Revell obtained an indication of the Bank of England approach
to prudential regulation. It appeared two ratios were
significant;
(i). a solvency ratio measured by the ratio of free resources
(shareholders' funds less fixed and capital assets) to public
liabilities (current plus contingent liabilities), and a (ii).
liquidity ratio of "quick assets" (all assets immediately
realisable) to deposits. The need for liquidity was seen as
arising from the risk of deposit withdrawal.
242
Revell gained further conversational evidence that the
solvency ratio was viewed as having normal or average levels
for differing types of institution (1:10 for a bank to 1:30
for discount houses). The ratios were viewed as internal
screening devices for alerting the Discount Office to the
possibility of overtrading. Real control was exercised in
informal conversations with bank representatives when
submitting their accounts, which was done more frequently than
once a year.
While this system worked well, given the low level of bank
failures, strains began to emerge in the 1960's with the
growth in the number of banks and the great increase in people
involved in directing bank affairs. This tended reduce the
factor of close personal contact, and newcomers had difficulty
in understanding the nuances of a system originally based on a
tight knit community of bankers. Revell (1975 p47).
The fringe banking crisis of 1973 emphasised deficiencies in
the supervision system and additional measures were introduced
in August 1974. This involved setting up a new Banking
Supervision Division and seeking both information from a wider
range of banks, and supplementary information.
The matter of capital adequacy was first addressed by the Bank
of England in 1974 through the establishment of a Joint
Working Party with the London and Scottish clearing banks
which reported in 1975; BEQB (September 1975, p240), Hall
(1985c). The report recommended the use of two ratios, the
free resources, or gearing, ratio and the risk asset ratio in
the assessment of capital adequacy.
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CHRONOLOGICAL TABLE 4.B
Major Developments in UK National Capital Supervision
1975: UK Bank of England first addresses capital adequacy with
recommended use of gearing and asset risk weighting
ratios
1979: UK Banking Act 1979, provided Bank of England with
statutory power for its unofficial supervisory
arrangements
1980: UK Bank of England publishes "The Measurement of
Capital" defining both ratios but no minimum level
stipulated.
1987: UK Banking Act 1987
retains fundamental objectives of 1979 Act but
provides Bank of England with greater powers, eg in
obtaining information from banks and auditors
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The free resources ratio related current, non-capital
liabilities to an adjusted capital base (21) and was taken to
represent the acceptability of an institution's capital to its
depositors and other creditors. To accommodate this purpose,
emphasis was placed on allowing its construction from
published information although, as noted by Hall, the
inclusion of inner reserves and general bad debt provisions
within the definition of capital militates against this.
The risk asset ratio was used as a measure of the adequacy of
capital in terms of an institution's exposure to the risk of
losses. It related the risk of losses to the capital available
to absorb such losses and was regarded the more relevant of
the two ratios for supervisory purposes. No standards were set
for individual firms or groups of firms on the basis that it
would be inappropriate given the great diversity of business
operations between deposit-taking institutions.
Following a review of these recommendations in 1979, and the
circulation of a consultative document with the banking
system, the Bank of England established the system of
assessment; the 1979 Banking Act provided statutory backing to
the Bank's supervisory role and established a deposit
protection scheme. (22).
The BEQB (September 1980, p324) 'The Measurement of Capital'
defined the two complementary methods of assessing bank
solvency,
(i). a gearing or 'free resources' ratio, which expressed an
adjusted capital base as a percentage of deposits and non-
capital liabilities.
Capital Base; same deductions as before except for unquoted
investments and connected lending.
Non-capital Liabilities; exclude contingent liabilities.
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(ii). an asset risk weighted capital ratio. The Bank of
England gave more emphasis to the risk weighted ratio, but
prescribed no exact numerical capital ratio. The ratio
expressed the adjusted capital base as a percentage of the
adjusted total of the risk assets.
Capital Base; same as for gearing ratio as well as deduction
of premises.
Adjusted Total of Risk Assets: calculated by multiplying each
balance sheet asset by an arbitrarily chosen weight. The
weights are chosen to reflect the differing degrees of
susceptibility of different types of asset to three specific
types of risk, namely credit, investment, and forced sale
risk; commercial advances are used as a benchmark and given a
weight of unity. There are 7 weights ranging from nil for Bank
of England notes and gold held physically in own vaults to 2
for property; the weights include nil, 0.1, 0.2, 0.5, 1.0,
1.5, 2.0.
As for the gearing ratio, the Bank of England's assessment of
an institution's position on the risk asset ratio front is
flexible, taking due account of the institution's particular
business composition, its exposure to other risks, 'peer
group' analysis, and ratio trends.
The Bank of England maintained a flexible approach, assessment
was on a case-by-case basis and was influenced by the
interests of the depositors with individual institutions and
the need to preserve confidence in the overall system. Some
adjustments were introduced in the calculation of the two
ratios; namely the definition of the adjusted capital base for
both ratios and the grading of risks involved in the
calculation of the risk asset ratio. The subsequent adjustment
to the definition of capital was largely to accommodate loan
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stock issues and debt provisioning; Hall (1985c) (23).
In what proved a forerunner of the Basle Agreement, the Bank
of England in co-operation with the three US regulatory
authorities (the FED, OCC and the FDIC) published a joint
proposal in January 1987 on primary capital definition and the
assessment of capital adequacy (reproduced in BEQB, February
1987), 27:1 p85-93). The UK and US authorities produced the
proposal in a low key manner by stating that 'the principal
objective of the paper is to promote the convergence of
supervisory policies on capital adequacy assessments among
countries.' (24)
After agreement on convergence of capital measurement and
standards by the governors of the Basle Agreement G10 central
banks in July 1988, the Bank of England published an
implementation scheme which has been modified most recently by
the EEC Directives on Own Funds and Solvency Ratio; (Bank of
England, December 1990).
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4.4.4	 International Developments
Two areas of international integration of bank capital
adequacy supervision have emerged since the 1970's. These stem
from the continued integration of the European Community, and
an initiative to seek consistency in the regulatory
supervision of international banks of the G10 countries plus
Switzerland, under the auspices of the Bank for International
Settlements (BIS).
With 7 members of the G10 also members of the EEC, the need
for consistency and compatibility in capital adequacy
supervision, namely the agreement of a common approach towards
the definition of capital and a solvency ratio to be applied
to credit institutions in the EEC has been recognised. While
the EEC proposals are to apply to credit institutions
generally, the Committee framework is designed more
specifically for banks undertaking international business.
a.	 Basle Committee
Disturbances in the banking industry in the early 1970's (25)
focused attention on the inter-dependence of national banking
systems and led to the creation of a standing committee of
bank supervisors, under the auspices of the Bank for
International Settlements (BIS) in Basle comprising the G10
('Group of Ten') countries plus Switzerland and Luxembourg.
Called 'The Committee on Banking Regulation and Supervisory
Practice' or 'Basle Committee' or sometimes 'The Cooke
Committee' after its chairman (from the Bank of England), its
objective was to ensure that all banks are supervised
according to certain key principles, rather than harmonise
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national laws and practices. An early step was to develop
guidelines for the division of responsibilities among national
supervisory authorities; the guidelines were approved by the
governors of the G10 central banks in 1975 and became known as
the 'Basle Concordat'.
Problems surfaced in terms of primary supervisory
responsibility (host responsibility for foreign subsidiary
solvency versus consolidated supervision of a bank's
international business) and different supervisory standards.
Also there developed a widespread, but mistaken, belief of
commercial bankers that the supervisory and lender of last
resort responsibilities of national authorities went hand in
hand. Many of these, and other, regulatory weaknesses were
manifest by events surrounding the collapse of the Banco
Ambrosiano's Luxembourg subsidiary in 1982. The original
Concordat was revised in 1983, closing certain regulatory gaps
and addressing the question of adequacy of supervision, and
consolidated supervision; Dale (1984a p175) (26).
In January 1987 a joint UK - USA proposal, or accord, was
published (between the Bank of England and the three USA
federal regulators) for the establishment of two risk-weighted
minimum capital ratios; "the principal objective of the paper
is to promote the convergence of supervisory policies on
capital adequacy assessments among countries." (BEQB1,
February 1987, 27:1, 87). This was to be superseded by a Basle
Committee initiative.
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CHRONOLOGICAL TABLE 4.0
Basle Committee: Agreement Development
1974: Collapse of Bankhaus I.D. Herstatt
Establishment of Committee on Banking Supervision
(The Basle, or Cooke, Committee)
1975: Basle Committee issued Concordat
1982: Collapse of Banco Ambrosiano Holdings
1983: Basle Committee issued revised Concordat
1987: (January) - bilateral, UK/US accord on capital adequacy
(December)- Basle Committee issued consultative
'Proposals for international convergence of capital
measurement and capital standards'.
1988: July - Basle Committee issued agreement on
'International Convergence of Capital Measurement
and Capital Standards'.
1990: December - Minimum Capital standard as per agreement
7.25%.
1992: December - Minimum Capital standard as per agreement
8.0%.
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Following the January 1987 UK/USA Accord and a December 1987
Basle Committee consultative paper on convergence of capital
measurement and standards, the Basle Committee reached
agreement (endorsed by G10 central bank Governors) on a
framework for measuring capital adequacy and the minimum
standard to be achieved. The agreement, published in July 1988
is titled 'International Convergence of Capital Measurement
and Capital Standards'.
The 1988 convergence agreement contains four key elements;
namely, a definition of the constituents of capital, a risk
weighting system (for both on and off balance sheet items), a
target standard ratio, and a schedule of transitional and
implementing arrangements.
i). Capital
is defined in two tiers. The capital base comprises at least
50% of Tier 1 capital; Tier 2 capital is admitted up to an
amount equal to Tier 1 capital.
Tier 1: The key element, core capital, comprises basic equity
and disclosed reserves. Basic equity is defined as issued and
fully paid ordinary shares/common stock and non-cumulative
perpetual preferred stock (but excluding cumulative preferred
stock).
Tier 2: Supplementary capital includes undisclosed reserves
(ie hidden reserves passed through the profit and loss
account), revaluation reserves, general provisions/general
loan loss reserves, certain hybrid debt capital instruments,
subordinated term debt (with an original maturity over 5 years
to a maximum of 50% of core capital).
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For the purposes of calculating the risk-weighted capital
ratio deductions are made from the capital base; namely
goodwill (from Tier 1), and investments in subsidiaries
engaged in banking and financial activities which are not
consolidated in national systems.
ii). The Risk-Weighting System
Capital adequacy is assessed by weighting different categories
of asset or off-balance sheet exposure according to broad
categories of relative riskiness.
Five weights are used (0, 10, 20, 50 and 100 per cent). The
central focus is on credit risk (ie the risk of counterparty
failure) and as a further aspect of credit risk, country
transfer risk (based on differentiation of defined groupings
of countries considered to be of high credit standing).
Off-balance sheet engagements are converted to credit risk
equivalents by multiplying the nominal principal amounts by a
credit conversion factor (five categories are distinguished),
the resulting amounts then being risk-weighted according to
the nature of the counterparty.
iii. A Target Standard Ratio
A target standard ratio of capital to weighted risk assets is
set at 8% (of which core elements are at least 4%). This
represents a common minimum standard which international banks
in member countries are expected to observe by the end of
1992.
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iv). Transitional and Implementing Arrangements
Banks are expected to maintain their end 1987 standards,
achieve 7.25% by end 1990, and reach 8% by end 1992. Certain
latitudes are allowed in measurement of the capital during the
transitional period.
A full summary of the first three elements is provided in
Annex 4.5, and the fourth (the implementation schedule) is
shown in Table 4.2.A. Tables 4.2 B and C also show Basle
Committee ratios for major banks in the UK and USA
respectively.
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Core Elements + 1001
(41 + 41)
None
TABLE 4.2.
BASLE AGREEMENT
A: BASLE STANDARDS
SCHEDULE FOR BASLE A6REEMENT RISK ASSET RATIOS
Year End	 1988	 1990	 1992
MINIMUM STANDARD
	
Level Prevailing at
end-1987
MEASURMENT FORMULA
	
Core Elements + 1001
SUPPLEMENTARY ELEMENTS	 Max 251 of
INCLUDED IN CORE
	
Total Core
7.25%	 BX
Core Elements + 1001
(3.6251 + 3.6251)
Max 10/ of Total
Core lie 0.361)
LIMIT ON GENERAL LOAN
	
1.52 points, or
	
1.251 points, or
LOSS RESERVES IN
	
No Limit
	
exceptionally up to
	
exceptionally and temporarily
SUPPLEMENTARY ELEMENTS
	
2.0 X points
	
up to 2.0 % points
LIMIT ON TERM SUBORDINATED
DEBT IN SUPPLEMENTARY 	 No Limit	 No Limit	 Max of 501
ELEMENTS	 (at discretion)	 (at discretion)	 of Tier 1
DEDUCTION FOR SOODWILL
	
Deducted from
	
Deducted from
	
Deducted from
Tier 1 at
	
Tier 1 at
	
Tier 1
discretion
	
discretion
Source: Annex of Basle Committee on Banking Regulations and Supervisory Practices, July 19813
B: UNITED KINGDOM BASLE AGREEMENT RAINS
(6 LARGEST BANK GROUPS)
TIER 1
Tier 1	 1986	 1987	 1988	 1989	 1990
BARCLAYS	 $6.0	 $5.9	 na
LLOYDS	 5.7	 4.8	 5.6	 4.4	 5.2
MIDLAND	 6.5	 5.4	 5.4
NATWEST	 5.5	 5.3	 5.2
RBS	 7.3	 7	 na
STANCHA	 5.3	 4.7	 5.4
Source: Individual Bank Group Report and Accounts
1 Source Moody's Bank Credit Report
TOTAL RISK ASSET RATIO
1186 1987 19138 1989 1990
9.3 9 8.3
10.7 9.1 10.1 7.4 8.5
11.8 10 9.8
9.8 9.1 9.1
13 12.8 na
10.4 9.2 10.7
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C: UNITED STATES - BASLE AGREEEMENT
RISK-WEIGHTED CAPITAL RATION
Selected Bank Holding Companies**
TIER 1	 TIERS 1 + 2
	
1988a	 1989a
	 1992E	 1988	 1989	 1992E
BANK
	
X	 X	 X	 X	 2	 X
BANC ONE CORP	 10.6	 12.9	 13.98	 10.6	 12.9	 11.01
BANK OF BOSTON CORP
	 7.6	 7	 NA	 10.7	 10.3	 NA
BANK OF NEW YORK, INC	 NA	 6	 4.61	 NA	 8.3	 7.58
BANKAMERICA CORP	 5.4	 7.5	 5.61	 10.1	 11.9	 9.11
BANKERS TRUST NEW YORK
	 6.7b	 5.7	 4.34	 9.2	 11.3	 8.08
BARNETT BANKS, INC 	 9.7
	 10.1	 NA	 10.2	 10.3	 NA
CHASE MANHATTAN CORP	 5.8	 5.8	 4.44	 10.4	 10.6	 8.87
CHEMICAL NEW YORK CORP	 NA	 6.9	 4.65	 NA	 12.2	 8.74
CITICORP	 4.7	 4.4	 4.04c
	 9.2
	 11.6	 8.08c
CORESTATES FINANCIAL CORP	 10	 11	 8.1	 12.5	 13.1	 12.8
FIRST BANK SYSTEM, /NC	 5.7	 6.3	 4.4	 9.1	 8.3	 7.6
FIRST CHICAGO CORP	 6.7	 6.8	 4.7	 10.1	 10.3	 8
FIRST INTERSTATE	 5.4	 4.7	 3.6	 9.3	 8	 7.2
FIRST UNION CORP	 NA	 12.2	 NA	 NA	 13.9	 NA
FIRST WACHOVIA CORP	 10.8	 11.3	 8.45	 10.8	 11.3	 9.94
FLEET/NORSTAR FINANCIAL
	 10.9	 11.6	 7.26	 12.3	 12.6	 10.7
J.P. MORGAN & COMPANY	 12.5	 6.8	 5.9	 14.9	 12.1	 10.1
MANUFACTURERS HANOVER	 5.4b	 8.7b	 5.69	 10.9	 15.7	 10.24
MELLON BANK CORP	 3.8	 7	 4.6
	
7.5	 10.1	 8.79
NATIONAL CITY CORP
	 9.8	 11.2	 7.45	 10.3	 11.3	 9.91
NBD BANCORP, INC
	 10.5
	 11.5	 7.59	 11	 11.5	 9.72
NCNB CORP	 10.9	 8.3	 6.15d	 11	 10	 9.1d
NORWEST CORP	 7.7	 8.9	 5.4	 12.4	 14.1	 10.5
PNC FINANCIAL CORP	 10.2	 10.8	 7.4	 10.5	 10.8	 9.73
REPUBLIC NEW YORK CORP	 8.7	 8.8	 12.45	 12	 14.8	 21.15
SECURITY PACIFIC CORP	 5.7	 5	 4.2	 9.1	 7.2	 8.4
SIGNET BANKING CORPORATION	 10.1	 11.1	 7.47	 11.1	 12.2	 11.2
SOVRAN FINANCIAL CORP	 9.7	 na	 7.07	 9.9	 na	 9.37
SUNTRUST BANKS, INC	 10.3	 12.4	 8.03	 11	 12.8	 11.01
U.S. BANCORP	 10.2	 10.7	 6.57	 11.1	 11.3	 9.73
VALLEY NATIONAL CORP
	 8.9	 7.2	 5.1	 10.9	 10.8	 6.35
WELLS FARGO & CO	 7.4	 8.1	 4.95	 12.9	 13.3	 9.91
Source: Salomon Brothers 'A Review of Bank Performance' 1989 and 1990 editions.
1 Ratio = capital as a percentage of estimated risk-weighted assets plus contingencies
St Banks from Salomon Brothers Selection of 35 Bank Holding Companies
a: Includes elements borrowed from Tier 2 Capital as permitted by Proposal
b: After deduction of investment in unconsolidated subsidiaries
E: Risk weighted Capital Ratios, Management Estimates at end 1989, on a 1992 basis
- except c = 1990 basis, and d = Transition Basis
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b.	 EEC Development
Pursuant to the market integration principles of the 1957
Treaty of Rome (later revised by the Single European Act of
1987) and the objective of completion of a unified internal
market by 1992, the European Economic Community (EEC)
Commission has issued a number of Directives aimed at internal
finance/banking industry regulation.
Acting on advice, the EEC Commission may issue
Recommendations or Directives, the latter alone carrying legal
force. Advice is received from, the Contact Group of EC
Supervisory authorities, the Banking Advisory Committee, and
links with both the Basle Committee and individual national
regulators (27).
After an earlier attempt (28), the First Banking Directive,
aimed at the harmonisation of regulation of banks and other
credit institutions within the Community, was issued in 1975
and agreed in 1977. Termed the First Banking Co-ordination
Directive, it provided a basis for bank authorisation
(including a requirement of a minimum, and separate, 'own
funds' of an amount unspecified), and requiring supervisory
authority cooperation (mostly in terms of information). The
Directive required its Advisory Committee to decide on the
content and method of calculation of the "observation ratios"
between the various assets and/or liabilities of credit
institutions; Allen (1978).
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CHRONOLOGICAL TABLE 4.D
EEC Bank Supervision: Developments
1957: Treaty of Rome
1972: Draft Directive on harmonisation of bank regulation
Establishment of the Contact Group of EEC
Supervisory Authorities (Groupe de Contact)
1975: Revised First Banking Co-ordination Directive issued
1977: Revised First Banking Co-ordination Directive adopted
1979: Establishment of Banking Advisory Committee as required
per First Directive of 1977
1987: Single European Act revised completion of internal
market by end 1992
1988: Second Banking Co-ordination Directive issued
1989: Second Banking Co-ordination Directive adopted
Own Funds Directive adopted
Solvency Ratio Directive adopted
1991: (January) Compliance with Solvency Ratio Directive
required
1993: (January) Full implementation of Own Funds and Solvency
Ratio Directives required
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As noted by Hall (1989 p41),
'In broad terms , the Directive sought to
pave the way for the gradual shift of
effective prudential supervision from host
to the parent supervisory authority - 'the
home-country-control' objective - a move
not entirely in keeping with the approach
to allocating supervisory responsibility
outlined in the Basle Concordat.'
Hall (1989 p42) noted a public airing of differences between
the EEC and the Basle Committee (and Bank of England) over
supervisory initiatives in the early 1980's since when little
has emerged to indicate any continuing rift.
Subsequent supervisory initiatives aimed at completion of the
internal market by 1992 include a Second Banking Coordination
Directive, an Own Funds Directive and a Solvency Directive
(29).
The Second Banking Co-ordination Directive, proposed in 1988
and adopted in 1989, is seen as the centre piece of the
Commission's plan for the banking sector (Bank of England,
June 1988) and, together with the liberalisation of capital
movements, seeks to eliminate the remaining barriers to
freedom of establishment in the banking sector and to afford
full freedom to provide banking services; Hall (1989 p43).
The Directive provides that authorisation as a bank in any one
EC country will be valid for all EC countries. Also included
are provisions aimed at harmonising aspects of the supervisory
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process, including a minimum capital requirements quantified
at 5 million ECU. Other provisions include the fitness and
propriety of major bank shareholders and the control of banks'
participation in non-banking companies; British Bankers
Association (1988).
Agreement was also reached on two related measures designed to
harmonise the definition of bank capital and the calculation
of risk asset ratios across the EEC; these follow closely the
July 1988 proposals of the Basle Committee. The Own Funds
Directive and the Solvency Ratio Directive were both adopted
in 1989; Member States were required to comply with the
Solvency Ratio Directive by January 1991, and full
implementation of both Directives is required by January 1993.
The Own Funds Directive harmonises the definition of bank
capital used for the purposes of the ratio calculation (and
for other supervisory purposes); ie the numerator of the
ratio. The expression 'own funds' is used throughout EEC
Directives to describe bank capital.
The denominator is defined by the Solvency Ratio Directive,
which provides risk-related weightings for the various assets
and off-balance sheet items. Also, it lays down a minimum
target ratio of 8%.
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4.5	 CRITICISM OF BANK CAPITAL REGULATION
Despite the sense of political achievement in securing
international agreement on the convergence of capital
measurement and standards, the economic impact is less readily
apparent.
A fundamental criticism of capital regulation regimes in
general, and certainly in the UK, is the failure to validate
their impost with a complementary cost-benefit study. Hall
(1989 p118) comments that, .
'no attempt has been made to demonstrate
the existence of net social benefits
arising from the implementation of any of
the strands of banking supervision, be
they administered under the Banking Act
1987, the Financial Services Act 1986 or
according to the requirements specified in
the Basle Concordat, the Basle Committee's
capital adequacy proposals or EC
Directives.'
The following considers questions which emerge about the
efficacy of capital bank regulation in general, as well as the
specifics of particular ratio methodology. Key relationships
concern the inter-action of regulator, management and market
viewpoints.
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4.5.1 The Efficacy of Bank Capital Regulation
a.	 Models of the Regulatory Constraint
As noted in the introductory chapter, a number of bank models
assume various market imperfections, the exploitation of which
yields optimal capital structures; these are reviewed in Annex
4.5. This sub-section focuses primarily on models
incorporating the capital regulation constraint.
Capital Regulation and the Risk-Return Framework:
The risk-return framework of portfolio theory provides a basis
for examining the effect of minimum capital regulation for a
number of researchers; viz Kahane (1977), Koehn (1979) and
Koehn & Santomero (1980), although these have been criticised
by Keeley & Furlong (1990).
Kahane (1977) demonstrates that capital regulation provides an
ineffective bound of the probability of ruin. He considers the
effectiveness of a combination of regulatory instruments,
namely an upper bound on leverage and constraining the
composition of both asset and liability portfolios, in
protecting a financial intermediary's solvency. Kahane
concludes that neither constraining the portfolio composition
of the intermediary per se, nor the minimum capital
requirement per se, can be regarded as an effective means for
bounding the firm's probability of ruin. Nevertheless he
allows that the combination of these regulatory practices may
reach the desired effect.
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Koehn (1979) considers the effect of capital structure
regulation, as well as two other forms of solvency regulation
- portfolio restrictions and (deposit) interest rate ceiling
restrictions, both individually and in combination. He
demonstrates that the leverage constraint does nothing to
increase the riskiness of banks per se, but reduces the number
of combinations of risk and return available to the bank. More
particularly, capital regulation serves to protect depositors
from the loss of funds by constraining an intermediary from
operating within the high risk area of its opportunity set.
But, if the firm is unable to offset the effects of asset
restrictions, it may not provide the return required by its
owners. Koehn also notes that leverage constraints have only a
negligible effect on the probability of failure relative to
the unconstrained regime.
Koehn & Santomero (1980) consider the impact of bank capital
regulation on individual bank behaviour, and whether the
desired result is achieved. The authors argue that while
typically, regulation is assumed to operate in a ceteris
paribus environment whereby the mere addition of capital to a
bank's balance sheet reduces risk, they explicitly examine the
issue of portfolio reaction to capital requirements by
investigating the effect of capital ratio regulation on the
portfolio behaviour of commercial banks. The paper implicitly
assumes that bank regulators do not constrain portfolio risk
so as to prevent asset reshuffling.
After examining the portfolio allocation that flows from the
portfolio decision of the firm, the paper examines the effects
on bank portfolio risk of a regulatory increase in the minimum
capital asset ratio that is acceptable to the supervisory
agency.
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For the system as a whole, the results of a higher required
capital-asset ratio in terms of the average probability of
failure are ambiguous, while the intra-industry dispersion of
the probability of failure unambiguously increases.
Consequently the authors question the viability of regulating
commercial banks in terms of a capital and say a
discontinuation of regulation of bank capital via ratio
constraints should be considered. Alternatively, they suggest
regulation should be imposed on both asset composition and
capital in a way that has heretofore not been considered.
The implication of these papers that capital regulation may be
counterproductive has been challenged by Furlong & Keeley
(1990) who criticise as inappropriate the use of Markowitz
two-parameter models to analyse bank risk taking under a non-
zero probability of bankruptcy, such as Koehn and Koehn &
Santomero. Furlong & Keeley claim the models neglect the
option value of the deposit insurance subsidy and use an
inappropriate measure of risk, thereby mischaracterising both
the risk return frontier, without capital regulation, and the
shift in the risk return frontier due to capital regulation.
They conclude that the models used are not applicable to
analysing the effects of bank capital regulation on asset risk
and cannot be used to support their results.
Deposit Insurance Substitution:
Deposit insurance represents a major form of prudential
control but problems of pricing, its potential to encourage
risk taking (ie. moral hazard) and assessing its substitution
for capital regulation hamper its effective utilisation.
Concerning deposit insurance which guarantees all deposits up
to a statutory limit, Santomero (1984) - noting that over the
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past couple of decades all depositors (not just the insured
ones) in failed institutions have been protected - comments
that, ...
'if one accepts the view that bank
liabilities are essentially 100 percent
insured, then the entire issue of bank
capital and risk taking should be recast
in terms of a discussion of insurance
pricing.'
To this end, Merton (1977) and Sharpe (1978) apply similar
approaches by deriving the optimal price for insurance from
viewing the payoff pattern of the insurance scheme as a put
option on the underlying assets of the institution. Merton
sees the payoff pattern of the insurance fund as the payoff
structure of a put option issued by the FDIC against the value
of the assets in the bank, and using the Black-Scholes (1972)
option pricing model derives an optimal price per dollar - and
the value of deposit insurance. Sharpe uses a state preference
approach noting the reality of the FDIC fixed net insurance
fee, and the tendency for financial firms to accept higher
risk levels than in the absence of the insurance subsidy.
Sharpe notes that, given other factors, the value of a fair
insurance fee declines as the capital-assets ratio increases
and that adequate capital is that quantity which would make
the current fixed rate insurance fee the correct price for the
underlying put option implicitly issued by the FDIC.
Buser, Chen & Kane (1981) consider a combination of explicit
and implicit pricing for deposit insurance employed by the
FDIC as costs to offset the inherent benefits accruing to the
insured liability issuers; they view implicit costs as
including capital regulation, community development
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accountability and the like. They reason that having accepted
the benefits of insurance without paying the full cost
explicitly, the firm can be manipulated by the regulator but
the resultant profit of the firm must at least equal the
uninsured case to maintain control.
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b.	 The US Experience
The efficacy of a number of aspects of the specific bank
capital regulation measures has been considered in the US in
terms of pre and post the 1981 introduction of minimum capital
ratio guidelines.
Capital Regulation influence on Capital Investment Level:
In the earlier period, Peltzman (1970) finds no evidence of
the influence of bank capital regulation on the level of bank
capital investment, while both Mingo (1975) and Mayne (1972)
find some evidence. Orgler & Wolkowitz (1976, p115) comment
that the evidence of Mingo, and Mayne, is more supportable
than Peltzman's but that .."the influence that regulators
appear to exert is quite minor". Mayne (1972) qualifies her
results;
she found no significant difference in impact of different
regulatory regimes - although regulatory practices and
policies on bank capital differ from one agency to another,
there does not appear to be any significant difference between
regulation agency impacts on bank capitalisation. Mayne found
some degree of explanation for this in terms of a management
resistance to regulatory required increases in capital which
was correlated directly with regulatory pressure.
Dietrich & James (1983) viewing a later period (1971-75)
confirm Petzman's finding of no evidence of regulatory effect
on bank capital and challenge Mingo's conclusion on the 1969-
70 period due to the coincident influence of regulatory
interest rate ceiling (30).
Focusing on the decline in capital to asset ratios over the
decades of the 1960' and 1970s (11.7% in 1961 to 5.7% in
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1978), Marcus (1983) finds evidence that it may be the
response of profit maximising banks to a changing economic
environment,
Marcus, unlike Peltzman, Mingo, or Mayne, focuses on the
decline in ratios over time (using time series-cross section
estimation rather than simple cross section estimation), uses
market, rather than book, values and defines capital in terms
of equity plus debt.
Deposit Insurance Substitution:
Peltzman (1970) provides evidence that regulators are largely
ineffective in preventing the substitution of deposit
insurance for capital. Mingo (1975) in a modified version of
Peltzman's study also finds the implication, albeit without
statistical significance, that deposit insurance and capital
investment are substitutes. Mingo also enquires whether the
substitution of insurance for capital is less likely to occur
in the presence of capital regulation, and finds that banks
with the lowest capital ratios are most successful in
substituting deposit insurance for capital.
Post 1981:
In the post 1981 era, Keeley (1988a) examined the effect of
the objective minimum capital-to-asset ratio requirements on
the capital positions of the 100 largest BHCs. He found that
the regulations succeeded in causing banks with low capital
ratios to increase their book value capital ratios both
absolutely and relative to banks with initially high capital
ratios, and that banks achieved this largely by slowing asset
growth.
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Nevertheless, evidence on changes in market value capital
ratios, while not necessarily inconsistent with the apparent
book value capital increase induced by regulation, lends
little independent support to the idea that regulation caused
an actual increase in capital ratios.
268
c.	 The UK Experience
UK bank capital regulation first received statutory backing
with the 1979 Banking Act; and the first formal regulatory
promulgation of capital measurement and assessment took place
in 1980. The capital regulatory regime changed to an objective
minimum basis with the advent of the proposed bilateral UK-US
arrangement in 1987, which was superceded by the Basle
Committee Agreement.
The equity (group shareholders' funds) capital ratio
experience of the big four clearing banks and two other major
UK banks is shown over the past couple of decades in Table
4.3; 1969 marks the year the UK banks undertook to eliminate
secret reserves from their accounts. Also the banks' equity
(ordinary share capital and reserves) ratios are shown in
terms of book and market values in Table 4.4; this is provided
in terms of a ratio in Table 4.5; these indicate, in end-of-
year terms, that for the first time since the early 1970's
some of the large banks were valued at a premium to book value
in 1989. Also, the Basle agreement ratios of the major banks
groups are shown in Table 4.2.B.
Apart from the general pressures on bank capital ratios noted
in Section 4.2, the UK banks response prior to the minimum
capital regime was determined largely by the Bank of England's
policy on capital definition,
The limited inclusion of subordinated loan stock in capital
definition was utilised by the banks in the early 1980's but
by the end of 1984 most were near or up against the stipulated
ceiling; Hall (1985c).
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A particular pressure emerged in the 1984 Budget amendment to
capital allowance and corporate tax liability (31); this
precipitated transfers from reserves to cover the enlarged
deferred tax payments of Barclays, Lloyds, Midland and
National Westminster of I543m, 1465m, 1230m and 1570m
respectively. Also, a strong US dollar in 1984 exacerbated
ratio pressure for banks with large proportions of dollar
denominated assets. The accompanying 1984 drop in equity
capital ratios is notable in Table 4.3.
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TABLE 4.3
Equity Capital Ratios of Major UK Banking Sroups
(Equity Capital to Total Assets)
Year	 Barclays Lloyds Midland Natmest	 *Average RBS Stancha
1 % % % % % %
1969 7.9 9.6 5.9 7.5 7.7 na na
1970 7.5 8.8 7.0 5.9 7.3 na na
1971 6.3 7.9 6.3 5.6 6.5 na na
1972 6.0 7.0 5.4 5.3 5.9 na na
1973 5.3 6.9 4.5 6.7 5.8 na na
1974 5.3 6.1 4.8 6.0 5.5 na na
1975 5.1 5.8 5.5 5.9 5.6 6.9 na
1976 5.1 6.1 5.4 5.5 5.5 7.0 na
1977 4.9 5.9 5.2 5.4 5.4 7.2 na
1978 6.0 7.0 6.2 6.0 6.3 6.9 6.2
1979 6.1 7.0 6.1 5.4 6.1 8.2 4.8
1980 5.6 7.1 5.5 5.3 5.9 7.9 5.1
1981 4.9 6.5 4.4 5.1 5.2 7.2 5.9
1982 5.0 5.9 4.2 4.7 5.0 7.8 5.4
1983 4.9 6.0 4.5 4.8 5.1 7.2 5.2
1984 3.8 4.7 3.5 3.7 3.9 5.2 4.6
1985 5.1 5.3 3.6 4.2 4.5 5.9 4.5
1986 4.8 5.8 4.0 5.6 5.1 5.8 4.4
1987 4.8 5.3 5.5 5.7 5.3 5.5 3.1
1988 5.6 6.3 5.7 6.1 5.9 5.9 5.1
1989 5.2 4.8 4.6 5.2 .	 ....y 5.2 4.1
1990 4.9 4.9 4.3 5.0 4.8 5.0 4.6
Ratio calculated as Equity Capital to Total Assets at year end
Equity Capital = Ordinary Share Capital + Reserves + Minorities
Year End = 31st December; except RBS at 30th September
t = Average of the Big Four UK Clearers
RBS = Royal Bank of Scotland Group
Stancha = Standard Chartered
Source: Annual Report and Accounts of the individual banks
TABLE
EMMY RATIOS: BHP VALUES & MARKET VALUES
BARCLAYS	 LLOYDS	 MIDLAND	 NATWEST	 AVERASEI
YEAR	 Book	 Market	 Book	 Market	 Book	 Market	 Book	 Market	 Book	 Market
	
1	 2
1970	 6.6	 4.0	 8.7	 6.6	 7.0	 5.2	 5.9	 5.5	 7.0	 5.3
1971	 6.3	 7.2	 6.9	 8.6	 6.3	 7.4	 5.6	 8.1	 6.3	 7.8
1972	 5.9	 8.5	 6.1	 7.9	 5.3	 7.7	 5.2	 9.3	 5.6	 8.3
1973	 5.1	 4.8	 6.9	 4.5	 4.4	 3.9	 6.6	 4.8	 5.8	 4.5
1974	 5.1	 1.7	 6.0	 1.5	 4.8	 1.3	 6.0	 1.4	 5.5	 1.5
1975	 4.7	 3.7	 5.7	 3.1	 5.4	 3.8	 5.8	 3.2	 5.4	 3.5
1976	 4.7	 2.6	 6.1	 3.0	 5.3	 3.0	 5.4	 3.0	 5.4	 2.9
1977	 4.6	 3.1	 5.8	 3.6	 5.1	 3.9	 5.3	 3.4	 5.2	 3.5
1978	 5.7	 3.6	 7.0	 3.3	 6.1	 3.8	 5.9	 3.0	 6.2	 3.4
1979	 5.8	 3.3	 7.0	 3.0	 6.0	 2.8	 5.3	 2.9	 6.0	 3.0
1980	 5.4	 3.4	 7.0	 3.0	 5.3	 2.2	 5.2	 2.7	 5.7	 2.8
1981	 4.7	 2.7	 6.2	 2.9	 3.5	 1.4	 5.1	 2.3	 4.9	 2.3
1982	 4.7	 2.3	 5.7	 2.3	 3.3	 1.1	 4.7	 2.0	 4.6	 1.9
1983	 4.6	 2.6	 5.7	 2.7	 3.6	 1.8	 4.8	 2.6	 4.7	 2.4
1984	 3.5	 2.7	 4.7	 2.9	 2.7	 1.4	 3.7	 3.0	 3.7	 2.5
1985	 5.1	 5.0	 5.3	 4.0	 3.2	 1.8	 4.1	 3.5	 4.4	 3.6
1986	 4.7	 4.5	 5.7	 5.0	 3.8	 2.7	 5.5	 4.8	 4.9	 4,2
1987	 4.7	 3.8	 5.3	 4.5	 5.3	 4.4	 5.6	 5.0	 5.2	 4.4
1988	 5.5	 2.9	 5.5	 5.1	 5.5	 4.1	 6.0	 4.0	 5.6	 4.0
1989	 4.9	 5.0	 4.1	 6.3	 4.3	 4.9	 5.1	 4.7	 4.6	 5.2
1990	 4.5	 4.3	 4.1	 6.5	 4.1	 2.5	 4.9	 3.6	 4.4	 4.2
EQUITY BOOK VALUE RATIO = (ORDINARY SHARE CAPITAL + RESERVES)/TOTAL ASSETS
EQUITY MARKET VALUE RATIO = EQUITY MARKET VALUE/(TOTAL ASSETS-BOOK EOUITY+MARKET VALUE EQUITY)
: sisple average of four ratios
Data Source: Annual Report and Accounts; Market Data from Datastream
272
TABLE 4.5"
RATIO OF MARKET TO BOOK VALUE OF EGUITY1
YEAR
BARCLAYS
1
LLOYDS
1
MIDLAND
1
NATWEST
1
AVERAGE
1970 59 74 73 94 75
1971 116 126 120 149 128
1972 150 131 148 186 154
1973 93 64 87 71 79
1974 33 24 27 22 26
1975 77 53 69 54 63
1976 54 47 56 54 53
1977 66 60 74 63 66
1978 62 46 60 49 54
1979 56 42 46 53 49
1980 61 41 41 50 48
1981 56 45 40 44 46
1982 49 39 33 42 41
1983 56 46 48 53 51
1984 75 61 51 81 67
1985 99 75 56 84 79
1986 95 86 69 86 84
1987 81 83 82 89 84
1988 52 91 74 65 71
1989 102 157 115 92 117
1990 94 161 61 73 97
Ratio = Market Value of Equity to Book Value of Equity (Ordinary Share Capital plus Reserves)
Source: Market Value from Datastream
Book Value from individual Bank Group Balance Sheets
Although Barclays relieved the pressure with an ordinary share
rights issue in March 1985 the other banks resisted, using
instead the avenue pioneered by Lloyds in May 1985 - a US
dollar denominated perpetual FRN, accepted as capital by the
Bank of England. The Lloyds $750m issue was followed by
similar issues by Midland (US$750m), National Westminster
($1bn), and Standard Chartered (1150m eurosterling bond
issue). Earlier perpetual FRN's issued in 1984 issued by
National Westminster, Barclays and Standard Chartered were
termed junior subordinated FR loan stocks as they ranked
between subordinated debt and equity; nevertheless they were
not accepted as primary capital as they carried no provision
for being treated as equity in the event of the issuing bank
experiencing financial difficulties.
Three broad regulatory regime periods may be defined over the
past two decades by two major developments; the introductions
of bank capital supervision and the later introduction of the
minimum capital ratio regime.
As indicated in Section 4.2 the introduction of capital
supervision appears to have progressed over a number of years;
from the emergence of the voluntary system in the mid 1970's
to its formal statutory ratification in 1979, clarified by the
publication of assessment methodology ratios in 1980. The
introduction of the minimum capital regime may be more
precisely dated with the announcement of the bilateral UK-US
agreement in 1987.
The general bank environmental pressures noted in Section 4.1
applied to the UK banks fairly uniformly; The supervisory
desire to improve bank capital ratios coincided with a need
for adequate loan loss provisioning in response to
deteriorating international business conditions. Fiscal
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conditions favoured subordinated debt at the expense of equity
capital by allowing tax relief on interest payments but not
dividends; and specific provisions carried tax deductibility
while general provisions did not. Also fiscal policy change
impacted on UK banks severely with the 1984 Budget amendments
to the systems governing the availability of capital
allowances and liability to corporation tax; for the English
clearing banks alone this prompted a 12bn transfer from
reserves.
The response of the UK clearing banks to these pressures was
in large part determined by the Bank of England's approach to
defining capital. The official line taken on subordinated debt
and debt provisioning proved particularly significant; Hall
(1985c).
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d.	 The Risk Asset Weighted Ratio (RAR)
The risk asset weighted capital ratio (RAR) as used by the
Basle Committee, has evolved from earlier methodologies; see
Chapter 3. The following criticism applies to RAR's generally,
but focuses on specifications of the Basle Committee's RAR.
Criticisms surround its construction and use as a regulatory
minimum constraint, and its influence on commercial bank
management.
As noted by Hall (1989) the use of the risk asset weighted
ratio (RAR) by both the Bank of England and the Basle
Committee is designed to provide a measure of a bank's
financial strength and, to a degree, allows for ready
comparability between institutions.
'In other words, the prescription of risk
weights and a minimum (or target) RAR is
designed to act as a safeguard against
insolvency.'
(i). Precedence
As noted in Chapter 3, a progenitor of the Basle ratio, the
Federal Reserve's increasingly complex ABC risk asset ratio
methodology was ultimately abandoned in the mid 1970's because
adequate capital levels could not be agreed; Moulton (1987).
In a general sense, the potentials for both increasing
complexity of the Basle ratio methodology (eg as more risks
are formally identified) and future disagreement about minimum
capital levels among national supervisors, are contingencies
which may ultimately qualify the tenure of the methodology.
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(ii). Capital Definition
Capital Sterilisation:
A fundamental paradox, which mitigates against bank
operational efficiency, is inherent in mandatory capital ratio
regulation. As noted by Gardener (1981), .. .
,... whenever such a fixed ratio is
prescribed in mandatory terms, banks are
compelled to regard the ratio satisfying
elements in their capital cushions as
being unavailable for potential loss-
absorbing purposes. ... (and) ... one may
refer legitimately to the operational
sterility for loss-absorbing purposes of
the required capital elements of mandatory
ratios as the paradox of prudential
capital adequacy. ... In broader terms,
the paradox ... has potentially
significant welfare implications. These
arise because margins may have to be
widened to build up capital bases above
functional needs in order to satisfy the
mandatory ratios. Such required actions
may then have the undesirable effect of
raising the social cost of intermediation.
Another undesirable effect might be the
indirect incentive given to excessive
banking competition in order to maintain
returns on equity. Excessive competition,
in turn, might itself lead to imprudent
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banking.'
Another form of "sterilisation" occurs when capital is
apportioned exclusively to match certain asset categories such
as goodwill and investment in subsidiaries. Capital so
apportioned is outside the definition of capital for ratio
calculation purposes. Such sterilisation ignores the multi-
functional capacity of bank capital. Also, it implies the
simplistic additivity of risk; see later.
Tier 2 Capital:
The definition of a "tier 2" capital is essentially arbitrary.
As noted in Chapter 3, Benston (1991 p223) argues for the full
inclusion of subordinated debentures. He makes other relevant
comments including, ..
'Given government-provided deposit
insurance, the important constraint on
excessive risk-taking is capital invested
by bank owners, including debentures that
are subordinated to deposits. ...
Marketable debentures would provide the
authorities with market evidence of the
risks taken by a bank, as these would be
reflected in the price at which the
debentures traded. The ease or difficulty
with which a bank refinanced its
debentures as they came due also would
provide the authorities with market
evidence about risks. Hence it would be
desirable for subordinate debentures to
have staggered maturities, such that a
bank would be continually forced to go to
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the market for a reaffirmation of its risk
profile.'
(iii). Risk
Risk Recognition:
Although the regulators acknowledge a wide spectrum of risks,
they incorporate few in their risk weights. The Basle
committee focuses on credit risk (and within this, country
transfer risk) but hopes for eventual incorporation of
investment, and especially interest rate, risk. Off-balance-
sheet items are also converted into credit risk equivalents
before being weighted by the nature of the counterparty.
Risk weights:
Even within the narrow context of credit risk, the assignment
of risk weights is open to challenge. Hall (1989 p130) notes
that the Committee failed to take into account the
characteristics of the obligor, ... 'a necessity, for example,
in any assessment of the true credit risk attaching to market
advances'; ie Hall argues for differentiation in the weights
attached to different categories of advances.
Hall also comments that no clear basis appears to exist for
the weighting relativity between different asset components:
ie ... 'is a claim on the private sector really 5 times more
risky than a domestic interbank loan?' This may have
ramifications for bank management; see next subsection.
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Risk Additivity:
Under the tenets of basic portfolio theory, the overall
riskiness of a bank cannot be assessed by the simple addition
of the riskiness of component activities.
Hogan & Sharpe (1990 p188) also stress the omission of
important balance sheet risks, ...
'With the focus on individual components
of the asset portfolio and off-balance
sheet exposures and the assigning of risk
weights broadly, the risk-adjusted
approach inevitably provides a confusing
perspective on bank risk. By treating each
component independently of all others, the
opportunities for diversification and the
many risk-hedging and immunisation
strategies available to a bank in a
portfolio framework complete in its
treatment of assets and liabilities are
ignored. Interest rate risk may be hedged
by matching asset maturities to
liabilities of roughly similar duration.
Consequently it is wrong to examine asset
risk independently of the composition of a
bank's liabilities, as in the case with
this risk-adjusted scheme. It is as if
maturity transformation between
liabilities and assets has no relevance to
bank risk.
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Influence on Insolvency Risk:
The relationship between bank capital and failure is not clear
(see Chapter 4.1.1). Hall (1989) comments that historical
evidence demonstrates that most bank insolvencies, where not a
direct result of generalised financial panic, result from
fraud or mismanagement rather than inadequate capital
holdings.
Cooper & Fraser (1986 p168) similarly note, in terms of a
normal failure - crisis failure dichotomy, that normal
failures occur in good to moderate overall economic conditions
as a result of mismanagement, fraud, or simple misfortune.
Nevertheless, they concede that, ...
'while this rough dichotomy has a degree
of usefulness, it is far too simple a
description of the risk of failure in
depository institutions... '.
These considerations challenge the ability of the RAR on its
own to prevent insolvency. Also, as noted earlier in this
section, there may be a danger that raising capital
requirements will actually increase risk exposure.
Hall (1989) cites the example of switching to higher yielding
(hence normally more risky) assets to generate the profit to
cover the higher capital backing requirement and its
servicing; and even if the risk weight differentials actively
discourage such activity, risk may nevertheless rise if the
structure of risk weights induces pure disintermediation and
high quality loan business is 'securitised' leaving a higher
level of risk exposure on the remaining portfolio.
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As noted by Hall (1989), Llewellyn (1988) argues that
supervisors have little to lose by exploring alternative
diagnostic devices such as the 'multivariate discriminant
analysis' developed by Vojta (1974) and the computerised
'contingency testing' proposed by Gardener (1981, 1982a).
(iv). Setting of a Minimum Level
Apart from the issue of using a minimum or target, RAR level,
the actual selection of a minimum figure (8% by end 1992)
appears unrelated to any process of reasoning and thus
entirely arbitrary. Certainly no evidence is provided to
indicate that this it is in any sense an optimal level.
(v). Competition
As noted by Hall (1989),...
'it is not clear that the 8% minimum ...
recommended ... by the end of 1992 will
achieve the degree of strengthening of
international banks' balance sheets that
the bulk of supervisory authorities insist
they want.
Hall (1989) believes, that in terms of ratio application, the
Basle initiative will secure a necessary degree of convergence
and establish a floor to the RAR's run by internationally
active banks. Nevertheless he notes that,..
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'The "level playing field" will not
materialise 	  partly because of the
discretion afforded to national
supervisors. This means that international
banks will continue to compete on an
(albeit reduced) inequitable basis and
that the associated risks of financial
instability, as business migrates to low-
cost regulation centres, will remain
within the system.'
There is also a view, noted in conversation with a
representative of the Arab Bankers' Association, that the
Basle RAR competitively disadvantages non-OECD banks; ie the
20% asset weighting for claims on OECD banks contrasts with
the 100% required for claims on Non-OECD banks. This
ultimately may have political/economic North-South
ramifications. Certainly such a blanket dictate is difficult
to reconcile to one of the two "fundamental" objectives of the
Basle Committee Agreement (1988); viz., ...
'the framework should be fair and have a
high degree of consistency in its
application to banks in different
countries with a view to diminishing an
existing source of competitive inequality
among international banks'.
Also, the net impact of possible distortionary effects of the
imposed risk framework on bank risks remains uncertain; this
remains a fundamental qualification to the other avowed
"fundamental" objective, ...
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'the new framework should serve to
strengthen the soundness and stability of
the international banking system'
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4.5.2 Managerial Allocation of Bank Capital
As implied in the foregoing, the influence of a minimum
regulatory level risk asset ratio (RAR) on balance sheet
management may be significant for bank risks, controls and
costs.
Balance Sheet Management:
A range of techniques of bank balance sheet management have
developed in recent decades.
Vlachakis (1988) observes two major ways of looking at the
problem of managing a bank's portfolio; namely, various forms
of asset or balance sheet allocation techniques and, secondly,
by applying portfolio theory. The evolution of a variety of
these techniques is noted in Annex 4.6.
A number of short term asset management techniques, each with
advantage and disadvantages which influence the individual
bank's choice (according to its needs and resources), are
identified by Mason (1979). Also noting the variety of
available techniques, Vlachakis (1988) comments that the
choice of analytic framework may influence the degree of
profitability or potential growth of a particular source of
funds.
In long-term management, Mason (1979) notes the need for a
means of controlling the allocation of funds to borrowers (and
ultimately the risk-return attributes of the loan portfolio).
Capital can be allocated either as a fixed proportion of
loans, or the proportion of capital allocated to a loan can
depend on the riskiness or type of the loan.
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Mason notes arguments in favour of a system of allocation
control rather than the alternative setting of lending limits.
Capital allocation can be used to achieve changes in capital
structure, and the return on capital (rather than on assets)
is more appropriate for financial management. Also, allocated
capital can serve as a control device by measuring the
profitability of individual loans as well as judging the
performance of personnel (32). Nevertheless, Mason adds that
the difficulty in constructing and using a system of capital
allocation should not be minimised, and this is one reason why
the technique is not widely used; The added cost of
implementing this type of system may be too great relative to
the benefit that many banks would receive from applying the
technique.
Influence of RAR:
Lomax (1987) points out that the assignation of risk weights
to different balance sheet (and off-balance-sheet) activities
fundamentally affects a bank's business strategy, pricing
policy and capital allocation. Failure to reflect true risk in
risk weights consequently leads to distortions in business
policy and resource allocation.
Survey evidence of major international banks suggests a
growing attention to the allocation of capital among lines of
business. A Coopers & Lybrand (1988) survey, conducted in
1987-1988, of major international banks in the USA, UK and
Canada suggests that the regulatory risk-based capital
framework is converging with banks internal performance
measurement needs.
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The survey finds the majority of banks employ regulatory
guidelines for capital allocation, but few have developed
their own assessments of capital allocation for internal
management purposes, relying instead on regulatory
authorities' guidelines.
Consequently risk-adjusted capital allocation is relatively
infrequently used for products which have not been assigned
risk weightings by the authorities.
Most banks intend to use the G10-Basle framework as the basis
for their future capital allocation procedures. This is
despite the fact that the G10-Basle framework does not address
certain types of risk, does not adequately differentiate among
certain types of instrument, does not 'price' risk
appropriately for certain products. Moreover the framework
represents a political compromise and is a regulatory
construct not a management tool.
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4.5.3 Market Views of Bank Capital Adequacy
a.	 The Potential Use of Market Discipline
Gilbert (1990) notes that in the light of recent US bank and
thrift failures and their associated costs, the Financial
Institutions Reform, Recovery and Enforcement Act of 1989
calls for government agencies to study changes in regulation
and supervision of depository institutions; it specifically
requests studies on the reform of deposit insurance, and the
potential for improving the effectiveness of market
discipline.
Gilbert provides a theoretical exercise to examine the
implications of proposed changes to the deposit insurance
system; he demonstrates that a change from full to partial
insurance cover would reduce the incentives for banks to
assume relatively high risk (34). Gilbert also reviews a
number of empirical studies and concludes that, ...
'Empirical studies of the effectiveness of
market discipline report mixed results.
The most consistent result is that the
stock prices of individual banks reflect
the risk assumed by banks. Market
discipline of such risk would tend to be
more effective if bank creditors were
forced to absorb losses in a more
consistent fashion in bank failure cases.
The empirical studies do not indicate the
degree of risk that banks would assume if
deposit insurance were reformed to enhance
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the effectiveness of market discipline.
Thus, the empirical studies do not permit
us to determine whether the probability of
bank failures would rise or fall if the
current form of bank regulation were
eliminated in favor of market discipline
by bank shareholders and creditors.'
In the UK context, Saunders & Ward (1976) provide an early
study of the market's assessment of the impact of bank
regulation change in the 1965-75 period; this centres on the
Competition and Credit Control reforms of 1971 and does not
directly concern bank capital regulation (35).
b. The Relevance of Bank Capital Structure
Early studies on the relationship between bank capital
structure and bank value (cost of capital) include Durand
(1957), Van Horne & Helwig (1966), Magen (1971) and Jacobs,
Beighley & Boyd (1975). Nevertheless, as noted by Orgler &
Wolkowitz (1976 p103) the evidence of a relationship is more
suggestive than conclusive. (See Annex 4.5.A).
c. Market Assessment of Capital Adequacy
Studies considering the market assessment of capital adequacy
have been developed along a number of avenues. The primary
concern of the studies varies; eg market discipline to augment
regulatory control, Avery et al (1988), and the augmentation
of flat rate insurance with risk-based capital adequacy
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standards, Ronn & Verma (1989).
Apart from the focus on duality between insurance premium and
capital ratio employed by Ronn & Verma (1989), other models
derived market based capital adequacy assessments by examining
the relationship between risk premia on capital securities and
capital ratios, Pettway (1976) and Avery et al (1988); and
also in terms of an equity valuation model, which provides a
means of examining the relationship between equity value and
financial risk proxied by capital ratios, Shome et al (1986,
1987).
Risk Premia Models:
The potential relationship between the market determined risk
of bank capital securities and the capital structure, and in a
wider sense, risk of banks is considered by Pettway (1976)
and Avery et al (1988).
Pettway (1976) estimates the relationship between various
proxies for component costs of capital (the risk premium on
capital notes; and for common stock, beta and the P/E ratio)
and the capital to asset ratio for large banks over 1971-1974.
He found that in the years covered by his study, the capital
ratio was generally uncorrelated with the proxies and
concluded that investors are not sensitive to low capital
ratios (33).
Avery et al (1988) emphasise the potential for market
discipline in regulating bank risk, focusing on the default
risk premium of subordinated notes and debentures (SNDs) and
generally accepted measures of bank risk for the 100 largest
BHCs during 1984. The default risk premium is defined in terms
290
of the spread between SNDs and Treasury securities identical
in terms of maturity, coupon and call privileges. The risk
premium is modelled as a function of various balance sheet
measures of risk including the ratio of BHC primary capital
to total assets (as well as bond ratings and an index proposed
by the FDIC for the pricing of risk-based insurance). The SND
risk premiums are found to be uncorrelated with any balance
sheet variable and the FDIC Index, and weakly related to the
bond ratings. The authors conclude that the potential for
market discipline to augment regulatory controls via the SND
capital market is weak; the pricing signals from the market
appearing at odds with the directions desired by regulators.
Valuation Model:
The adequacy of bank capital from a market perspective has
been investigated in an empirical study by Shome et al (1986,
updated in 1987). The study determines whether banks hold
capital above or below the value maximising optimum in terms
of an historical relationship between the equity market value
of banks and their capital ratios. The model, specified in
Chapter 7, has a general form of price equals a function of
earnings, payout ratio, equity capital ratio and asset size.
The equity capital ratio is a measure of financial risk, and
its coefficient is of focal interest in the study.
The Shome (1987) study analyses the relationship between the
capital levels and valuation for the 99 largest banks each
year between 1976-85. A positive relationship between equity
value and capital ratios - implying that value would increase
if capital were increased - would suggest that bank capital
ratios are inadequate from the market (le shareholders') point
of view. A negative relationship implies that value would
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increase by reducing equity, and that regulation forces banks
to hold more equity than desired by the market. Finally, the
absence of a statistically significant relationship between
value and capital ratios would imply capital ratios are on
average near the value maximising optimum.
Shome et al (1987) comment that the results indicate that over
the 1976-85 decade, the market viewed the banks on average as
having adequate or insufficient capital but not excessive
capital.	 Consequently this
challenges industry claims that regulation forces banks to
hold more capital than desired by the market.
Also, they note that in the 1979-82 period the ratios were
significantly positive implying the banks had insufficient
capital even from the market perspective. Shome et al believe
this market perception may be due to the combination falling
capital ratios, and high volatility of interest rates over the
1979-82 period.
Finally, they note that insignificant coefficients over 1983-
85 suggest the market perceived a return to adequate capital;
they comment that this is clearly a refection of the
corrective action taken by regulators to require bank to meet
an increased fixed capital standard since 1983.
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TABLE 4.6
Market View of Bank Capital Adequacy
(99 Banks over the 1976-1985 Decade)
1976 1977 1978 1979 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985
EQR Coeffic 0.31 0.23 0.33 0.54 0.70 0.51 0.45 0.29 0.21 -.18
t statistic* 1.25 0.93 1.52 2.71 3.10 2.15 2.18 1.42 0.71 -.09
bbba	 a	 a	 a	 b	 b	 b
EQR Coeffic = coefficient of Equity Ratio
* values of the t-statistic for testing the statistical
significance of the coefficient of EQR. Coefficient is
statistically different from zero (at 5% significance level)
when t-value is > or = to 1.98; a = significant, b = not
significant
SOURCE: Shome et al (1987)
Insurance Risk Premium:
As an alternative to risk based deposit insurance premiums,
Ronn & Verma (1989) derive the capital adequacy standard that
should be required of a bank under a flat deposit premium
regime.
Their model views flat deposit premiums as consistent with
industry-wide risk uniformity if combined with a rigid control
of bank asset risk, or the adjustment of the leverage ratio
through the application of risk based capital adequacy
standards. The isomorphism between put options and deposit
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insurance can be used to deduce the value of such insurance
implicit in the observable market prices of banks' equity.
(After the application of option pricing to deposit insurance
pioneered by Merton (1977) and its later modification by Ronn
& Verma (1986) to take into explicit consideration market
perceptions of the regulatory agencies' bank closure rule).
This valuation methodology can then be inverted to yield
market and book value based capital adequacy standards.
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4.6
	 SUMMARY
A combination of economic and other factors led to supervisory
pressure for change in relative, or balance sheet, structure
capital regulation in the past couple of decades. The main
dimensions of this change are the international convergence of
capital measurement and the stipulation of a minimum standard.
This development has been accompanied by improved analysis of
capital definition and bank risks.
The accounting profession also appears to be moving towards a
greater international compatibility of accounting standards,
although the actual benefits of the exercise are unclear.
Also, in the US, a market based accounting system is being
advocated for banks although this is qualified by practical
implementation problems.
In support of relative bank capital regulation, via a risk-
asset weighted capital ratio, the regulatory agencies - as
manifest in the Basle Committee (1988) Agreement - tend to
stress the achievement of international agreement and the
bluesky of improved risk analysis; ie in time, an increase in
the identified risks taken into the purview of the ratio
calculation. Nevertheless, the structure of the risk
assessment framework appears fundamentally flawed in
methodological terms, and arbitrary in its specifics.
Also el	 note that the individual regulatory authority
has some latitude in interpreting the agreement, and the
'capital adequacy as measured by the present framework, though
important, is one of a number of factors to be taken into
account when assessing the strength of banks'; Basle Committee
(1988). Nevertheless, underlying such implied adaptability and
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looseness, the imposition of the capital definition, risk
framework and minimum standard represents a real constraint
which appears likely to influence bank management policy.
While bank capital regulation may be generally justified as a
counter to systemic failure risk, and more particularly the
moral hazard generated by protective regulation, the specific
impact on bank costs and risks of the minimum standard risk-
asset weighted ratio methodology is uncertain.
The following chapters, seek a market view of the impact of
the new minimum standard regulatory regimes via the
investigation of capital issue announcement price affects.
Also, comparison of both the market's and the regulator's
views of bank capital adequacy suggest a means of assessing
potential costs in regulatory policy.
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FOOTNOTES
(1). The general change in financial regulation has been
characterised as "deregulation" by some, eg Cooper & Fraser
(1986), and "reregulation" by others, eg Baker (1986).
(2). Examination of the relationship between bank capital and
insolvency around the depression era has been undertaken by
a. Secrist (1938), cited in Vojta (1973a), studied capital to
deposit, and to total liabilities, ratios for a number of
national banks which failed and similar ratios of those
national banks which did not fail in the 1921-31 period.
b. Crosse (1962) quoted in Vojta (1973a), A study of 50 banks,
31 of which failed or were required to recapitalise before
re-opening after the Bank Holiday, and 19 of which survived
the Depression unscathed, showed that 'for the banks which
were required to raise additional capital, the ratio (of
capital to risk assets) averaged somewhat higher (22.8) than
for the banks which survived. For the latter, the comparable
figure was 18.7%...'
c. Cotter (1966), quoted in Vojta (1973a), used data for West
Coast banks which failed between 1921-23 tested the hypotheses
that ratios of capital to deposits, risk assets, and total
assets showed significant differences in banks which have
survived financial panics and depressions and those which did
not. Such differences were not found among the banks studied
and Cotter concluded these ratios would not have been useful
in determining the need for capital in those cases".
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(3). Santomero & Vinso (1977) cited in Wall (1985), provide
empirical evidence that increased bank capital will not
significantly reduce banks' risk of failure. Using historical
data on the volatility of changes in banks' capital they
estimate the risk that a sample of banks would exhaust their
capital base. The evidence from their 1965-74 sample period
suggests the probability of bank failure was small and that
reasonable variations in the capital level would not have an
economically significant effect on the risk of failure.
The authors employ the probabilistic theory of gambler's ruin
to model the risk of bank failure. Following its use to
predict business default risk, Wilcox (1971), Santomero &
Vinso use it to calculate the risk of capital inadequacy for
their sample of banks but, as Talmor (1980, p804) notes, they
ignore both causes of change in capital and the nature of
variations in other components of the balance sheet. Moreover
their model provides only a general notion about the riskiness
of the banking system as a whole and presents no predictive
power for individual banks. Talmor (1980) builds on this work
to derive an optimal capital structure for an individual bank
based on the determination of an ex ante acceptable
probability of bankruptcy. He constructs a testable theory of
bank failure which focuses on the sensitivity of the bank's
sources and uses of funds to basic market and policy factors
as the major determinants for the capital requirement.
Nevertheless, Santomero (1984) criticises the gambler's ruin
approach on the basis that it is not clear how the acceptable
probability of failure is defined.
Cates Consulting Analysts, Inc. (1985) cited in Wall (1985),
examine bank failures in 1984 and conclude that capital risk
was not a significant factor in failure. The study notes that
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failed banks typically had lower capital ratios than their
peers but points out that 70% of the failed banks had book
capital values in 1982 that exceed the 1985 guidelines by 35
basis points or more.
(4). The relationship between financial sector development
and the potential for crisis has been considered by Minsky
(1982) who argues that, ...
'the larger a financial system grows in
relation to the economy and the more
complex and layered it becomes, the
greater its fragility and its proneness to
financial crises, and the more serious its
effects on economic development.'
This quote, in Collins (1988 p83), is a paraphrase of Minsky's
model by Goldberg, R.W. in - Kindleberger, C.P. & Laffargue,
J. (eds) (1982) Financial Crises, Theory, History and Policy
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press). This contains Minsky,
H.P. (1982) The Financial Instability Hypothesis: Capitalist
Processes and the Behaviour of the Economy; p13-39.
(5). The general economic environment experienced a series of
major structural changes. The OECD (1985) comments...
"The low-inflation/high-growth era of the
sixties gave way to a period of high
inflation, slower economic growth and
rising unemployment. Two oil shocks
contributed powerfully to an unprecedented
widening of balance-of-payments imbalances
and to greater volatility of relative
prices. Imbalances in the real economy
299
were reflected in large swings in sectoral
financial imbalances as well as in a rapid
accumulation of domestic and international
debt which continued well into the early
eighties, calling for commensurate
adjustment efforts."
Subsequent efforts in OECD countries to follow a policy of
disinflation aimed at greater economic stability has reduced
inflation rates - but the world economy experienced a sharp
recession from which a slow recovery has developed since
1982-83. In the process a number of non-OECD countries have
been confronted with severe debt and liquidity problems.
(6). The structure of the US banking sector reflects in part
major regulation of geographic and product markets by
statutory control. Dale (1984a p129-30) notes that, ...
'the 1933 Glass-Steagall Act separates
investment banking business from
commercial banking, the 1927 McFadden Act
restricts inter-state banking, and the
1956 Bank Holding Company Act limits the
scope of a banking company's activities to
those that are closely related to banking.
Dale also notes that, ...
'the effective prohibition of interstate
banking has led to a highly fragmented
financial system comprising some 14,000
banks, while limitations on the kinds of
business banks may undertake has resulted
in financial specialisation among
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commercial savings and investment banks.
However changes in financial technology,
more permissive regulatory policies and
statutory deregulation (notably the Garn-
St. Germain Depository Institutions Act of
1982) have tended in recent years to blur
the traditional distinction between banks
and other financial businesses.'
(7). The OECD (1985) notes that Capital strength is a major
factor in determining a bank's market standing - and
consequently its ability to raise funds. Growing concern about
an observed deterioration in asset quality in recent years has
caused an emphasis on the strengthening of own funds by
improving profit capability. One avenue used by banks desiring
to economise on capital, has been via off-balance sheet
business; this development has been recognised and
accommodated in the capital adequacy requirements set by
supervisory authorities.
(8). More particularly, Greenspan (1988) comments that, ...
'For many banks this means increased
capital requirements. I recognize that
some of these banks, not feeling market
pressures to raise capital ratios, may
consider increased capital requirements
unnecessarily burdensome. However, given
the existence of the federal safety net,
market signals regarding the level of
capital may not be appropriate from a
broader perspective. The safety net has
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the effect of overriding some forms of
market discipline, and the implied partial
backing of the federal government for some
bank funds means that incentives for banks
to maintain adequate capital are weakened.
The reluctance of banks to raise equity in
capital markets may also be based, to an
extent, on comparisons of book and market
values of equity and the apparent
consequences of a shortfall in market
value for shareholder dilution. But the
relevant consideration is clearly
enhancing the market value of the firm
over time. High-capital banks will be the
ones that can react to the changing
environment and profit from new
opportunities.
Regulatory policy can and should do more
than merely raise the level of capital. A
risk-based system of capital standards
should help deter excessive risk-taking by
individual banks; and the greater capital
costs imposed on high-risk banks will
imply a fairer distribution of capital
requirements within the banking system.'
(9). Staats (1965) identified 12 bank capital functions from
a questionnaire sent to commercial bankers and state banking
authorities. Respondents were asked to identify the most
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important functions of capital, and the single most important
function. Of the most important functions, the provision of
depositor protection, to act as a cushion against losses, the
provision of a basis for bank operations, and the inspiration
of confidence were rated highly by the respondents while the
provision of depositor protection was considered the most
important single function by a majority of respondents.
Significantly, Staats's survey evidences a range of functions
accorded to bank capital, and differences in the perceived
importance of functions both within groups and between groups
of responders.
Nevertheless, in the context of the provision of FDIC cover,
the significance of the depositor-protection function, as an
incentive to maintain or increase bank capital has been
challenged by Friedman & Formuzis (1975). They stress the
distinction between the failure-avoidance incentive (involving
the probability of failure) which increases depositor
confidence, and the deposit-protection incentive (involving
bank failure) which provides more protection for uninsured
depositors.
They argue that the deposit-protection incentive for
increasing a bank's capital level has in fact little or no
influence on a bank's capital holdings. More particularly they
reason that an increase in the capital/liabilities ratio must
exceed a critical level if an increase in capital is to be of
any interest, via deposit-protection rationale, for any
depositor; moreover even if this condition is satisfied, only
depositors with balances above a certain level will find the
increased ratio a potentially attractive feature. Both levels
depend on the expected realisation rate of the bank's assets
in liquidation and the depositor's sensitivity to potential
savings in case of bank failure. They conclude that, ...
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'The deposit-protection incentive,
therefore, is of probable significance
only in the case of small banks which hold
but a tiny fraction of total bank capital
and an even smaller share of total bank
liabilities.'
(10). The Spectrum from Risk to Uncertainty
The distinction of risk from uncertainty enjoys a tradition in
economics extending from J.M. Keynes (Guttentag & Herring
1986). Although risk is perceived in a general, non-specific
sense, as a potential jeopardy or loss, finance literature
defines risk in the sense of the known dispersion of possible
outcomes around a known expected outcome. Uncertainty
describes the situation where the parameters of the
probability distribution, ie the measures of central tendency
and dispersion of an event, are ill-defined and, at the
extreme, unknown. Guttentag & Herring (1986) define the
extremes, noting pure uncertainty as a situation where
nothing is known about the size of the probability that a
particular event will occur while pure risk describes a
situation where the probability of that event takes on a value
between one and zero. In practice, they note, knowledge of the
event parameters is intermediate between pure uncertainty and
pure risk
(11). Vojta's Generic Risk of Loss
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Vojta (1973a) identified 6 generic commercial banking risks
which may occasion loss or, put another way, negative claims
on earnings and capital. His analysis was significant at the
time but needs qualification in terms of the era (pre the
rapid internationalism of banking) and the limited context of
loss risk.
Vojta's framework identified risks, of loss, in the context of
the capital, of a bank in difficulty, being adequate to absorb
losses while the bank restored a normal level of earnings; or
in his words, ...
'in conditions short of total economic
collapse to provide protection against
unanticipated adversity leading to loss in
excess of normal expectations'.
The identified risks factors include,
1) Credit Risk: 2) Investment Risk:
3) Liquidity Risk: 4) Operating Risk:
5) Fraud Risk: 6) Fiduciary Risk:
The expanded frameworks of Revell (1975) and Gardener (1981)
are in Annex 4.2.
(12). Clark (1976 p68-70) distinguishes,
I. Bottom Line Insolvency: unavoidable and massive contractual
failure which occurs when a firm is generally unable to pay
its debts as they become due and payable, without
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'government intervention of the sort
provided by the FDIC, even though the firm
tries its best to obtain refinancing or to
liquidate its assets at the best
immediately available price.
ii. Traditional Equity Sense Insolvency: similarly occurs when
a firm is generally unable to pay its debts as they become due
and payable, but inability to pay here means,
'the firm cannot meet its due and payable
obligations without engaging in a
liquidation of assets at distress prices
or jeopardizing the debtor's ability to
meet future maturing obligations.'
iii. Accounting Insolvency: occurs when
'a firm's balance sheet, prepared in
accordance with generally accepted
accounting principles, shows an excess of
liabilities over assets (a negative net
worth). Accountants value many kinds of
assets at their historic costs, less
depreciation.'
iv. Bankruptcy Act Insolvency: occurs when
'a firm's liabilities exceed its assets,
where the assets (but not the liabilities)
are valued at their fair market or
intrinsic value.
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Clark notes that i and ii. relate to short term capacity to
meet imminently due obligations, while iii. and iv. are
"balance sheet" notions that account for all, or nearly all,
liabilities and the firm's long-term ability to meet them. He
comments, ...
' all risk-regarding regulation of the
soundness of financial intermediaries is
directed toward preventing or coping with
bottom line insolvency. ... Because the
law aims at preventing contractual
failure, regulatory tests of insolvency,
or related, propaedeutic concepts such as
minimum net worth and capital adequacy,
are tests of insolvency or unsoundness in
a more remote and abstract sense then
bottom line insolvency. The relevant
question then becomes whether there is a
significant correlation between these
remote tests and freedom from future
bottom line insolvency.
... The relationships among the four
concepts of insolvency are largely
indeterminate; ... Since bottom line
insolvency is the touchstone of policy,
five negative propositions about
indications of its presence should be
expressly noted. First ... traditional
equity sense insolvency does not imply
bottom line insolvency. Second, accounting
insolvency does not imply bottom line
insolvency. Third ... Bankruptcy Act
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insolvency does not imply bottom line
insolvency. Fourth ... a balance sheet
test of insolvency based on a statement
which listed assets at fair market values
and liabilities, not at their face values,
but at their discounted negative present
values ..., would not imply bottom line .
insolvency. Fifth ... solvency in neither
the accounting nor the Bankruptcy Act
sense implies that the firm will soon fall
into bottom line insolvency.'
(13). Maisel (1981) notes that the most important risk of
insolvency or of a fall in the net worth of a bank arises fr
a mismatch of the term to maturity of assets and liabilities
with fixed interest rates. Samuelson (1945) and later author
have used the concept of duration to study the effects of
interest rate changes on financial institutions. Duration is
the measure of the weighted average time before payments are
received from interest and principal on a security or loan;
the bank's duration is a weighted average of the duration of
its individual activities. (ie weighted by each activities
share of the present value of the portfolio).
Maisel (p52) notes that Morrison & Pyle (1981 published in
Maisel 1981) show that, under the simplifying assumption tha
all spot and forward rates change by the same amount and tha
assets and liabilities remain constant, the percentage chang
In a bank's net worth will be proportional to the percentage
change in interest rates. The proportion or actual value of
such movements in capital will depend on the duration of the
bank as a whole. Nevertheless, Morrison & Pyle show that the
simplifying assumptions are unlikely to be met for two
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reasons:-1) The discount rates for all future payments are
unlikely to move together, and 2) because, not all of a bank's
assets and liabilities have fixed payment streams and a well
defined maturity.
(14). Ball & Brown (1968) argue that accounting earnings
proxy for economic earnings by showing a positive relationship
between unexpected earnings for a year and the unexpected rate
of return to the stock. Nevertheless, Ball (1972) examines
whether the market is influenced by changes in accounting
technique, testing the hypothesis that the market cannot
distinguish real from accounting effects on reported income.
Using FFJR event methodology, Ball found no significant stock
price effect in the month of the accounting change; also for
these firms, no association between the sign of the earnings
change and the sign of the annual abnormal returns. This is
contrary to Ball & Brown's findings for firms in general,
suggesting that the market does not mechanically adjust the
stock price according to the observed change in earnings.
Citing more recent studies, Copeland & Weston (1988) note that
Sunder (1973, 1975) finds evidence that suggests investors
value cash flow not earnings.
(15). Rowe (1980) notes that in view of a lack of academic
unanimity about basics, the UK accountancy bodies issued a
Statement of Standard Accounting Practice (SSAP2) in 1971 (see
"Accountancy" December 1971) which indicated that the reader
of published accounts could assume four concepts had been
followed unless otherwise stated: viz 'Going-Concern' (as
opposed to break-up or saleable values) the results and asset
values are reported on the presumption that the business
entity would continue operating in the foreseeable future;
'Consistency' of the bases used for asset valuation;
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'Conservatism or Prudence' - profits and assets values should
take account of probable, or even merely possible, present or
future losses, but gains should only be taken into account
when realised; 'Matching' - profits are computed by matching
revenues against relevant costs which contrasts with the
economist's view of profit as the net value change in a
business between two dates.
(16). Giraud & Walton (1990) comment on two surveys. The one,
published in October 1989, is based on a survey of company
accounts carried out by a joint organisation set up by
European professional accounting bodies; the Federation des
Expertes Comptables Europeans (FEE). The FEE'S survey assessed
whether the first major instrument of accounting
harmonisation, the Fourth EC Directive, did achieve greater
harmonisation of practices and greater comparability of
financial statements. The Directive itself does not impose
consolidation, and also offers two basic approaches to
disclosure within the profit and loss account, viz expenses
shown by nature (ie salaries, materials etc) or by function
(cost of sales, administration etc); these factors also
represent a qualification to the survey findings. The survey
findings concluded that while there was a high degree of
harmonisation on matters covered by the Directive, including
account presentation, significant differences exist in terms
of measurement and disclosure practices, particularly in the
areas of depreciation, intangibles, pension liabilities and
leasing.
The second survey, by accountants Touche Ross, reviews
practices in 7 EC states and provides comparative data based
on a case study; this latter demonstrates, using local rule
flexibility, a maximum, minimum, and most likely profit
measurement for the case study in each country; an extreme
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difference is represented by the UK minimum of 170 (Ecu) and a
German maximum of 140 (Ecu).
(17). By analysing the reports of UK companies with a US
listing, and thereby required to compute results according to
both US and UK generally accepted accounting principles
(GAAP), Walton & Wyman (reported by Whitelam 1990) consider
which accounting differences between the two systems have the
most significant impact on measurement of shareholders' funds
and earnings. Whitelam reports that, ...
'In more than 75% of the sample, US
principles gave lower earnings than under
UK GAAP, while almost three quarters of
the companies had a higher value for
shareholders' funds on the balance sheet
than under the UK system. The impact on
earnings was found to be greater than on
equity, with differing treatments of
goodwill and deferred taxation having the
greatest effect on the profit and loss
account, resulting in a reduction of 7.3%
in earnings, in aggregate, under US GAAP.
Goodwill and deferred tax are also the
cause of the main discrepancies in the
balance sheet totals, but here the effects
are opposite and almost equal, with the
write-back of goodwill increasing equity
by 14% and the extra provision for
deferred tax reducing it by 18% in the US
restatement.
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The higher US balance sheet numbers
naturally result in lower asset turnover
values, but also give lower capital
gearing ratios. And, since earnings are
lower but shareholders' equity is higher,
the powerful return on equity ratio is
doubly distorted, to give a lower value
using US rules, 20% for the sample in
aggregate, compared with 27% under UK
GAAP.'
(18). As reported by Whitelam (1990), the Choi & Levich
survey of capital market practitioners finds that, ...
' ... half of the respondents felt that
their capital market decisions were
affected by variations in accounting
disciplines ... (but this) ... actually
understates the issue, since they found
evidence that an additional number of
users change the way in which they analyse
investments when looking at foreign
markets.
These sophisticated investors were found
to cope with the problems by developing
what was described by Choi & Levich as MPC
- multiple principles capability - meaning
that they familiarised themselves with
each set of the relevant foreign
accounting principles and then adopted a
local perspective when analysing the
foreign financial statements.'
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Areas considered "tricky" by investment managers included, . ..
' ... not only differences in accounting
principles, but also differences in
corporate financial disclosure practices.
Some investors also mentioned different
audit practices between countries as being
important in this context.
Countries whose accounting principles were
most often mentioned as a source of
concern for analysts when investing
outside the home country were Japan,
Switzerland, West Germany and the US.
Industries which caused most problems
included banking, insurance, financial
services in general, semi-conductors and
mining. The list of accounting areas
where difficulties were encountered was
long, and comprehensive, and included in
particular: multinational consolidations,
valuation of assets, deferred taxes,
pensions, discretionary reserves, foreign
currency transactions and translation,
leases, provisions and goodwill.
Interestingly, investors taking part in
the survey appeared evenly divided as to
whether international accounting standards
are necessary, and when asked whether
there were any preconditions which would
make them more willing to expand their
313
geographical scope or increase their
international equity investments, no one
voluntarily mentioned the need for a
harmonised set of accounting standards.'
(19). Morris & Sellon (1991) comment that despite the capital
measurement informational advantage of the market Valuation
system, vis a vis the historic cost system, qualification
arise from the problems of implementation. Both partial and
full market value accounting have been advocated. The partial
valuation approach (applying only to tradeable securities) has
the advantage of cost (security market values are easily
obtained) and represents a solution to current accounting
abuses such as gains trading, earnings and measured capital
would become more volatile. The full valuation approach varies
in terms of presentation; at one extreme banks merely disclose
market values as footnotes on financial statements, while at
the other the banks use market values instead of book values
as the basis for the financial reporting.
In evaluating these implementation proposals Morris & Sellon
note that,...
• partial approaches would reduce
accounting abuses such as gains trading
and would not be costly to implement. At
the same time , however, partial
approaches do not show an institution's
full interest rate exposure and may lead
to artificial and misleading volatility of
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capital. Full market value accounting
would show a bank's interest rate exposure
and would also eliminate accounting
abuses. However, this approach would be
more costly to implement. Moreover, until
better valuation models are developed,
full market value accounting might not
provide accurate measures of bank capital.
In deciding whether to require banks to
adopt market value accounting, regulators
will have to weigh these advantages and
disadvantages. If regulators decide that
the benefits of market value accounting
outweigh its costs, the time and effort
needed to develop accurate, market value
models suggest a gradual approach to
implementation.'
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(20). The recent capital adequacy requirements for bank
holding companies have been summarised by Isberg & Brown
(1987) and may be represented as,
	
17 largest BHCs	 BHCs Assets>$1bn	 BHCs Assets<$1bn
	
Year Multinational
	
Regionals	 Community
1981
	
no explicit	 5.5 Total Cap	 6.5 Total Cap
standards	 5.0 Primary	 6.0 Primary
1983	 5.5 Total
	
5.5 Total
	
6.5 Total
5.0 Primary	 5.0 Primary	 6.0 Primary
1985	 6.0 Total
	
6.0 Total
	
6.0 Total
5.5 Primary	 5.5 Primary	 5.5 Primary
Regulatory Definition of BHC Capital
Primary Capital:
Common Stock (par) + Perpetual Preferred Stock(par) +
Undivided Profits + Surplus + Capital Reserves
= Equity Capital
+ Mandatory Convertible Instruments + Loan Loss Reserve +
Minority Interest in Consolidated Subsidiaries - Equity
Commitment Notes
= Primary Capital
Secondary Capital:
Limited Life Preferred Stock + Subordinated Debt + Other
Mandatory Convertible Instruments
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. Secondary Capital
Total Capital . Primary + Secondary Capital
As noted in the following section on international
developments, multinational US banks came under the purview of
the Basle Committee capital adequacy requirements during the
latter half of the 1980's.
(21).	 The capital base, as noted by Hall (1985c) comprised,
- amounts partly or fully-paid up on issued share (ordinary
and non-redeemable preference) capital and share premium,
- loan capital (up to a third of the total capital base net of
the outstanding goodwill and subject to straight line
'amortisation' in the last five years of life) which is fully
subordinated to other creditors (including depositors) and
which has an initial term to maturity of at least five years
of life and involves no restrictive covenants.
- general bad debt provisions, less any associated deferred
tax asset,
- general reserves (including inner reserves) plus the balance
on the profit and loss account, and
- minority interests, when included in accounts as a result of
the consolidation of subsidiary companies not wholly owned.
The adjusted capital base was defined after the deduction of
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premises, equipment and other fixed assets, goodwill,
investments in subsidiaries and associated companies and trade
investments, unquoted investments and connected lending were
all deducted
(22). Also, the Banking Act 1979 was designed to provide
statutory backing to the Bank of England's unofficial
supervisory arrangements. Certain shortcomings in its
structure became apparent and were addressed by the 1987 Act.
As noted by the Bank of England Deputy Governor (BEQB August
1987).
'It (the 1979 Act) conferred on the Bank
functions with respect to the control of
institutions carrying on deposit-taking
businesses and created the Deposit
Protection Board. The objective of
supervision in the Act was to safeguard
depositors and its focus was individual
banks. It was not - and is not - directly
concerned with the soundness of the
overall banking system or with the
protection of shareholders, though both
can have a bearing on the protection
afforded to depositors and so need to be
borne in mind by our supervisors.'
'While the 1979 Act certainly met many of
the intentions of its drafters, it did not
prove wholly satisfactory....the new 1987
Act... retains the same fundamental
objectives as its predecessor, but gives
the Bank greater powers - for example, in
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obtaining information from banks and from
auditors; and removes the distinction
between licenced and recognised
institutions, which was an obstacle to
effective supervision of the latter.'
Also, in accordance with the 1979 Banking Act, a statutory
deposit protection fund was first introduced in February 1982.
The scheme is administered by the Deposit Protection Board,
chaired by the Governor of the Bank of England. The scheme
protected depositors for the first Y10,000 of sterling
deposits with an original maturity of up to 5 years held with
either a recognised bank or a licensed deposit-taking
institution. The protection was amended by the 1987 Banking
Act; cover was increased to 75% of the first E20,000 of
sterling deposits held with an "authorised institution".
Interbank deposits are excluded from cover which is otherwise
extended to all personal and corporate depositors (except
those associated with the institution).
The protection fund is financed by a levy on each authorised
institutions proportional to its deposit base; this is subject
to a minimum of 110,000 and a maximum of J200,000.
Arrangements for supplementary contributions exist, although
these are subject to a limit of 0.3 per cent of the sterling
deposit base. Hall (1989 p 113).
(23). Major features of changes in capital definition
included loan stock and debt provisioning, as noted by Hall
(1985c).
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Loan Stock:
The Bank of England's 1975 view of loan stock, which was
required to be subordinated and medium to long term, was as
finance for part of the infrastructure of the business and not
to provide a loss cushion; this was reasoned on the basis
that, unlike shareholders' funds, loan stock was impermanent,
inflexible with respect to servicing costs, and not available
to absorb losses without a liquidation.
The Bank adopted a more lenient attitude by 1980, emphasising
that fully subordinated medium to long term loan stocks might
reduce the threat to creditors confidence in the event of an
institution experiencing difficulties and so enhance its
ability to survive; also, when of long term and denominated in
foreign currency, maturity and currency mismatches may be
reduced.
Accordingly, the Bank allowed the inclusion of fully
subordinated loan stock, up to a maximum of one third, within
the capital base provided they were of a minimum initial
period to maturity of 5 years, did not incorporate unduly
restrictive covenants triggering early repayments, and were
subject to an amortisation factor once within 5 years of
maturity. The last point was designed to discourage unduly
short initial terms, soften the impact on capital ratios when
loan stocks mature and are not replaced, and reflect the
diminishing comfort afforded. Also, in order to prevent an
illusory boosting of capital for the banking system as a
whole, and in recognition of the fact that the bulk of bank
issues are held by other banks, the Bank insisted that all
banks operating in the UK deduct their holdings of other
banks' issues from their own issues in calculating the size of
their capital base.
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Innovations in capital market products resulted in the Bank
circulating a note to members of the British Bankers'
Association in November 1984; Hall (1985c). The Bank proposed
that a maximum of half of primary capital could be held in FRN
form provided that,
i. the issue never has to be repaid, except in the case of
liquidation,
ii. the issue converts automatically into equity if the
issuing bank gets into financial difficulties, and
iii. no clauses are contained in the terms of the issue which
trigger early repayment of the monies raised.
A pioneering perpetual floating rate note issue, by Lloyds in
1985, was accepted by the Bank as primary capital, albeit in a
slightly modified form to that previously stipulated by the
Bank. The Lloyd's issue was allowed as primary capital because
interest payments could be suspended if no dividend was
declared on common stock and that, in the event of Lloyds
going into liquidation, noteholders would be deemed preference
shareholders ranking behind all bar ordinary shareholders for
repayment.
Debt Provisioning:
Prior to 1980 both general and specific provisions were
included in the capital base. The justification for including
only general provisions post 1980 was that provisions set
aside for likely losses already identified, are not available
to cushion future unidentified losses. This ruling, making
allowance for the tax deductibility of specific reserves,
favours general rather than specific provisioning for all but
the relatively well capitalised banks.
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(24). The proposal adopted a uniform capital definition as
well as a five tier risk-weighting framework which
incorporated off-balance sheet items. A risk asset ratio is
calculated by applying to each category of on or off-balance
sheet obligations a weight ranging from 0% to 100% and
reflecting the relative inherent credit risk: le the nature of
the counterparty-obligor, maturity, or in limited cases the
quality of the collateral. Two ratios of primary capital to
total risk-weighted exposures were proposed, namely,
i. a common minimum ratio which would apply to all banks in
both the US and UK, and
ii. an individual minimum ratio which would account for each
institution's idiosyncrasies.
(25). Dale (1984a p172) notes that until the Herstatt crisis
of 1974 there was formally no machinery for co-ordinating
national regulatory arrangements and supervisors were very
much domestically orientated.
(26). Focusing on the demarcation of responsibilities of
national supervisory authorities in international banking,
the Basle Concordat of 1975 contained a number of principal
guidelines
summarised by Cooke (1981, p240)
1: The supervision of foreign banking establishments should be
the joint responsibility of host and parent authorities.
2: No foreign banking establishment should escape supervision,
each country should ensure that foreign banking establishments
are supervised, and supervision should be adequate as judged
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by both host and parent authorities.
3: The supervision of liquidity should be the primary
responsibility of host authorities since foreign
establishments generally have to conform to local practices
for their liquidity management and must comply with local
regulations.
4: The supervision of solvency of foreign branches should be
essentially a matter for the parent authority. In the case of
subsidiaries, while primary responsibility lies with the host
authority, parent authorities should take account of the
exposure of their domestic banks' foreign subsidiaries and
joint ventures because of the parent banks' moral commitment
in this regard.
5: Practical co-operation would be facilitated by transfers of
information between host and parent authorities and by the
granting of permission for inspections by or on behalf of
parent authorities on the territory of the host authority.
Every effort should be made to remove any legal restraints
(particularly in the field of professionals secrecy or
national sovereignty) which might hinder those forms of co-
operation.
As noted by Hall (1989 p12) the revised edition of the
Concordat issued in June 1983 was designed to incorporate
agreements reached since 1975 on the principle of
consolidation which had been recommended by the Committee in
1976 and formally agreed by the Group of Ten Governors in
1978. Under the principle of consolidation, the risks
undertaken by the banking group as a whole are assessed by the
supervisor of the parent bank.
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The revised Concordat also clarified and amplified some of the
original points in the light of experience - most notably the
collapse of the Luxembourg-based Banco Ambrosiano Holdings in
1982, which raised questions about the treatment of
intermediate institutions (such as bank holding companies like
Banco Ambrosiano). The revision also reaffirmed that lender of
last resort function was outside the remit of the Basle
Committee.
(27). As noted by Hall (1989), the advisory groups include;
i) the Contact Group of EC Supervisory Authorities (Groupe de
Contact); the first advisory body to be established (1972) is
an
informal club comprising the supervisory authorities of the
Member States. Its role is to provide a forum for the exchange
of views by national supervisors so as to achieve closer
understanding of supervisory practices and promote practical
co-operation. It commissions its own research studies and
submits reports to the Banking Advisory Committee and the EEC
Commission.
ii) The Banking Advisory Committee, comprises representatives
(not more than three) from each Member State and the
Commission. Established in 1979 (following the First Banking
Co-ordination Directive of 1977), the Committee is
responsible, along with the EEC Commission for determining
general policy guidelines on supervisory co-operation for the
Community
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iii) Close contact is maintained with the Basle Committee of
Supervisors and individual national regulators.
(28). Revell (1975 p69) notes that in July 1972 the
Commission of the European Communities issued a draft
directive on the subject of harmonisation of regulation of
banks and other credit institutions within the Community. But
in the climate of the time before the fringe banking crisis
was foreseen it did not find favour in the UK - provoking one
former Governor of the Bank of England to refer to 'vexatious
legislation'. The draft directive, which was based on West
German banking law, was eventually withdrawn and the
commission decided on a step by step approach to
harmonisation; the revised Directive issued in 1975 covered
only part of the ground.
(29). As noted by Hall (1989), other subsequent initiatives
relevant to banking supervision include two further Directives
and two Recommendations.
i) The Consolidated Supervision Directive, obliging Member
States to supervise credit institutions with financial
subsidiaries on a consolidated basis, was adopted in June
1983.
ii) The Bank Accounts Directive, requiring standardisation of
the presentation of the annual accounts of banks and other
financial institutions, was adopted in 1986.
Recommendations relating to
iii) Large Exposures, and
iv) Deposit Protection Arrangements, were both adopted in
1986.
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(30). Working on a larger (10,000 bank), and later (1971-75)
data base, Dietrich & James (1983) note that when interest
payments are limited by rate ceilings, banks have an incentive
to increase capital in their financial structure in order to
compete for noninsured deposits since an increase in capital
raises the risk-adjusted expected return to depositors. And in
the 1969-70 period analysed by Mingo (1975), banks were unable
to raise interest payments on deposits to market clearing
levels because of Regulation Q ceilings. They conclude that
the increase in bank capital detected by Mingo may have been
due to this capital-oriented competition for deposits and not
to direct regulation of bank capital.
(31). Capital Allowances: The first year allowances on plant,
machinery and assets were cut from 100 to 75% on 14 March 1984
and to 50% after 31 March 1985, and to zero after 31 March
1986; an annual allowance of 25% was then to apply.
Corporation Tax: The rate was cut from 52 to 50% for 1983/84,
to 45% in 1984/85, to 40% in 1985/1986 and to 30% in 1986/87.
(32). Mason (1979) notes reasons for using allocation instead
of lending limits include,
i. The bank can use capital allocation to achieve desired
changes in its capital structure. It can set its capital-asset
ratio to the value it hopes to achieve rather than at
historical levels. Then as loans are booked, the actual
capital-asset ratio will move towards the desired ratio.
Working with loan amounts does not necessarily achieve this
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result.
ii. Although bankers have historically considered return on
assets the most important measure of the yield on a loan, the
return on capital is more appropriate from the standpoint of
financial management. There are two reasons for this;
- loan decisions are, in a sense, capital budgeting decisions,
and capital budgeting techniques compare returns with the cost
of capital, and
- if owners want their wealth maximised, the appropriate
measure for wealth maximisation is the return on capital, not
the return on assets.
Also, allocated capital can serve as a control device, since a
loan area must earn a given yield on its capital. That is, in
assigning capital to a profit centre, top management expects
it to earn at least an amount consistent with the annual plan
and with the specific loan types and risks for which the
centre is responsible. If these explicit quantitative
standards are not set up, then there is no way to measure
performance consistent with optimisation of return for a given
risk.
Mason also notes that lack of adequate control variables has
caused banks to rely on very unsatisfactory measures of
portfolio performance; eg, the number or amount of loan losses
attributable to a loan officer has frequently been used to
judge his or her performance. But if bank considers only
losses without considering the potential earnings it could
receive, it is taking into account only half the problem of
portfolio construction.
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(33). Focusing on capital market sensitivity to differential
capital standards, Pettway (1976) asks whether the market
requires differential risk premium. If there is no
relationship between the risk premiums required by the market
and the capital position of the issuing banks, capital must be
adequate, or perhaps abundant for the perceived risk in these
investments; Also, if the market demands significant risk
premiums which are a function of the banks' capital position
the market is questioning the bank's capital adequacy.
Pettway's study considers the years 1971-74, testing firstly
the relationship between risk premium on new capital notes
issued (defined as the market yield to maturity of the capital
notes on the day of issue minus the market yield to maturity
of a Treasury security of the same maturity on the same day
expressed as a percentage) by large banks to capital adequacy
ratios and other banking factors. The regression coefficients
for two measures of capital adequacy proved insignificant and
Pettway concludes that capital adequacy ratios of capital note
issuing firms was not considered a significant factor in
determining the risk premium demanded. Also, the market
appeared to make no distinction between of risk premiums
demanded between capital in the form of equity and equity plus
capital notes.
For common stocks Pettway tests the relationship between the
systematic risk of the bank's common stock (Beta) and the
bank's capital and other bank variables, and similarly the
relationship of the common stock's price/expected earnings
ratio to bank capital and other variables. In the beta test
capital adequacy was significant (and negative) in 1974, and
significant (and positive) in 1972 and 1974 for the P/E test.
Pettway notes that the significance of the capital adequacy
coefficients was much below those of more traditional non-
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capital variables and concludes that investors were not very
sensitive to unacceptable levels of risk due to thin capital
ratios.
(34). Gilbert (1990) observes a general consensus that
deposit insurance creates an incentive for banks to assume
higher risks (ie choose asset portfolios with higher variance
in rates of return and/or lower capital ratios) than they
would otherwise; in other words deposit insurance blunts the
penalty of banks having to pay higher interest rates on
deposits. He notes recent proposals designed to increase the
effectiveness of market forces in reducing the risk assumed by
banks. The proposals involve exposing bank owners and
creditors to larger losses if their banks fail; the idea is
that if they have a greater exposure to loss, they will limit
the risk assumed by banks.
Gilbert uses a theoretical exercise to examine the
implications of a number of proposed changes in deposit
insurance on the optimal choice of risk by a banker. He
considers four cases.
i). All liabilities fully insured
ii). No deposit insurance
iii). Co-insurance; le federal deposit insurance coverage is
limited to a fraction of each deposit, and
iv). bank is required to have liabilities that are uninsured
and subordinated to deposits, and equal to at least 10% of its
assets.
He concludes that market forces could limit the incentives for
banks to assume risks; if the insurance coverage of bank
creditors were dropped from full to partial coverage the
incentives for banks to assume relatively high risks would be
reduced. Also, he notes that a key difference among approaches
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to developing market discipline of banking risks concerns the
vulnerability of banks to runs. He notes that run
vulnerability
is greater if depositors are at risk than if the risks are
borne
by long term subordinated debt.
(35). Although not directly concerned with bank capital, an
early UK bank sector study utilising market assessment of
regulatory change is provided by Saunders & Ward (1976). The
study focuses on the 1965-75 period and the impact of
regulatory changes surrounding the introduction of Competition
and Credit Control (CCC) on the clearing banks. More
particularly the study considers the effects on risk
performance and efficiency of the big four clearers and the
merchant bank sector over the period May 1965 to August 1975.
Saunders & Ward identify three regulatory phases, viz
(i). May 1965 to May 1971, from the imposition of the first
quantitative lending ceiling until the publication of the
Competition and Credit Control (CCC) reforms.
(ii). June 1971 to Sept. 1973, from the introduction of
comparatively unrestricted competition until the modification
of CCC in Sept. 1973.
(iii). Oct 1973 to August 1975, a period of constrained
competition until the end of the study.
They conclude that in periods of close regulation (le i and
iii) clearing banks appear to have performed (in terms of
cumulative monthly residuals) badly in comparison with
merchant banks; only in period ii. in which regulations
applying to all banks were relaxed and standardised did the
clearing banks achieve a relatively superior performance.
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CHAPTER 5
US BANK CAPITAL ISSUE ANNOUNCEMENT EFFECTS
5.1	 INTRODUCTION
Recent studies have assessed common stock abnormal returns
(ARs) associated with capital issues announcements by bank
holding companies (BHCs) in the USA. Generally the ARs reflect
both the negativity and the issue type based relative
magnitudes observed in the industrial and utility sectors; see
Chapter 2.4. The BHC results particularly resemble those of
the utility firms; the absolute magnitude of BHC ARs is lower
than those for industrial firms; also, preferred stock issue
announcements have been associated with a positive AR, eg
Keeley (1989) Wansley & Dhillon (1989) (1).
While the BHC studies estimate the ARs of a variety of
security type issue announcements, the analytic focus
primarily has been upon common stock issue announcements (2);
these tend to experience the largest absolute magnitude of
(negative) AR. Observations have been disaggregated according
to the influence of regulatory regime (pre and post the
introduction of the 1981 regime) and the regulatory status of
individual banks; ie via capital adequacy-or-inadequacy and
also multinational-or-"other" categorisations.
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(1989)
(1989)
Polonchek et al
pre change
post change
Keeley
pre change
post change
	
1975-84	 -1.4
	
-81	 -1.7
	
1981-	 B	 -1.1 b
	
1975-86
	
-1.5
	
-81	 A	 -2.6
	
1981-	 A	 -0.8 b
TABLE 5.1
Bank Capital Issue Announcement Effect Studies
- Observations and Common Stock Issue Effects -
PAPER
	
PERIOD	 OTHER	 AR %
Isberg & Brown	 (1987)	 1981-85	 A	 a
Wansley & Dhillon (1989)	 1978-85	 -1.5
Wall & Peterson,P.(1988)	 1982-86
	 -1.5
PERIOD = Period of Study, and sub-periods (pre and post 1981).
OTHER = Further Bank Observation Criteria
A: Adequacy or Inadequacy of Regulatory Capital.
B: Multinational or "Other".
AR% = Abnormal Return on Common Stock Issues
a. One-day average AR of -0.8% for BHCs above, and -1.1% for
BHCs below, the capital regulation standard; on a
two-day (-1, 0) cumulative average AR basis the
corresponding results are -1.1% and -2.0%.
b. Not statistically significant.
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5.2	 OBSERVATIONS
5.2.1	 Security and Sector Types
a.	 Security Type
Polonchek et al (1989) describes a pattern of results parallel
to those found in non-financial organisations; nevertheless
his results for the 1975-84 period are only significant for
common stock issue announcements ( -1.38%).
Keeley (1989) comments that, in sum, his own results
(tabulated in Annex 5.1A) ...
'strongly suggest negative announcement
effects for issues of common stock and
securities with characteristics similar to
common stock, such as mandatory
convertible debt.' (with the acknowledged
exception of a positive effect for
perpetual preferred stock);
Keeley records a common stock issue announcement effect of -
1.5%, and -0.74% for mandatory convertible debt. Nevertheless
preference share issue announcements appear associated with a
positive AR as noted by Keeley (1989), Wansley & Dhillon
(1989) and Poloncheck et al (1989).
b.	 Sector Type
Polonchek et al observe common stock issue announcement ARs as
only 40% of that reported for industrial firms and the
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difference is highly significant; eg Mikkelson & Partch (1986)
measure -3.56% for industrial firms,
Polonchek et al comment that, . ..
'Overall, the evidence for the impact of
securities issuance by BHCs parallels that
of industrial firms in terms of the
differential reaction to debt versus
equity issues ... (but) ... negative
announcement returns for the issuance of
common stock and convertible debt are much
less negative than the results for
industrial firms.'
5.2.2	 Increase in Regulatory Regime Pressure
Polonchek et al (1989) and Keeley (1989) both consider the
1981 change in regulatory regime; ie the implementation of
joint capital definition and minimum capital ratio standards
by the federal regulators; see Chapter 4.
Polonchek et al (1989) estimate pre and post 1981 ARs for a
variety of security type issue announcements but the results
suffer from a lack of statistical significance, although the
common stock issue announcement effect of -1.7%. pre 1981 is
statistically significant (at the 1% level); the post 1981
effect of - 1.1% is not.
Otherwise they note that the AR results are less negative post
1981, and argue that the fact that the changes move in the
same direction in all five cases of security type issuance has
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a probability of only 0.03; they conclude that this allows
rejection of the hypothesis that it is the result of random
variation.
Keeley's pre and post 1981 results (summarised in Annex 5.1B)
show a striking decline in the absolute size of the AR from -
2.6% to -.79% for common stock issue announcement effects and
the change is statistically significant. The -.79% AR in the
post 1981 period is not statistically significant and
contrasts with the magnitude of -1.5% (and significant) found
by Wall & Peterson, P. (1988) in the same period; Keeley
attributes this to sample differences.
Keeley also reports a significant +1.1% AR for perpetual
preferred stock issue announcements in the post 1981 period.
Otherwise, he generally finds that pre and post 1981 Ars for
the other security type issue announcements appear slight and
insignificant, and AR changes between periods also appear
insignificant.
5.2.3	 Regulatory Status Pressure
a.	 Capital Adequate or Inadequate
Isberg & Brown (1987) and Keeley (1989) consider the
regulatory capital adequacy/inadequacy status of the
Individual BHCs.
Isberg & Brown (1987) assess common stock, preferred stock,
and subordinated debt issue announcement effects for BHCs
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distinguished as capital adequate, or inadequate, in the post
1981 period. The study estimates ARs in the 10 day period
either side of the announcement day, calculating both average
ARs and cumulative ARs; the Z scores are not reported. The
announcement day ARs for common stock issues are -0.8% for
capital adequate BHCs, and -1.1% for capital inadequate BHCs;
similarly, for preference stock the ARs are 0.3% and -0.17%
respectively, and for subordinated debt -0.36% and 0.76%. As
noted in Table 5.1 the two-day cumulative average prediction
errors for common stock issues appears to be -1.1% for BHCs
above the capital regulation standard and -2.0% for those
below. Keeley (1989) criticises Isberg & Brown's
classification of BI-ICs as capital adequate/inadequate; he
argues that many of the common stock issues by capital
adequate BHCs were intended to comply with expected future
standards.
In his own paper, Keeley (1989) distinguishes BHCs that would
meet the 1985 primary capital requirements in 1981 as capital
sufficient, and other banks as capital deficient; he argues
that the 1985 standards were the goal as early as 1981 (3); in
this dissertation the terms "capital adequate" and "capital
inadequate" are used, but accordingly these terms should be
qualified in reference to Keeley's work.
Keeley distinguishes his common stock issue announcement AR
results in terms of capital adequate and inadequate BHC
groups, and also in terms of pre and post 1981 periods; the
disaggregated results are shown in Annex 5.1C. Other issue
types provided no significant differences either between time
periods or between capital adequate and inadequate groups of
BHCs.
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Keeley notes that capital sufficient BHCs changed from -1.2%
pre 1981 to +1.5% post 1981 and the change is statistically
significant. For capital insufficient BHCs the change was from
-3.3% to-2.0% but the change was not statistically
significant. Although Keeley argues for the apportioning of
capital adequacy/inadequacy status on the basis of future
(1985) standards from the 1981 initiation of the objective
regulatory regime, using this as a basis to apportion the
status retrospectively to the 1975-1981 period appears less
justifiable and does not appear to be addressed in the text of
his paper.
Consequently, this stands as a qualification to his
disaggregation of pre 1981 AR results on a capital
adequacy/inadequacy status basis.
b.	 Multinational or 'Other'
A particular aspect of the 1981 regulation, was the
regulator's identification of 17 BHCs as multinational banks
to which the specific capital ratio guidelines did not apply,
preferring to apply individual criteria relevant to each banks
unique characteristics; see Chapter 4.
Polonchek et al (1989) estimate announcement effects for
common stock, preferred non-convertible, and straight debt in
the post 1981 period in terms of multinational and "other" BHC
groups. The average ARs for multinationals are more negative
than for "other" BHCs but the results are qualified by a lack
of statistical significance; nevertheless differences between
the ARs for the two type of BHCs is significant in two of the
three types of security issuance.
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Another feature is the positive average ARs for announcements
of both preferred non-convertible and straight debt of the
"other" BHCs group; but only the preferred non-convertible
announcement result is significant (indeed this is the only
significant AR in the bank status exercise of Poloncheck et
al).
5.2.4	 Dilution Effects of Common Stock Issues
a. General Dilution
For all BHCs, Keeley (1989) finds a mean dilution effect (4)
of 27%; similar to the 31% dilution effect recorded by Asquith
& Mullins (1986a) for industrial firms. While BHC common stock
issue ARs are smaller than those for industrial firms, the
dilution effect is about the same. Keeley says this is
presumably because BHC stock issues typically raise far less
funds in proportion to their pre-issue value than do
industrial firms.
b. Dilution by Group and Period
Keeley reports that the pattern of dilution effects is
basically the same as the stock price ARs; le capital
deficient BHCs have more negative dilution effects than the
capital sufficient BHCs, and both groups show less negative
effects during the post 1981 period. He concludes that, ...
'systematic differences in issue
size do not appear to explain
the pattern of abnormal returns
across capital deficient and
sufficient organizations.'
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5.3	 REGRESSED DETERMINANTS
Regression analysis of hypothesised determinants of the ARs
are undertaken by Wansley & Dhillon (1989) and Keeley (1989).
Keeley, focusing on common stock issue announcement ARs,
considers the percentage change in capital/asset ratio.
Wansley & Dhillon undertake a regression of five hypothesised
determinants of straight debt issue announcement ARs.
5.3.1	 Common Stock Issue Announcements
Keeley analyses the relationship between common stock issue
announcement ARs and the percent change in the capital/asset
ratio due to common stock issues. Nevertheless, his definition
(5) of this variable appears ambiguous.
Regressions are carried out on the ARs for capital sufficient
and deficient BHCs separately, and also in terms of three
periods for the whole 1975-86 period and the pre and post 1981
sub-periods); nevertheless Keeley acknowledges that the
results should be treated with caution due to small sample
size; see Annexes 5.1C and 5.1D.
For capital deficient BHCs Keeley observes that pre 1981,
issues that had a larger effect on the capital/asset ratio had
less negative ARs. Post 1981 the point estimate suggests a
negative relationship but is not significant.
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For capital sufficient BHCs, the regression coefficient is not
significant pre 1981, but post 1981 indicates a statistically
significant positive relationship between ARs and the size of
the issue.
5.3.2	 Straight Debt Issue Announcements
To better explain the announcement effects, Wansley & Dhillon
(1989) regress a number of potential explanatory variables;
limited sample size precluded examination of common stock
issue announcement effects.
For straight debt issue announcement effects they find, in
single predictor variable regressions, a negative relationship
for
i). Relative Size of Offering; Defined as dollar amount of
offering divided by total bank capital before offering.
ii). Pre-Issue Cumulative AR (from day -60 through day -2
relative to announcement day).
iii). Variance of Stock Returns (from day -60 through day -2).
No relationship was evidenced for the dummy variables
iv). Quality of Debt; (.1 if bonds rated AA or higher, =0
otherwise)
v). Issue Registration (Shelf or Non-Shelf).
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5.4	 INTERPRETATION OF RESULTS
5.4.1	 Regulatory Factors
a. General Regulation Environment
The lower absolute magnitudes of ARs for both utilities and
BHCs, compared with industrials, may be explained in terms of
their relatively stronger regulatory environments which
require greater disclosure and monitoring.
It may be argued that a stronger regulation environment
mitigates information asymmetry; ie increases the
predictability of an issue announcement and/or reduces its
information content.
Nevertheless, there are differences in the regulatory system
for utilities and BHCs (6).
b. General Increase in Regulatory Pressure
There is some evidence that the change to the more objective
1981 regulatory regime was associated with a reduction in
absolute magnitudes of announcement ARs, at least for common
stock issue announcements; eg Keeley (1989), see Annex 5.1B,
and Poloncheck et al (1989). This tends to support the view
that an increase in regulatory pressure, as represented by the
introduction of the new objective regime tended to diminish
information asymmetry.
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c.	 Bank Regulatory Status Based Pressure
Polonchek et al (1989), notwithstanding statistical
insignificance, suggest that multinational BHCs experienced a
greater magnitude in announcement ARs than the more
stringently regulated non-multinationals (which were obliged
to follow the 1981 guidelines).
Contrarily, there is some evidence of greater absolute
magnitudes of announcement ARs for capital inadequate BHCs;
this is supported for common stock announcements; Isberg &
Brown (1987); and Keeley (1989) in both the pre and post 1981
periods. Also, Keeley notes that the regulatory change of 1981
saw the absolute magnitude of ARs of capital deficient BHCs
decrease, although the change was not statistically
significant.
5.4.2	 Issue Types
a.	 Preference Stock
The announcement effect for preferred stock issues, or at
least certain classes of preferred stock, appears positive.
Keeley finds a positive, and significant, AR of +1.1% for
perpetual preferred stock (limited life and convertible were
both negative but insignificant). Wansley & Dhillon find a
similar +0.8% AR (preference stock other characteristics
unspecified). Also, Polonchek et al record a positive AR
(+1.57%) for non-convertible preference stock, although this
is for non-multinational banks in the post 1981 era; (an
insignificant positive effect is found for the combined BHC
groups in both the pre and post 1981 era and the full 1975-
1 .984 period).
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While preference stock is close to the risk characteristics of
common stock, Keeley notes important differences.
i). The risk characteristics of preference stock effectively
may be closer to bank deposits than common stock. The market
may view perpetual stock as implicitly insured in the light of
the FDIC's resolution of the Continental Illinois failure in
1984; the FDIC implicitly insured preferred stock holders as
well as debt holders since the BHC was never declared
insolvent.
ii. A preference stock issue may contain information about the
ability of the organisation to meet preferred stock dividends,
which the market would view favourably.
In terms of preference stock issues by financial firms, Linn &
Pinegar (1988) suggest they generally issue adjustable-rate
preferred stock and that the positive common stock AR
associated with the issue announcement is most likely
explained in terms of tax benefits and/or regulatory
conditions (7).
b.	 Straight Debt
Wansley & Dhillon (1989) observe that straight debt issue
announcements are associated with a very small (0.095%) AR
which does not approach conventional levels of significance.
Among the other studies Keeley (1989) and Poloncheck et al
(1989) also detect small, statistically insignificant ARs for
straight debt issues.
343
Wansley & Dhillon comment that the negative relationship
between ARs and size, noted in section 5.3.2, is contrary to
most prior findings on the security issuance process for
industrial and utility firms; eg Masulis & Korwar (1986).
Nevertheless, they comment that it is consistent with
information asymmetry models which assert that negative
announcement effects are related to the magnitude of the
financing rather than the change in capital structure. Also,
they observe a negative relationship between ARs and the pre-
issue cumulative ARs which they interpret as providing weak
evidence for market timing.
c.	 Common Stock
Keeley's results show that capital sufficient BHCs experience
common stock issue announcement effects that change with
statistical significance from -1.2% pre 1981 to + 1.5%
(insignificant) post 1981. Capital deficient BHCs similarly
record a change from -3.3% to -2.0% (both statistically
significant, but the change is not); see Annex 5.1C.
The greater absolute magnitude of the common stock issue
announcement effect for capital deficient BHCs, compared with
capital sufficient BHCs in both pre and post 1981 period,
appears as an anomaly in terms of information asymmetry; le
capital inadequate BHCs announcement effects should be more
predictable and contain less information.
344
5.4.3	 Keeley's Analysis of "Anomalies"
a.	 "Anomalies":
The hypothesis that the imposition of a more stringent
regulation regime (which makes equity issues more predictable
and diminishes announcement information content) should lower
common stock issue announcement ARs is borne out by Keeley's
results for pre and post 1981; see Annex 5.1B.
Nevertheless, when the results are further disaggregated by
the capital adequacy/inadequacy status of the BHCs (see Annex
5.1C) two basic hypotheses are challenged.
The hypotheses that an increase in regulatory "pressure", via
the imposition of the more stringent post 1981 regime, should
reduce the AR absolute magnitude appears to be contradicted in
the case of capital adequate BHCs; also the sign changes from
negative to positive.
Also, the hypothesis that announcement ARs for capital
inadequate BHCs should be of a lesser absolute magnitude
(because of greater predictability) than those for capital
adequate BHCs, appears to be contradicted.
Keeley considers that these results cast doubt on the simple
signalling hypothesis. Seeking an explanation for the
"anomalous" pattern of ARs, he suggests other explanatory
hypotheses, which are not mutually exclusive.
i). Diminution of the value of the deposit insurance
guarantee: Keeley suggests that the larger (negative) stock
price effects for capital inadequate BHCs, especially post
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1981, are consistent with the view that, .
'the value of (underpriced) deposit insurance is
capitalized in the share prices of capital deficient
banking organizations and that increases in their
capital diminished the value of that asset.'
ii). Regulators have inside information which is revealed to
investors by the nature of a security issuance.
b.	 Diminution of Value of Deposit Insurance Guarantee
Hypothesis:
In order to explore these hypotheses, Keeley considers the
explanatory power of a two size factors; namely a dilution
factor and a capital structure change factor. As indicated in
Section 5.2.4 the dilution factor does not appear to provide
an explanation,
The factor of percent change in capital structure is
considered in Section 5.3.1. Keeley reasons that if issues
with the greater proportional effect on the capital-to-asset
ratio have more negative ARs, this reflects a diminution of
the value of deposit insurance,
He acknowledges the problem of small sample sizes for the
regressions. For the capital inadequate BHCs, he notes the
(insignificant) indication of a negative relationship post
1981 which provides a heavily qualified suggestion of evidence
of the diminution of the value of deposit insurance guarantee.
Also, Keeley observes that capital adequate BHCs post 1981
show a statistically significant positive relationship between
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ARs and the size of the issue (relative to capital); le large
issues (relative to capital) are viewed as positive signals by
the market. And as such issues are voluntary they presumably
do not reflect a diminution in the value of the deposit
insurance guarantee.
Keeley concludes that these regression results, ...
'provide some support for the capital
structure theory, which predicts that
issue size relative to capital is
important and that stock price effects
become more negative for capital deficient
organisations as the size of the issue
increases. They also suggest that the
deadweight costs of common stock issuance
for well-capitalised banking organizations
are small or nonexistent since, on
average, stock price announcement effects
are not negative and even become more
positive as the relative size of the issue
increases.'
c.	 Information Hypothesis
Keeley argues that results of the regression also provide
evidence consistent with an information hypotheses; namely
that the type of securities issued conveys inside information
about earnings prospects obtained by regulators from BHC
examinations.
Keeley reasons that while market investors can readily
determine, from the balance sheet, whether a BHC is under
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regulatory pressure to increase its capital ratio, they do not
necessarily know the future prospects of the BHC nor the
method the BHC will use to augment capital.
For the capital inadequate BHC, a common stock issue may
signal management and regulator skepticism about future
earnings generation; le it may suggest an inability to meet
the cash flow requirements of additional debt or preferred
stock, or to accumulate sufficient retained earnings to meet
capital requirements.
For a capital adequate BHC, the presumption is that a common
stock issue is voluntary and would not provide a negative
signal; and might even signal the availability of a positive
net present value project.
Consequently, argues Keeley, the positive effects of issue
size on the ARs associated with securities issuance by capital
sufficient BHCs might also be explained by this hypothesis.
Keeley observes that prior to the institution of specific
minimum capital guidelines, market participants would have
been unsure whether a banking organisation's common stock
issuance was due to regulatory pressure. Since there was some
chance that it was, there was a small mean negative
announcement effect even for capital sufficient organisations.
But, after specific capital guidelines were introduced, market
participants could be confident that a common stock issue by a
capital adequate BHC was not a signal that regulators viewed
the organisation's earnings prospects unfavourably. As a
result, in the post-1981 regulatory period, the estimated mean
ARs associated with capital adequate BHCs' common stock issues
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were positively related to the size of the issue.
In other words, Keeley appears to be implying that the new
objective regulation, namely the categorisation of the
regulatory capital adequacy, or inadequacy, status of BHCs,
facilitates the provision of additional information when a
common stock capital issue is announced.
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5.5	 SUMMARY
General Findings:
The BHC studies indicate announcement effects similar to those
in the industrial and utility sectors. There is a general
propensity toward negative announcement effects, the
magnitudes are similarly patterned according to security type
of the proposed issue, and the absolute magnitude of the
results, like utilities, are lower than those for industrial.
The BHC studies focus on regulation based explanations for the
ABS.
The BHC results frequently are qualified by statistical
insignificance, and caution where sample size is a problem.
Also the basis for categorisation of a BHC as being capital
adequate or inadequate in terms of regulation requirements is
based upon assumptions; and these assumptions vary among
studies; ie Isberg & Brown (1987) versus Keeley (1989); the
validity of Keeley's pre 1981 categorisation appears
questionable.
Common stock issue announcement effects are broadly consistent
with the hypothesis that BHC regulation reduces the
information content and increases the predictability of
securities offerings, since the absolute magnitude of issue
announcement effects are smaller than those for industrial
firms. Also the influence of increased regulatory pressure,
namely the impost of the 1981 regime, appears to have further
mitigated information asymmetry as demonstrated by common
stock issue announcement effects; see Keeley (1989) and Annex
5.1B.
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Nevertheless, these results do not identify any particular
aspect of the regulatory process which may contribute to the
mitigation of information asymmetry.
In an attempt to determine better those aspects of the
regulation framework which may influence the information
content, studies have been undertaken on common stock issue
announcement effects in terms of different regulatory regime
periods, and the regulatory capital adequacy/inadequacy status
of the observations; Isberg & Brown (1987), Polonchek et al
(1989) and Keeley (1989).
The explanatory power of the simple hypothesis that regulatory
pressure mitigates information asymmetry is challenged by the
results of Keeley's joint disaggregation of common stock issue
announcement AR results; le in terms of different regulatory
regime periods, and the capital adequacy status of the BHCs.
Nevertheless, these results appear to warrant particular
qualification in terms of pre-1981 disaggregation.
More particularly, the hypothesis is challenged by results
which indicate an increase in the absolute magnitude of ARs
for capital adequate BHCs post 1981 (and a change in sign from
negative to positive). Also capital inadequate BHCs appear to
experience a greater absolute magnitude of AR than capital
adequate BHCs.
Keeley views his disaggregated results as consistent with both
capital structure and signalling hypotheses; namely he finds
some indication of a diminution of the value of the deposit
Insurance guarantee, and suggests that the announcement of a
common stock issue signals good or bad earnings prospects
information depending on the capital adequacy/inadequacy
status of the BHC.
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Keeley's latter hypothesis appears to imply that the formal
identification of banks in terms of differential regulatory
pressure may be an aspect of the new objective regulatory
regime which has mitigated information asymmetry.
Thus, in a broad sense, it may be concluded that regulation
and increased regulation pressure appear to mitigate
information asymmetry; ie presumably increase the
predictability of an issue, and decrease its information
content. Nevertheless, Keeley's disaggregation analysis
appears to suggest a refinement of information content
stemming from the capital adequacy status categorisation of
the new regulatory regime.
Also, in the realm of capital structure hypotheses, Keeley
further suggests that if a capital issue is regulation-induced
it may involve a costly change of a BHC's capital structure
away from its private optimum (ie due to distortions such as
taxes and agency costs); but this appears untested.
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FOOTNOTES
(1). BHC results do appear to differ in the realm of "pure"
leverage transactions. Wansley & Dhillon (1989) note that
Scott, Hempel & Peavy (1985) find no significant AR on BHC
stock-for-debt swap announcements which contrasts with the
significant negative announcement effect found in the non-
financial sector, eg Peavy & Scott (1985). Noting this
difference, Wansley & Dhillon suggest the swaps reduce the
potential costs of regulatory interference and that accounting
for this may explain the differences in findings.
(2). Some studies crudely define the type of debt and
preferred stock issues; le no distinction of characteristics
such as convertibility, and maturity (eg perpetual or limited
life).
Also, the studies vary in definition of event period and AR
estimation methodology. Instead of the more common two day
event period, Isberg & Brown (1987) use a one day event
period; Poloncheck et al (1989) use a mean adjusted return
model instead of the more commonly accepted market model, and
use a three day event period. Wansley & Dhillon (1989) use an
announcement period of the announcement day and the day after,
instead of the more conventional announcement day and the day
before; also, while they consider the 1978-85 period, they do
not consider the influence of the regulatory regime change of
1981. The study by Wall & Peterson, P. (1988) could not be
obtained; consequently analysis of its findings relies on the
commentary of Keeley (1989).
(3). Keeley (1989) argues that, . ..
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'although objective minimum capital
regulations were phased in over the 1981
to 1985 period, ... the 1985 standards
were the ultimate goal even as early as
1981. The main reason the 1985 standards
were not immediately imposed was to give
institutions time to raise the necessary
capital to bring them into compliance. In
keeping with this interpretation, this
paper distinguishes those banking
organizations that would have met the 1985
primary capital requirements in 1981 from
those that would not have. Throughout the
paper I refer to the latter as "capital
sufficient" and the latter as "capital
deficient" banking organizations'
(4). Keeley (1989) defines dilution as the ratio of the change
in the aggregate equity value of the outstanding shares
(percent change in share price, times share price, times
number of shares, divided by 100) to the total dollar value of
the issue. For example, a dilution ratio of 100% means that
the decline in existing share value equals the value of the
new capital raised by the issue.
(5). Keeley (1989) defines this as, . ..
'the value of the issue divided by the
pre-issue market value of the firm's
equity minus the value of the issue
divided by the pre-issue market value of
the firm's assets.'
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(6). Wansley & Dhillon (1989) note that
i. Utilities are state regulated while BHCs are federally
regulated (by the Federal Reserve System).
ii. (Equity) Issue Anticipation
As utilities have extensive capital requirements, they are
frequent participants in the capital markets. Pettway &
Radcliffe (1985) find a high degree of regularity in the
calendar dates of new equity sales among companies that sold
new equity annually; they conclude that it is possible that
utility equity issues are partially anticipated by the market.
In contrast BHCs are heavily regulated but nonetheless
infrequent participants in the issue market for common stock;
consequently a common stock issue announcement should
represent a surprise similar to comparable announcements by
industrials.
(7). Linn & Pinegar (1988) also find that generally,
utilities issue straight fixed-rate preferreds and industrials
issue convertible fixed-rate preferreds. Their findings also
suggest that returns to preferred stockholders support neither
the wealth distribution nor the price pressure hypothesis.
355
CHAPTER 6
UK BANK CAPITAL ISSUE ANNOUNCEMENT EFFECTS
6.1	 GENERAL OBSERVATIONS AND QUESTIONS
Observations:
While bank sector capital issue announcement effects have been
examined in the US, as discussed in the previous Chapter, no
comparable analysis appears to have been undertaken in the UK.
Key factors in the US analysis have included change in
regulatory regime environment (the introduction of imposed
objective minimum capital ratio standards) and the associated
regulatory capital status (ie under regulatory capital
adequacy pressure or not) of individual BHCs. There is some US
evidence that, for common stock issues announcements, the
change in regulatory regime reduced the absolute magnitude of
issue announcement effects; but, combined with the factor of
BHC regulatory capital adequacy status, this becomes less
clear.
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Questions:
The deficiency in comparable UK research leads to the primary
question, do UK banks exhibit common stock abnormal returns
(ARs) coincident with capital issue announcements? And, if so,
is there a discernible pattern of common stock announcement
ARs based on the security type issued? 	 -
A further question concerns the possible impact upon capital
issue announcement effects of changes to the regulatory
regime. Chapter 4 provides details of UK regulatory
developments; two broad regime changes may be observed.
Firstly, the imposition of an objective, minimum capital
standard regime was mooted in early 1987 under the bilateral
US-UK agreement. While a minimum standard was not set, it was
intended to be declared and an associated methodology for
capital measurement was formally promulgated. Nevertheless
this development was superceded later that year by the Basle
Committee's proposals, carrying a quantified minimum capital
standard, and which culminated in the 1988 Agreement.
Secondly, 1979-1980 represent a period of marked regulation
change; the 1979 Banking Act provided statutory backing to the
supervisory power of the Bank of England; and 1980 saw the
official promulgation of a supervisory capital measurement
methodology (albeit without the specification of any minimum
standard); ie Bank of England (1980) 'The Measurement of
Capital'.
Each of these two periods of regulatory change represent a
move to greater formality and objectivity of capital
regulation. Generally, it is hypothesised that an increase in
regulatory stricture causes a reduction in information
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asymmetry, and an associated decrease in the absolute
magnitude of any capital issue announcement effects; as was
found in the US context.
The following analysis seeks to assess any change in
announcement effects associated with the regulatory changes.
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6.2	 SAMPLE AND DATA
Observations are drawn from the 6 largest banks groups in the
UK; namely, Barclays, Lloyds, Midland, National Westminster,
Royal Bank of Scotland, and Standard Chartered (1).
a. Market Data
Market data was obtained from Datastream which provides
historical daily closing stock prices and market indices for
the UK market.
b. Capital Issue Details and Dates
Issue details and dates were gained from two sources, Extel
News Cards and newspaper indexes; viz. "The Times" (1975-80)
and "The Financial Times" (1981 and onwards).
The Extel News Cards records were purchased from Extel itself;
nonetheless the records were missing in some years and tended
to provide a lesser news coverage in the 1970s. The Cards
provide news reports from newspapers and from stock exchange
company announcement releases; but, while each news report in
the Card service is dated for the day of original publication,
the source is not indicated. Capital issue announcements
selected were of confirmed publicity - appearing in both the
Extel News Cards and the newspaper index. The Extel News Card
report was used as the primary source of issue details.
The news origin day, t = 0, is defined as the stock exchange
company news announcement day. The (morning) newspapers
publish news released the previous day. Consequently, relative
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to the two sources, news origin day is defined as the day
prior to newspaper publication day, or the Extel News Card
date, whichever is the earlier.
Based on the Extel News Cards, the capital issues are for cash
and are screened according to two criteria; namely the
coincidence of other news announcements on the issue
announcement day and the purpose of the issue; the screening
may be imperfect but represents the best use of available
information from the Extel Service.
Accordingly the capital issue announcements were categorised
into (a). "clean" announcements: which had no coincident
announcement and concerned capital issues for general or non-
specific purposes, and
(b). coincident announcements: those accompanied by coincident
announcements and/or concerning capital issues for specific
non-general matters such as take-over finance. General purpose
was assumed unless a specific purpose was stipulated.
The capital issues comprised ordinary share issues made by the
parent company and loan stock issues made either by the parent
or its subsidiaries. The loan stock was categorised in terms
of maturity (dated or undated) and the nature of the interest
Charge (fixed or floating). One preference share issue was
also documented.
c.	 Period
Datastream price data is available as far back as the 1960s
but the Extel News Cards, searched since 1970, yielded the
first confirmation of a capital issue in 1975. Consequently
the overall period of analysis runs from 1975 to the end of
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1990; nevertheless, years 1980 and 1990 yielded no confirmed
issue, and 1989 yielded one preference share issue; see Table
6.1.
Sub-periods are defined for the analysis of both pre and post
the impact of regulatory regime change. These included,
(1). 1975-1986 and 1988
The introduction of a minimum capital standard regime was
first mooted in early 1987 with the UK-US accord and minimum
standards actually proposed (in the Basle Committee proposal
later that year). Pre and post impact sub-periods are defined
either side of 1987.
(ii). 1975-1978 and 1981-86
It was decided to treat the contiguous years of the 1979
Banking Act and the 1980 "Measurement of Capital" promulgation
as a single change in regulatory regime. Pre and post impact
sub-periods are defined either side of 1979-80.
d.	 Statistical Package
Regression analysis was undertaken using the SPSS/PC
Statistical package. The Lotus 123 spreadsheet was used for
other calculations and tabular presentation.
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6.3	 ABNORMAL RETURN MEASUREMENT
a. Model Specifications
The measurement of ARs has been a major methodological tool
used in empirical testing of the efficient market
hypothesis (EMH) and a variety of models have developed.
Generally, the method Lnvolves the assumption of a return
generating function, acting as proxy for the true return
process, from which expected returns may be estimated. ARs
are calculated as actual deviations from the expected
return. The market model is chosen as the appropriate
return generating model; full specification of the model is
provided, for instance, by Fama (1976) (2).
A two stage methodology, as employed for instance by
Mikkelson & Partch (1986) and Keeley (1989), is employed.
The first stage involves estimation of the parameters of
the return generating process during a period which
excludes the announcement event date; in the second stage
the parameters are used to calculate the AR at the
announcement event date.
b. Event Day
In lieu of more detailed announcement timing information,
ARs are estimated over a two-day event announcement period.
The news is published in (morning newspapers) on day t = +1
following its announcement during the previous day, t = 0
(the news origin day), either before or after the market
closes; if before, the market's response to the news
actually predates the publication by one day; and if after,
the market responds the next day and the reaction is on day
t=1. Consequently, there is a two-day announcement "day"
t= 0 and t=+1.
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A stock's rate of return is defined as the change in the
stock's price plus dividend payments on the day, if any,
divided by the previous day's closing stock price.
Unfortunately the effect of any dividend is not included in
the Datastream service and is consequently excluded from
the rate of return calculations; this must stand as a
qualification to the results.
c. Announcement Event AR
The market model, shown in equation.. .1), is used as the
assumed return generating process.
Rjt = aj + bj(Rmt) + ejt 	 	 1)
where
Rjt = the actual rate of return on bank j's common stock
over	 day t
Rmt = the rate of return on the market portfolio (proxied
by the	 FTA All Share
Index) over day t
aj and bj are coefficients for bank j's common stock
ejt = the error term for bank j f s common stock for day t.
i). Step One: Parameter Estimation
The parameters, aj and bj, are estimated by using the least
squares regression as provided by the SPSS Statistical
Program. Ordinary least squares (OLS) regression is shown
by Brown & Warner (1985 p25) to be well specified in
determining the market model parameter estimates when using
daily data.
The estimation of the market model parameters requires
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specification of an estimation period which is separate
from the event period associated with the announcement; ie
it provides a forecast of what the ordinary share's returns
would have been absent the announcement of a security
issuance. This separation is needed, unless the strong
assumption of no cross-sectional correlation between
announcement date returns and market returns is made; eg
Thompson (1985 p158).
Among the banking studies, Keeley (1989) estimates his
model parameters over a 60 day period, beginning 80 trading
days before and ending 20 days before the announcement day.
In this dissertation the example of Keeley is followed by
estimating the parameters over a 60 day period; this is
defined as beginning 80 trading days before and ending 20
days before t=0, the announcement origin date (3).
ii). Step Two: Two-Day Event AR
Abnormal returns are thus calculated from the difference
between actual and predicted AR for each day recorded by
the bank common stock over the two-day announcement period.
ARjt = Rjt - (aj + bj(Rmt))
	
	 2)
where
ARjt= the abnormal return on ordinary shares of bank j over
day t
Rjt = the return on ordinary shares of bank j over day t
Rmt = the return on FTA All Share Index over day t
In order to facilitate statistical testing, the AR is
standardised in order to allow the use of the t-
distribution for tests of significance.
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The calculation of the standardised AR (SAR) for bank j is
shown in equation.. .3); and the particular form of the
standard error calculation in equation...4) is used by
Mikkelson & Partch (1986),	 and Keeley	 (1989).
SARjt = ARjt / Sjt 	 3)
where
2.
I
2
-	 \
(1* bit — Rn, )
Sjt =	 V	
1
J 	   4)
÷
M
+	
Ik(Rtrz.—	 Rv")
1
Vj	 = the market model residual variance for bank j
obtained	 from the regression over the estimation
period.
M	 = the number of days in the estimation period, (M=60)
-km = the mean return on the FTA All Share Index over the
estimation period.
Rmt = the actual return on the FTA All Share Index on day
t
The summation over the index i represents summation over
the period used to estimate the market model.
Finally, SARjt /fir	 	 5)
allows for sample size adjustment and is a component used
in the hypothesis test that the average two day AR is zero;
see AISAR , equation ...9) below.
d. Average AR for a Class of Announcement Events
In assessment of average two-day ARs for a class of
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announcement events, such as ordinary share issue
announcements, the following calculations are made,
Average AR on day t for a class of announcement events of
sample size N,
AARt = J .	 	 6)c
N
Average standardised AR for a class of announcement events
of sample size N,
I
ASARt =	
.jt
	
	 7)
N	 J=1
e. Significance of Average AR for a Class of Announcement
Events
As noted by Mikkelson & Partch (1986), the variance of
ASARt approximately equals 1/N (4) so, for each day, the
Z-statistic is computed
Z	 (ASARt)	
	 8)
To test the hypothesis that the two day AR averaged over N
events (in a given class of security type issue
announcement) is zero, the average two-day standardised
abnormal return is calculated as
+I
j	 SilR
AISAR =
N :,	 fT_
9)
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and the Z statistic is calculated as,
Z =j1:. (AISAR	 )	
	 10)
-to "GI
The significance of all Z statistics referred to in
Chapter 6 are two-tailed, and assessed from "t" tables in
Salvatore (1982).
The Z statistic is assessed for assessment of the null
hypotheses that,
- two-day AR averaged over N events is zero, and
- for a particular security type, there is no difference
between the average two-day AR averaged over a period of
years from that in another period of years; in this case
the Z statistic is assessed in terms of a pooled variance
estimate (5);
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6.4	 RESULTS
a.	 Presentation of Results
Each of the 42 announcement events is itemised in Annex
6.1; this identifies the issuing bank and assumed news
origin date
(t = 0) as well as details of the security's
characteristics.
Details of the AR measurement calculations associated with
each announcement event are itemised in Annex 6.2.
The AAR and Z results for the whole sample of 42
announcement events (ie including both "clean" and
coincident announcement events) classified according to
security type, is presented in Annex 6.3. These indicate a
significant AAR of -3.4% for ordinary share issue
announcements; loan stock issue announcements show a
positive AAR (+1.1%) significant at the 5% level.
The observations classification of event AR and SAR/J2-
results, from which the APR and Z are drawn for the several
analyses, are shown in Annex 6.4.
More particularly, Annex 6.4A shows the whole sample
classed in terms of security type (these results are
summarised in tabular form in Annex 6.3).
The remaining tables, 6.4B to 6.4E, are based on the
"clean" announcement events, which number 33, and provide
the basis for the analysis presented in Tables 6.1 to 6.5
and discussed in the following sections.
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b. Security Type
The distribution of the "clean" capital issues are noted by
security type and year in Table 6.1, and by bank and
security type in Table 6.2.
The "clean" announcements, shown in Table 6.3 show ordinary
share issue announcements register a significant AAR of -
4.2% while loan stock remains at an AAR of +1.1%
significant at the 5% level. Disaggregation of the loan
stock by the factor of maturity suggests that dated loan
stock provides a more positive AAR than undated loan stock;
but the difference is not significant. Similar
disaggregation by nature of interest charge suggests that
loan stock with a fixed interest charge experience a
greater positive AAR than those with a floating charge; the
difference is significant at the 1% level.
c. Sub-Period Analysis
Pre and post 1987:
Analysis of the impact of the introduction of the minimum
capital standard regime, which is defined as occurring in
1987, is provided in Table 6.4. This considers issue
announcements in the previous 1975-1986 period and also in
the post regime introduction period; the latter period
yielded scant observations and in 1988 only.
Ordinary share issue announcement APRs of a significant -
4.5% are found in the 1975-86 period. An AAR of -2.98% in
the post 1987 period is not significant, but the difference
between the pre and post 1987 ARs is significant at the 5%
level.
Loan stock issue announcement AARs record 1.1% (significant
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at 5% level) in the pre 1987 period; similar to ordinary
shares, the magnitude of AARs appears to drop (to an
insignificant 0.5%) in the post period but the change is
not significant.
Pre and post 1979-80:
Analysis of the combined impact of the 1979 introduction of
statutory backing for prudential supervision and the 1980
promulgation of capital measurement methodology are
considered in Table 6.5. Neither the ordinary share (-3.7%)
nor the loan stock (+2.2%) APRs appear significant in the
pre 1979-80 period. Post 1980 (effectively post 1981 as no
announcement events are recorded in that year) ordinary
share capital issue announcement ARs appear to increase in
absolute magnitude to a significant
-5.3%, but the change is not significant.
Loan stock issue announcement AARs similarly appear to
increase from an insignificant +.22% to a (significant at
5% level) +1.4%, and the change is significant.
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TABLE 6.1
DISTRIBUTION CF NUABER OF ISSLES BY SECURITY TYPE
ALL
1975 1976 1977 1978 1979 1980 1981 1982 1983 1784 1785 1986 1987 1988 1989 YEARS
Ordinary Shares
	 2	 1	 2	 1	 1	 1 10
Preference Share
	 1	 1
Loan Stock	 1	 1	 1	 2	 2	 2	 5	 1	 1	 1	 2	 1	 2	 22
of which:-
a. Maturity
••• ••• ••• ••• •116 ••• ••• ••• ••• ••• ••• ••• ••• ••• ••• •••
Dated 1 1 1 2 2 2 5 1 1 1 1 1 19
Undated
b. Interest Charge
1 1 1 3
Fixed 1 1 5 1 1 9
Floating 1 1 2 2 1 1 1 2 2 13
TOTAL 1 3 1 2 3 0 2 5 3 2 2 3 1 4 1 33
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-ABLE r.2
CISTRIETION OF SAMPLE BY BANK AND SECURITY TYPE
Ordinary	Preferrce
Bank Srouo	 Shares	 Snares
Loan
Stock
Total
Issues
Barclays 1 4 5
Lloyds 3 3
Midland 1 1 8 10
National Westliinster 3 2 5
Royal Bank of Scotland 1 1 2
Standard Chartered 4 4 8
?UAL 10 1 22 33
'ABLE 6.3
AVERAGE TWO-DAY ABNORMAL REIMS (AAR) 1975-1989.
BY SECURITY TYPE
EVENT AAR Z
Number of
Events
Ordinary Shares -0.04213 -7.28109 *It 10
Preference Shares 0.006344 0.690745 1
Loan Stock
of which:-
a. Maturity
0.010803 2.59380Z It 22
Dated 0.011129 2.495361 tt 19
Undated
b. Interest Charge
0.009745 0.744196 7u,
Fixed 0.015547 2.375499 $$ 9
Floating 0.007515 1.397719 13
	 't Test
II* Significantly different from zero at 1% level
$1 Significantly different from zero at 5% level
t Significantly different from zero at 10% level
'ABLE 6.4
WW1 TWO-DAY MOM_ RETURNS (AAR) PRE AND POST 1987
(hUtber of Events in Parentheses)
1975-1926 1928 Absolute Difference
EVENT	 AAR AAR AAP
Ordinary Shares	 -0.04521	 -6.94541 itt -0.02985 -2.38219 0.01536 -2.34094 tt
(8) (2)
Lear, Stock	 0.010839	 2.37188	 St 0.005322 0.549816 0.005516 0.757246
(19) (2)
'tu Test
tit Significantly different from zero at 17. level
SI	 Sigrificantly different from zero at 57. level
Significantly different fro 	 zero at 107. level
TALE 6.5
AVERASE TWO-DAY ABN3RMA. . FORS (AAR) PRE AND POST 1979-1980
(kutber of Events in Parentheses)
1975-1978 1981-1996 Absolute Difference
EVENT AAR 2 2 PPR
Ordinary Shares -0.03726 -3.80222 -0.05309 -5.84225 lit 0.01583 -0.18772
(2)	 . (5)
Loan Stock 0.002193 0.279882 0.014632 2.466648 it 0.012439 -3.25921 Ill
(5) (12)
	 'I" Test
tt: Significantly different froc zero at 17. level
11 Significantly different frot zero at 57. level
I Significantly different from zero at 107. level
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6.5	 SUMMARY
To the extent that ordinary share issue ARs are negative
and of a greater absolute magnitude than other securities
examined, the results mirror those experienced by BHCs in
the US. A point of difference concerns the significance of
positive ARs recorded for loan stock issues; disaggregating
loan stock by characteristics indicates that those with a
fixed interest charge and/or a dated maturity appear to
experience a positive AR.
In terms of the impact of regulatory change, there is some
suggestion that the introduction of a minimum standard
capital ratio regime in 1987 has resulted in a reduction of
the AR magnitude for ordinary shares. Consequently this
provides support, albeit nominal, for the hypothesis that
increased regulatory pressure in a form which facilitates
identification of the capital adequate, or inadequate,
status of a bank from a regulatory perspective may mitigate
information asymmetry.
There is no significant change in ordinary share ARs pre
and post the 1979-80 period. Nevertheless, here the
suggestion of an increase in the absolute magnitude of the
ordinary share ARs, hints that increased regulatory
pressure (albeit loosely defined in terms of statutory
backing and promulgation of capital measurement
methodology) increases ordinary share issue announcement
ARs; notwithstanding its significance limitations, this
tends to contradict the hypothesis that increased
regulatory pressure mitigates information asymmetry. Loan
stock ARs appear to have significantly increased post the
1979-80 period.
Overall, the UK bank AR results tend to confirm the pattern
based on security type evidenced in the US by, for
instance, Keeley (1989). A paucity of observations tends to
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diminish the "strength" of conclusions.
Keeley (1989) provided some evidence of the hypothesis that
increased regulatory pressure (via the introduction of a
minimum capital standards regime) may reduce information
asymmetry.
Nevertheless, the above UK evidence provides a suggestion
that increased regulatory pressure, via greater formality
from 1979, may increase ordinary share ARs; presumably
greater supervisory formality involved banks in new
administrative compliance costs. Also, while capital
measurement methodology was promulgated - which allowed
some degree of relative capital regulatory pressure
experienced by the banks to be assessed - the absolute
degree of capital pressure was not assessable.
The 1987 minimum capital standard regime provides absolute,
as well as relative, capital regulation pressure
information. The suggestion that ordinary share issue
announcement ARs were reduced may reflect a mitigation of
information asymmetry; namely the ability to classify banks
as capital adequate, or inadequate, from the regulatory
perspective. Further, as a suggestion, the potential costs
of a move away from some optimal level of capital structure
caused by the regulatory standards, do not appear strong.
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FOOTNOTES
(1). US Sample and Data
The estimation of abnormal returns on US bank capital issue
announcements, particularly for issues of common stock and
non-redeemable preference shares for the purpose of Chapter 8,
are of interest in this dissertation. Unfortunately
satisfactory information necessary to make this estimation was
not available.
Although as for the UK banks, market data is available for US
banks, access to US capital issue details and dates proved
difficult to obtain. SEC filing and other publications used by
researchers in the US appear unavailable here. "Moodys Bank
and Finance Manual" provide capital structure and issue
details on US banks and a list of common stock and preference
issue stock issues was compiled over the 1983-1987 period (to
accord with the availability of IBCA account data).
Nevertheless, it proved difficult to categorise the preference
stock as redeemable or non-redeemable on a consistent basis.
Also, the list was substantially reduced when issue
confirmation was sought in the "Wall St Journal Index".
(2). As noted by Fama (1976), specification of the market
model is based on the assumption of the bivariate normality of
the joint distributions of the return on any security and the
return on a market portfolio of all securities.
Brown & Warner (1980, 1985) find the market model as powerful
as competing models in detecting abnormal returns when they
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exist. Schadler (1987) comments that the, ...
'market model performs better than
alternatives when the event date is not
known precisely. This advantage is
attributed to the market model's ability
to track general market movements over the
event period.'
(3). While Keeley's methodology is followed, the choice of
estimation period length and position, relative to
announcement day, varies among studies. Some studies use a
longer estimation period; eg Wansley & Dhillon (1989) use an
event estimation period of 130 days, t = - 250 to t = -121.
Schadler (1987) uses an estimation period post the security
issuance; he notes that Mikkelson & Partch (1986) observe
systematic average price movements prior to and immediately
subsequent to the announcement of a new issue of common stock
and convertible debt; consequently including these systematic
movements in the estimation period will also bias the market
model parameters; eg Thompson (1985), Mikkelson & Partch
1986).
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(4). Mikkelson & Partch (1986) note that, if the individual
daily prediction errors are assumed to be normally
distributed, each SARjt is distributed Student t with a
variance equal to,
M
(M - 2)
where M is the number of days in the period used to estimate
the market model (ie M = 60).
Also, under the Central Limit Theorem, and assuming that the
individual ARs are cross-sectionally independent, Mikkelson &
Partch observe that ASARt is asymptotically normally
distributed with a variance equal to,
M
(M - 2)N
and since M is large, M/(M-2) is very close to one, and so the
variance of ASARt approximately equals
1
N
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(5). In considering the samples from the two periods,
mikkelson & Partch, see Footnote (4), have shown that the
variance of ASARt is approximated by 1/n therefore,
2	 2
s = 1/n and
	 s2. = 1/n1i	 t
where,
s is the standard deviation of sample 1 (ie for period 1)1
sa is the standard deviation of sample 2 (ie for period 2)
also let,
_
x = the mean of sample 1 (ie the AISAR of sample 1)i
x= the mean of sample 2 (ie the AISAR of sample 2)t
Salvatore (1982 p95 section 5.15) considers testing hypotheses
for differences between two means when each of the samples is
<30. He assumes both populations are normally distributed and
,-2 ,...a.
CD ' =b.L. (but unknown), so the sampling distribution of the
difference between the two means has a t distribution with
n1 + n2. - 2 degrees of freedom.
z=
ET- 77
2	 -1.	 -3.	 I.
Using s, as an estimate of d5, and s 	 an estimate of 671.
1	 2	 2.he notes that, s is a weighted average of s i and s2.
/	 2	 1.
s =	 (n l - 1) s i +	 (n a - 1) sl.
n + n
z
 - 2
1
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and	 64	 ........ i S	
+	
S
	
2	 2.
`
	n 	 n
	
1	 L
Consequently, in assessing the Absolute Difference between the
AARs of two periods, as shown in Tables 6.4 and 6.5, "AAR" is
the absolute difference (le between the AARs of the two
periods), and Z is calulated as per Salvatore (1982) above,
and the level of significance (two-tail) is assessed from "t"
tables.
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CHAPTER 7
MARKET VIEWS OF UK AND US BANK CAPITAL ADEQUACY
7.1 AN ASSESSMENT OF KEELEY'S RESULTS
7.1.1	 The Duality of Capital Adequacy
The introduction of a minimum capital standard regulatory
regime in the US, UK and other countries (see Chapter 4)
formally categorised banks as either capital adequate or
inadequate; ie in terms of some notional bureaucratically
determined minimum capital standard.
Also, under the capital structure relevance hypothesis, the
market's view of the adequacy of a bank's capital may be
considered in terms of an optimum determined by the influence
of market imperfections. Consequently it is possible to
consider capital adequacy in terms of dual, ie market and
regulatory, criteria; accordingly, four possible
categorisations of banks are represented in Table 7.1A.
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Generally, under the basic capital structure relevance
hypothesis, a firm's voluntary capital issue decision may be
expected to move the capital structure towards an optimum
defined by various market imperfections. In the particular
environment of the banking sector, a capital issue may be
required of, or coerced from, a bank by the regulatory regime
irrespective of whether it represents a move towards or away
from the bank's capital structure optimum.
7.1.2
	
Issue Announcement Evidence
The evidence of Chapters 5, and to some degree Chapter 6,
suggests that common stock (and ordinary share) issue
announcement effects are negative and tend to decline in
(negative) magnitude after the imposition of a minimum capital
standard regulatory regime. It is difficult to draw any direct
evidence supporting the capital structure relevance hypothesis
from these announcement effects.
Keeley (1989) analysed banks' common stock issue announcement
effects in terms of their regulatory status; his results
indicate a negative announcement effect for capital inadequate
banks, and a positive effect for adequate banks; see Chapter
5. These results are indicated in Table 7.1B. Keeley reasons
that common stock issues by capital inadequate banks are
coerced, while those by banks with adequate capital are
voluntary.
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7.1.3	 Regulatory and Market Views.
Keeley's (1989) evidence viewed banks as either regulatory
capital adequate (bank groups A & B) or inadequate (groups C &
D) according to the regulatory view. His announcement effect
results are also indicated in Table 7.1B; ie positive for A &
B, negative for C & D. He views the latter as implying a
voluntary issue decision and the latter implying a coerced
issue.
Nevertheless, Keeley's analysis neglects the market's view of
a bank's adequacy of capital. Table 7.1B also presents the
hypothesised influence on issue announcement effects of a
bank's capital adequacy from the market perspective; if
inadequate the influence should be positive, and if adequate
the influence should be negative. In other words, if it is
assumed that the market's view of capital adequacy, or
inadequacy is based on a defined optimal structure, then it
may be hypothesised that the announcement effects would be
negative for capital adequate banks (A & C) and positive for
capital inadequate banks (B & D).
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Table 7.1
A: Regulatory and Market Capital Adequacy Status
MARKET
VIEW
Adequate* Inadequate
Adequate A
REGULATORS
VIEW
Inadequate
(* Adequate, or Optimal, and Over Adequate)
B: Issue Announcement Effects
Hypothesised
Market
Keeley's Evidence Reaction
Bank Group
A voluntary + -
B
C
voluntary
coerced
+ +
D coerced - +
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7.1.4	 Criticism of Keeley's View
Based on Table 7.1, a capital issue decisions by the various
bank groups would be, ...
Bank Group A: voluntary, but unlikely as it would represent a
costly move away from the optimum as defined by the market.
Bank Group B: also voluntary and, because it represents a move
towards the optimum defined by the market, would represent a
positive influence on issue announcement effects.
Bank Group C: coerced by the regulators; also, because the
market views capital as adequate, a capital issue represents a
move away from the optimum structure - a costly addition to
capital which would represent a negative influence on issue
announcement effects.
Bank Group D: coerced by the regulators; but the market also
views capital as inadequate and would view a capital issue as
a move towards the optimum capital structure; this would
represent a positive influence on issue announcement effects.
Thus while capital issues from banks in group A would be
unlikely (and costly), issues by those in group B would
influence announcement effects positively.
Capital issues by banks in group C would influence capital
issue announcements negatively. This represents a cost of bank
capital regulation; this cost arises from the conflict of an
imposed regulatory capital standard higher than that assessed
as necessary by the market.
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Nevertheless, issues by banks in group D while nominally
coerced, would provide a positive issue announcement effect;
this suggests that not all capital issues by banks with
inadequate regulatory capital should necessarily influence
announcement effects negatively.
These hypotheses suggest a new insight, and invite a
reassessment, of Keeley's results; the positive announcement
effects of voluntary common stock issues (ie by regulatory
adequate banks) may represent a movement towards the optimal
capital structure by a bank judged capital inadequate by the
market (le group B). Also, an issue announcement by a
regulatory capital inadequate bank may be either negative or
positive, depending on the market's assessment of the bank's
capital adequacy, ie groups C or D; the negative influence on
group C represents the cost of a conflict between market and
regulatory views of a bank's adequacy of capital. Thus a
"coerced" capital issue by a bank judged regulatory capital
inadequate may indeed be voluntary if the bank is
simultaneously judged capital inadequate by the market.
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7.2 PROPOSED ANALYSIS
7.2.1	 Objectives
The assessment of adequacy of US bank capital from a market
viewpoint has been reported by Shome et al (1987); See Chapter
4. No comparable study appears to have been undertaken in the
UK. The following analysis assesses the adequacy of bank
capital in the UK and the US. Additionally, it seeks to assess
the potential for the cost of conflicting regulatory versus
market views of bank capital adequacy; this latter analysis is
carried out by assessing the market view of the adequacy of
groups defined as capital adequate or inadequate by the
minimum capital standard regime.
7.2.2	 Sample and Data
Observations are qualified by the small number of large UK
banks and a frustrating limited access to US bank data which,
while apparently available in the US, is not readily
disseminated elsewhere; in this regard, the kindness of IBCA
who provided account data on 103 US banks over 1983-87 is
particularly acknowledged. The following data relates to the
needs of the market assessment model specified in Section 7.3.
Regression analysis is undertaken using the SPSS/PC
Statistical Package with tabular presentation using the Lotus
123 Spreadsheet.
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a.	 UK Banks
Observations are drawn from the 6 large banks groups in the
UK; namely, Barclays, Lloyds, Midland, National Westminster,
Royal Bank of Scotland, and Standard Chartered. All have a
year end balance date at end December, except Royal Bank of
Scotland at end September.
Account Data:
Per share data (earnings per share and dividend per share;
both adjusted for subsequent issues) are provided by
Datastream from 1978. Nevertheless, in years when banks made
losses (such as the late 1980's), earnings per share is
recorded as zero which invalidates the observation which is
thus excluded from the assessment - and unfortunately reduces
the already small number of observations
Asset, and capital data are derived from the 'Annual Report
and Accounts' of the individual UK banks.
Price Data:
Balance date share price data, adjusted for subsequent issues,
is provided by Datastream.
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b.	 US Banks
Account Data:
As for the UK banks, per share account data is gained from the
Datastream service, and is available since 1978.
Capital and Asset Data -
Unfortunately, other account data from Datastream is limited;
while equity account data is reasonably comprehensive, total
asset data is not available.
The IBCA service provides account data on 103 US banks; while
the data is arranged in a purpose designed bank analysis
format, the equity account data is provided in aggregate form;
the service also itemises primary capital. Data for the 1983-
87 period is available.
For an exercise using Basle Risk-Weighted Capital, the capital
ratio data was gained from the 1990 edition of Salomon
Brothers "Review of Bank Performance".
Price Data:
As for the UK.
Screening:
The resultant data used requires the amalgamation of
Datastream and IBCA sources. The original number of IBCA banks
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had to be reduced due to a number of factors (See Annex 7,
Table 7B).
- incompatibility between IBCA and Datastream figures for
equity capital (and other items) in certain years; where this
exceeded more than 1% of the Datastream equity figure the
observation for that year was excluded.
- lack of corresponding price data on the Datastream service.
This may in some cases be caused by the bank being taken-over
in subsequent years and its deletion from the Datastream
service.
c.	 Adequacy of Capital: Market Assessment Model
The equity valuation model used by Shome et al (1986) to
provide a market assessment of capital structure adequacy (of
99 large US banks over 1974-83) provides a basis for the
assessment of the adequacy/inadequacy of bank capital
structures.
The focus of the Shome model, noted in Chapter 4, is upon the
parameter of the variable used to represent financial risk.
Shame uses the ratio of equity capital to total assets; also
he alternatively used total capital (common equity + loan loss
reserves + capital notes and debentures) to total assets, but
this did not qualitatively alter the regression results.
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7.3 MODEL SPECIFICATION
7.3.1	 The Model
The model, which employs a two-stage least squares regression,
is derived by Shome et al (1986) from whom the following
specifications are taken.
The model is based on the proposition that the current price
of a stock (Po) is equal to the present value of the expected
future dividends (Dt) to existing shareholders discounted at a
rate kt the market determined required rate of return
commensurate with the risk of the security for period t; le
.0
D*1). P0= 
t-i (i 4- 'c.)t
With Do, the current dividend known, and assuming constant
growth, then it follows that ...
ao t
< #92). = Do ( * <
	
t:.,	 1 4 kt
Recognizing that equation 2) is linear in logs and
that Do = (POR)Eo
3). 1nPo = lnEo + 1nPOR + ln
where
oo	 t
4: ( + St )
K.	 1 + k t
i . i
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Eo . current earnings per share
POR = the payout ratio, and
gt . the expected growth rate in earnings for the
firm in period t.
Because neither the level nor time path of kt or gt (or their
ratio) is directly observable, a general solution is found in
employing observable variables which are highly correlated
with k and g. Shome et al select leverage, dividend and size
variables and use a functional form which allows for their
interactive influence on the risk and/or growth variables (1).
tco
4 ) .
	 ( I 4- 3t	 81	 82	 B3	 )= Bo ( POR ). ( EQR )4: ( S )(1 ez
	
I 4- h't	 .	 c
t= I
	 c
where
POR = payout rate
EQR . equity ratio, a measure of financial risk
S = total assets, a size variable that proxies for business
risk
Bi = constants, i = 0, 1, 2, 3, and
e . disturbance term which, by assumption, is
lognormally distributed
In equation 4), Shome et al note that the payout rate should
be inversely related to gt, which implies B1 < 0. The sign of
B2 is of focal interest, as EQR will influence both kt and gt.
Shome et al comment that while the net impact is not clear,
the literature suggests the null hypothesis is B2 0. Either
the value maximising capital structure is chosen or regulators
force managers to hold excess capital (2). The size variable
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is expected to be inversely related to kt;ie, B3 > 0.
Taking logs of equation 4) yields,
0,0
	t
5).1ri,E  "'St - 1nBo + Blln(POR)i + B21n(EQR)i + B31n(S)i + lnei
)t,, I + IT t 1:
and substituting 5) into 3) results in a valuation equation
that relates share price to the equity ratio.
5a)	 1nPi = 1nBo + lnEi + (1 + B1)1n(POR)i + B21n(EQR)i +
B31nSi + lnei
or
5h)	 1nPi = ao + allnEi + a21n(POR)i + a31n(EQR)i +
a41nSi + ui
where
ao	 1nBo -(1/2)6	 a3 = B2
al	 1.0	 a4 = B3
a2 = (1 + Bl)	 ui = lnei	 ( 3 )
Concerning equation 5b), Shome et al comment that if dividend
policy is irrelevant, a2 should be zero; per se, the payout
ratio should have no influence on price per share. Also, the
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equation assumes a log-linear approximation for the
relationship between P and EQR within the range of the sample
data; the validity of this assumption may be checked using a
Durbin Watson test (4).
In order to purge the system of measurement error with respect
to E, and simultaneous equation bias, Shome et al employ two-
stage least squares (5). The first stage regression equation
is specified as
6)	 Ei = do + dlDi + d2(EQR)i + d3Si + vi
A
The predicted value, Ei, from equation 6) is used in place of
Ei in equation 5a).
7.3.2	 Financial Risk Variables
In the above model, the choice of financial risk measure (EQR)
represents a definition of capital. The definitions of
capital, and asset size used in the following exercises
include:-
1). UK: 1978-89: 6 Banks.
Capital Ratio:
Equity Capital (Ordinary Capital + Reserves)/ Total Net Assets
Size:
Total Net Assets.
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2). US: 1983-87: IBCA database banks (see Annex 7, Table 7B).
Capital Ratio:
Equity CapitaL (defined by IBCA)/ Total Net Assets
Size:
Total Net Assets.
3). US: as above
Capital Ratio:
Primary Capital (defined by IBCA)/ Total Gross Assets
Size:
Total Gross Assets (ie Total Net Assets + Loan Loss Reserves)
4). US: 1988-89: Salomon Brothers and IBCA data bases.
Capital Ratio: (from Salomon Brothers)
Basle Risk-Weighted Capital Ratio as determined by management
on a 1992 basis.
(ie Tier 1+2 / Total risk-weighted assets plus contingencies)
Size:
Total Gross Assets (from IBCA)
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7.4	 RESULTS
The results of the above four regression studies are
summarised in Table 7.2 (A,B,C,D); full regression results are
detailed in Annex 7.
7.4.1	 UK: Equity Capital
The UK results, Table 7.2 A, are qualified by a low number
(six) of observations; an insufficient number of observations
precluded regression in the years 1987, 1989 and 1990 (6).
Also while the results for 1979, 1986 and 1988 suggest a
significant regression (significance of F ratio < .05) the
other years do not.
Although the coefficient is negative in 1979, indicating
excessive capital levels, the insignificance (> .05) of the t
statistic suggests capital levels were at or near the optimum.
The significant and positive (albeit small) coefficient for
1986 indicates a capital level which is inadequate. By 1988,
following the announcement of the introduction of a minimum
capital adequacy regulatory regime, the level appears to have
regained adequacy with the coefficient, while negative,
qualified by insignificance.
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TAB4: 7.2
MARKET ASSESO ADEOUA:Y OF CAITA_ - SLMMAFig
!SLA:arv of regression resul:s containeo in Annex 7)
a3 = coeficiert of capital ratio
t = t statistic; sig t = two-tailed significance of t statistic
adj R2 = adjusted R2; sig F = s:gnificance of regression
- UK BANKS -
A: 6 WOR UK BANKS: CAPITAL DUPED AS BUITY
6 Cases	 = (Ordinary Capital Reserves)iTctal Net Assets
YEAR
	 1978	 1979	 1980	 1981	 1992	 1993	 1984	 1995	 1996	 1987	 1989	 1989	 1990
	
a3	 -1.66 -1.25003 -2.1361 0.41561 0.1 9644 -1.23049 -162922 -0.02492 	 0.31	 NA	 -0.8426	 NA	 NA
	
t	 -1.31 -6.641 -1.165	 0.524	 0.157 -1.631 -9.456 -0.032	 37.29	 -2.276
	
5IQ t	 0.42	 0.10	 0.45	 0.69	 0.90	 0.35	 0.07	 0.98	 0.02	 0.26
	
adj R2	 0.96	 1.00	 0.95	 0.98	 0.94	 0.99	 1.00	 0.99	 1.00	 1.00
	
sig F	 0.13	 0.02	 0.15	 0.09	 0.17	 0.09	 0.05	 0.22	 0.00	 0.04
- US BANKS -
P: US WO's: CAPITAL OFINED AS EVJITY
RISK RATIO = EOR = (Ordinary Capital 4 Ree-ve)/Total Net Assets
YEAR	 1993	 1984	 1985	 1526	 1987
	
(Cases)
	
(58)	 (52)	 (56)	 (52)	 (66)
	
a3	 0.37837	 0.2462	 0.22569	 1.75727	 -0.20353
	
t	 2.501	 1.786	 1.055	 3.287	 -0.761
	
sig t	 0.02	 0.09	 0.30	 0.00	 0.45
	
adj R2	 0.84	 0.87	 0.7:	 0.55	 0.37
	
sig F	 0	 0	 0	 0	 0
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C: US BC's: CAPITAL DEFINED AS PRIMARY :PTA..
R:SK RATIO = PCRI = Primary	 tal/Total Bross Assets
I I primary capita: define: by IEC)
(i Bross Total Assets = Total Assets + Loan Loss Reserves(
YEAR 1963 1984 1925 1986 1987
(Cases) (58) (52) (56) (52) (66)
a3 0.272E6 0.24579 0.21227 1.71532
-0.21622
t 1.663 1.722 0.991 3.229
-0.807
sig t 0.10 0.08 0.33 0.00 0.42
adj R2 0.84 0.27 0.73 0.55 0.36
sig F 0 0 0 0 0
Observations categorised into one of two groups:
0 = BroLp of observations with PCR equal to or greater than Regulatory MiniBmum Standard
0 = 8roup of observations with PCR less than Regulatory Minimum Standard
Minimum Regulatory Stardard: 52 in 1983, 1984
5.52 in 1925, 1926, 1987
OVER::
YEAR 1923 1924 1985 1926 1987
(Cases) (56) (30) (20) (28) (49)
a3 0.27722 1.26277 -0.07701 0.46595 0.57143
t 1.64 6 -0.136 1.1 2.021
sig t 0.1072 0 0.8937 0.2826 0.0497
adj R2 0.2775 0.85849 0.47203 0.74499 0.58564
sig F 0 0 0.0076 0 0
UNDER::
YEAR 1923 1924 1985 1986 1987
(Cases) (2) (r) (36) (24) (17)
a3 NA 0.54478 -0.14399 5.49064 -1.6007
t 1.476 -0.423 3.276 -1.138
sig t 0.1595 0.6326 0.004 0.2775
adj R2 0.92259 0.22941 0.61171 -0.05791
sig F 0 0 0.0002 0.5587
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0: S FC's: CAPITA, DEFINE: AS BALE AFEEvE
RISK RATI3 = BALE RISK-WEIFTED CAPITAL RATIC (WC), = Tier 1,2 ait1 / Total (60%.Welto.LA
Acsa.i. 1,14 Co,Tiny'hiit)
(I Caoital Ratio Source - Salomon Brothers: Managemert Estimates)
S = Gross ASS2t5
YEAR	 1999
(Cases)	 (29)
a3 0.57173
1.407
sig t 0.19
adj R2 0.46
sig F 0.0454
199?
(23!
YEAR
(Cases)
33 -0.9E661
-1.791
sig t 0.10
ad. 	 P' 0.35
sig F o.oge
UNDER
YEAR	 1999
(Cases)	 (5;
33	 Insufficient Data
4 Regre:sicn Skipped
sig t
adj R2
sig F
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7.4.2	 US: Equity Capital
The results for the 1983-87 period (Table 7.23) suggest
that equity capital levels were inadequate in 1983 and 1986
and, indicated by statistical insignificance, at or near
optimal levels in the other three years.
7.4.3	 US: Primary Capital
The primary capital adequacy results (Table 7.2C) tend to
mirror those for US equity capital, although the
coefficient for 1983 appears insignificant (>.05) and
therefore at or near an optimal level. As for equity
capital, primary capital appears inadequate in 1986.
In a further exercise, the bank sample is disaggregated
into two groups based on regulatory capital adequacy (ie
the exercise assumes a primary capital ratio of 5% or more
is adequate in 1983, 1984, and similarly a ratio of 5.5% in
1985, 1986 and 1987; a lesser ratio is inadequate); eg see
regulatory capital constraints in Chapter 4.4.2 (and
footnote 20) and Annex 4.3.
The significance of the regression of the disaggregated
groups is qualified (F statistic significance >.05) in 1987
for the "under" (ie 5.5%) group. Also regression was
precluded in the 1983 "under" sample because of a lack of
observations.
Otherwise the results for the "over" group suggest an
inadequate level of primary capital in 1984 and 1987. Also,
based on the insignificance of the coefficient (t statistic
significance >. 05) the results indicate a primary capital
level at or near optimum levels in 1983 and 1985 and 1986.
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ADE/ATE
(Ever Mini
Standard$1)
REGULATORS
VIEW
BADEDUATE
(Under Minimum
Standardt$)
For the "under" group, the market appears to view primary
capital as being near optimal levels in 1984 and 1985. In
1986 primary capital levels appear inadequate.
The regression results for the "over" and "under" groups
suggest market assessments of capital adequacy which
conflict with the regulatory view.
Using the format of Table 7.1A, the results may be
categorised as depicted in Table 7.3
TABLE 7.3
US Primary Capita: Assessment
(Years 1983-1987)
MARKET V IR
ADMUATEt	 INADDIATE
1923 1984
1985 1987
19Ei
1984 1986
1985
$ Optimal and Over Adequate
$1 Minimum Standard: 5% in 1983, 1984
5.5% in 1985, 1986, 1927
NOTE: Table Omits: 1983 Under - only 2 observations
1987 Unger - Insignificant Regression
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This evidence suggests the potential for both conflict and
cohesion between market and regulatory views of capital
adequacy. Via the capital structure relevance hypothesis,
"Under" banks stock prices would be likely to receive a
positive influence on the announcement of primary capital
issues in 1986 while, similarly, "over" banks would be
likely to be influenced negatively by announcement effects
in 1983, 1985 and 1986. These likelihoods run contrary to
Keeley's observations.
7.4.4	 US: Basle Capital
Under the Basle regulation regime, and defining capital
(tiers 1 and 2) by the 1992 requirements, the market
appears to view the capital level as at or near optimal in
1989.
The capital level for banks defined as capital adequate
under the 1992 regulatory requirement of 8% (the "over"
group), appears to be verging on an excessive level from
the market perspective judging by the sign of the
coefficient; nevertheless the coefficient's insignificance
suggests a capital level at or near the optimum.
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7.5	 CONCLUSIONS
Generally, this analysis has looked beyond the simple
influence of regulatory capital adequacy status as a
determinant of capital issue announcement effects as observed
by Keeley (1989).
By acknowledging the capital structure relevance hypothesis
and the market's view of capital adequacy, vis a vis optimal
capital structure, the potential for conflicts between market
and regulatory views has been suggested.
Analysis indicates that, from the market perspective, at times
banks may hold capital levels which are excessive or
inadequate rather than adequate. Also, periods of conflict,
and agreement, between market and regulatory views have been
assessed in the US; this evidence provides encouraging grounds
for testing the hypothesis that such conflict and agreement
may influence capital issue announcement effects.
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FOOTNOTES
(1). In terms of selecting observable variables highly
correlated with k or g Shome et al note that,
- Hamada (1972) demonstrates that the firm's beta is an
increasing function of financial leverage and its basic
business risk.
- Sealey (1983) shows that the required rate of return for
financial intermediaries should be a declining function of
size if there economies of scale in providing liquidity
services to depositors.
- Gordon (1974) suggests that investors may also view
dividends as less risky than capital gains; therefore,
conclude Shome et al, kt may be a declining function of the
dividend payout ratio.
- Also, Shome et al reason that if there exists an inverse
relationship between size and the likelihood that regulators
will allow the bank to fail (and therefore the probability
that the BHC will fail) size and price per share should be
positively associated.
Shome et al similarly argue that these same variables may have
a potential influence on growth. More particularly,
- An increase in the payout ratio will, ceteris paribus,
reduce gt.
- Leverage will tend to increase gt to the extent that
earnings are now shared by a smaller group of equity holders.
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- Earnings growth may be a function of size due to better
product or geographic expansion opportunities enjoyed by
larger firms.
Shome et al use the multiplicative functional form to allow
for the interactive effects of the financing/investment
decision.
They note that the size variable is a proxy for business risk
since larger banks have better product and geographic
diversification possibilities; they cite Edwards & Heggestad
(1973) who provide a direct test of the joint hypothesis that
larger banks have lower risk levels and better 'growth'
opportunities.
(2). Shome et al note that while the required rate of return
on equity, kt, is a non-increasing function of EQR, the impact
of EQR on gt is not so clear. Increases in the equity ratio
through new stock financing decrease gt if the new stock is
sold at a price below the book value per share. If managers
are more concerned with growth than maximising share prices,
they may choose a capital structure to force B2 > 0, even
though kt is a declining function of the equity ratio.
(3). Since ei is lognormally distributed with an expected
value of 1, lnei is normally distributed with a mean of-J-ec
where, 6; = Var(lnei) and Var(lnei) is the variance of ln(ei).
This result follows from the fact that
E[ei] = exp[i(lnei) +-1: 45fj= 1. Assuming homoscedasticity of
the error term allows for a constant to be added to 1nBo in
order to leave the relationship unaltered.
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(4). If the approximation is seriously in error, and the
actual relationship is concave to the origin within this
sample, then the residuals ranked according to the equity
ratio values would exhibit significant positive serial
correlation. Shome et al check the validity of this assumption
by applying a Durbin Watson test to the cross-sectional
residuals ranked according to EQR values; Kmenta (1971)
provides a description of the test and Litzenberger & Rao
(1971) an example of its application.
(5). Although equation 5b) could be estimated using ordinary
least squares, Shome et al comment that if the firm's economic
earnings are not equal to current accounting earnings, the
measurement error will cause its coefficient to be biased
towards zero. Also, dividend and capital structure decisions,
as well as size, may provide information concerning economic
earnings. Using the two-stage least square procedure removes
the information impact of dividends, capital structure, and
size and reduces the measurement error bias.
(6). Also, the low number of observations (six) in other years
were not accommodated in available tables of the Durbin Watson
statistic.
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CHAPTER 8
THE PREDICTABILITY OF SECURITY TYPE ISSUED
8.1	 INTRODUCTION
8.1.1	 Objective
The type of security issued appears to be an important
determinant of issue announcement common stock abnormal return
(AR). The hypothesised inverse relationship between an
announcement AR and the predictability of the security type of
the announced capital issue is examined in this chapter.
Previous assessment of this hypothesis in the industrial
sector found at best very weak supporting evidence, Schadler
(1987).
This investigation requires the estimation of ARs for
different security types issued and the construction of a
security type to be issued predictability model. Such
predictability models have been successfully constructed in
the industrial sector but not apparently in the banking
sector, although problem bank early warning systems and bank
failure predictability have been modelled, eg Sinkey (1979),
Sinkey et al (1987).
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8.1.2	 Industrial Models
The estimation of issue security type predictability, given
the need for external financing, has been explored with varied
success in the industrial sector over the past two decades.
Industrial firm studies include Baxter & Cragg (1970), Martin
& Scott (1974), Taub (1975), Marsh (1982) and Schadler (1987).
A number of financial characteristics have emerged as
indicators of issue type. Marsh (1982) achieved an issue
security type predictive ability of 73% in a relatively
methodological rigorous model largely using theoretically
backed variables.
The studies generally employ three types of predictive model.
Issue security type, as a discrete dependent variable, has
invited the use of multivariate discriminant analysis (MDA) as
well as logit and probit models.
8.1.3	 Model and Predictor Variable Selection
The MDA is selected as an appropriate model for this
dissertation. Apart from its use in previous security type
predictor models, see Table 8.1, the MDA model has been used
in a variety of financial applications including, for example,
the prediction of bond ratings (Pinches & Mingo 1973), company
failure (Taffler 1982), bank problem and failure (Sinkey
1979), and debt servicing problems in developing countries
(Taffler & Abassi 1984). Generally, MDA is a multivariate
statistical technique concerned with separating distinct
groups of observations and allocating new observations to the
previously defined groups. The MDA reduces the task of
examining group differences among a large number of variables
to a univariate problem. The selection of MDA also is
supported by Taffler & Abassi (1984) (1).
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TABLE 8.1
SECURITY TYPE ISSUED PREDICTION STUDIES
SECURITY	 NUMBER OF
STUDY	 TYPES	 MODEL VARIABLES SUCCESS
Baxter & Cragg (1970)
	 5	 L & P	 11(90)	 n a
Martin & Scott (1974)	 2	 MDA	 6(23)	 75% (77%)
Taub (1975)	 2	 P	 6	 n a
Marsh (1982)	 2	 L & P	 8	 75% (73%)
Schadler (1987) 	 3	 MDA	 9	 58% (56%)
NOTE:-
SECURITY TYPES: 5 = Five security types; 2 = Debt or Equity; 3
= Debt or Equity or Convertible Debt.
MODEL: MDA = Multivariate Discriminant Analysis; L = Logit,
P = Probit.
NUMBER OF VARIABLES ; Number of predictor variables in final
specification: initial selection in parenthesis.
SUCCESS ; Correct classification of model; tested best
predictability in parentheses.
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A degree of experimentation in variable selection is necessary
due to the novelty of forming a bank capital issue security
type predictability model. Nevertheless, it is intended to
emphasise Schadler's (1987) approach; namely predictor
variable nomination is designed to reflect public information
available to determine the bank issue security type, rather
than the result of exhaustive 'data mining' in order to obtain
the highest degree of predictability.
The selection of potential predictor variables is assisted by
reference to those selected in previous industrial studies;
see Annex 8.1. Among the previous industrial studies, the
framework of predictor variables developed most recently by
Marsh (1982) and Schadler (1987) provide a particularly useful
reference point.
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8.2	 MODEL SPECIFICATION
8.2.1	 Discriminant Function
In application of MDA, a linear combination of the independent
(or predictor) variables is formed and used as the basis of
assigning observations to groups, thus summarising in a single
index the information contained in multiple independent
variables. Variable weights are estimated to provide the
'best' separation between the groups.
The linear discriminant equation is of the form,
Z = dO + dl V1 + d2 V2 + 	  + dm Vm
where,
Z = the discriminant function score
V1, V2	 Vm are the m variables selected for the analysis,
and
do, dl ... dm are the optimal coefficients estimated from the
data.
The coefficients are chosen so the values of the discriminant
function differ between the groups as much as possible. In
other words, for the discriminant scores, the ratio 
	
between-groups sum of squares
within-groups sum of squares
is maximised; this also minimises the probability of
classifying an observation to the wrong group. Any other
linear combination of the variables will have a smaller ratio.
412
8.2.2	 Assumptions
Basic requirements for the application of MDA include the
ability to divide the sample of observations into separate and
discrete known groups, and that each observation in each group
must be described by a set of measurements on m variables,
where m is greater than or equal to two.
Also, to provide a classification rule that minimises the
probability of misclassification, certain assumptions about
the data must be met. For each group, the m variables are
assumed to come from a multivariate normal distribution. Also,
the within-group covariance matrix for the variables in the
data matrix is assumed to be the same for each group.
Violation of these assumptions may influence the performance
of the linear discriminant model (LDA).
a). Multivariate Normal Distribution of each Group's Variables
As with most multivariate techniques, multivariate normality
of the independent variables is required in formal development
of the model. It is assumed that either multivariate normality
exists, eg Martin & Scott (1974), or that the MDA
classification procedure is robust to deviations from
multivariate normality, eg Schadler (1987).
b). Equality of Groups' Covariance Matrices
Violation of the assumption of equality of the within-group
variable covariance matrices is common in practice; such
violation indicates that the use of a quadratic discriminant
analysis (QDA) model may be more appropriate than a linear
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discriminant analysis (LDA) model. Nevertheless, under some
circumstances the LDA may perform better than the QDA despite
differences in covariance matrixes (2).
8.2.3	 Classification Result:
The classification result is inflated because a model usually
fits the sample from which it is derived better than it will
fit another sample from the same population.
A common technique used to obtain a better estimation of the
misclassification rate is the 'hold-out' method. If the sample
is large enough, it may be split into two sub-samples; the
one is used to obtain the discriminant coefficients, while
observations in the second (or 'hold-out' sample) are then
assigned to their respective groups. Schadler (1987) who uses
this method notes that it provides consistent and unbiased
error estimates but is less efficient with small samples.
The 'jack-knife' or 'leaving-one-out' method involves leaving
out each of the n observations in turn, calculating the
discriminant function based on the remaining n-1 observations
and then classifying the left out case. Since the observation
being classified is not included in the calculation of the
function, the observed misclassification rate is a less biased
estimate of the true one: eg Lachenbruch (1975).
The predictive estimation is illustrated in Table 8.2; the
"confusion" matrix shows whether bank observations are
classified correctly (in the main diagonal cll or c22)) or
incorrectly (off-diagonal c12 or c21).
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Security
Type
A
Actual
Group
Security
Type
B
cll c12
c21 c22
8.2.4	 Predictability Hypothesis
AARc =	 41NRci
Nc
TABLE 8.2
CONFUSION MATRIX
Classified Group Membership
Security Type A	 Security Type B
The hypothesis that the predictability of security type issued
is inversely related to its abnormal return, is assessed in a
number of steps.
a). The observations associated with each cell of the matrix
are formed into portfolios, and the portfolio abnormal returns
calculated, ...
where Nc is the number of observations in
cell c,
c = 11, 12, 21, 22
i = 1,2, ....Nc
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b). The following hypothesised relationships are considered,
Hol: AARcll = AARc12
Hal: AARcll*. AARc12
and
Ho2: AARc22 = AARc21
Ha2: AARc22 AARc21
The average abnormal returns from each portfolio must be
compared, as indicated in the above hypotheses tests.
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8.3	 SAMPLE AND DATA
8.3.1	 Observations
Although the US provides a potentially rich observation
source, lack of data restricted the analysis to the UK where a
paucity of valid observations compromises the validity of the
hypothesis assessment (3). Notwithstanding this fundamental
qualification, the following exercise is constructed with a
view to future hypothesis tests utilising a more suitable
observation sample.
The UK observations total 11 and were derived from the 6 large
banks; 5 banks contributed 2 observations. The discriminator
variable is based on the distinction of a bank announcement of
an ordinary shares issue or debt issue in a given year. These
observations (6 debt and 5 ordinary shares) are drawn from the
pool of issue announcements identified in Chapter 6; although
this pool offers a potentially greater number of observations
these were reduced by using only "clean" observations (issue
is for a non-specific purpose, and there is no coincident
announcement) and the need for common predictor variable data
for each observation.
A residual problem concerns the selection of distinct classes
of observation suitable for discrimination. A bank making an
ordinary share issue announcement in a particular year may
also have made debt issues; also a bank making a debt issue
announcement in a particular year may have made other debt
issue announcements in that year. The use of a specific debt
type issue announcement, namely perpetual/undated, which is
less frequent and better identified would conceivably overcome
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these problems; but they represent only two of the 6 debt
observations. Consequently the validity of the discriminator
variable is compromised.
Data for the predictor (independent) variables are drawn from
both market and account sources. Market data is derived from
Datastream and the Bank of England's "Financial Statistics".
Account data is drawn from each banks annual report and
accounts; also data from the IBCA account format is used for
comparability of certain account data between banks. The
SPSS/PC+ V2.0 and Advanced Statistics V2.0 program is used for
discriminant analysis.
8.3.2	 Predictor Variables
Generally, the frameworks of Marsh (1982) and Schadler (1987)
identify three categories of variable; namely variables they
consider proxies for target leverage, deviations from target
leverage, and market and timing variables (4). The variables
proxying for target leverage include size, asset composition
and financial risk.
Variables representing financial risk are conveniently
identified and selected from bank specific models. These
include the "early-warning" model developed by Sinkey (1979)
(5) and the failure prediction model of Sinkey et al (1979)
(6).
A fourth category of variable, regulatory capital pressure,
may also be identified. Variables selected include the Bank of
England defined "free capital ratio" and a dummy variable to
represent the introduction of a minimum capital standard
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during the latter part of the observation period (post 1986).
In all, 21 variables are identified. These are listed in this
section and more precisely defined in terms of accounting data
in Annex 8.2.
a).	 Market Conditions
Vi. Equity Market Conditions (EMC)
The cumulative market return in the period prior to the issue
announcement. The market return (on the FTA index) is
cumulated over days -60 to -2 inclusive.
V2. Short-Term Debt Market Conditions (STDMC)
The price of three month UK Treasury Bills (middle rate price,
monthly data) averaged over the previous 12 months, bar the
issue announcement month, divided by the issue month's price.
V3. Long-Term Debt Market Conditions (LTDMC)
The gross redemption yield on British Government Securities
(long dated 20 year, quarterly data). The average of the
previous 8 quarters, bar the issue announcement quarter,
divided by the issue announcement quarter.
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b).	 Deviation from Target Leverage
Two measures of capital are used; the narrow measure contains
ordinary capital, reserves and minorities (ie equity capital);
the wider measure also includes preference capital and debt
capital.
Variables concerning the wider capital measure include,
V4. Wide Capital Ratio (WCR)
The ratio of wide capital to total assets.
V5. Average Wide Capital Ratio (AWCR)
The average wide capital ratio over the previous four years
bar the last.
V6. Deviation of Wide Capital Ratio (DWCR)
The ratio of V5 to V4.
Variables concerning the narrow capital ratio mirror those for
wide capital.
V7. Narrow Capital Ratio (NCR)
The ratio of narrow capital to total assets.
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V8. Average Narrow Capital Ratio (ANCR)
The average narrow capital ratio over the previous four years
bar the last.
V9. Deviation of Narrow Capital Ratio (DNCR)
The ratio of V8 to V7.
C).	 Proxies for Target Leverage
This category covers variables which represent size and asset
composition and financial risk. These are selected from the
respective problem bank and bank failure prediction models of
Sinkey (1979), variables V10 to V14 inclusive; and Sinkey et
al (1987), variables V15 to V19 inclusive.
V10. Size
The variable of size is represented by the natural log of
total assets.
V11. Revenue Concentration (RC)
The ratio of interest and fees on loans, to total operating
income.
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V12. Net Interest Margin (IM)
The ratio of net interest income after loan loss provisions,
to total interest income.
V13. Operating Efficiency (OE)
The ratio of non-interest expenses, to pre-tax profit before
the non-interest expenses.
V14. Loan Volume (LV)
The ratio of loans, to total assets.
V15. Return on Assets (ROA)
The ratio of earnings for ordinary shareholders to total
assets.
V16. Standard Deviation of Return on Assets (SDROA)
The standard deviation of return on assets over the past five
years.
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V17. Retained Earnings (RE)
The ratio of retained earnings to total assets
V18. Liquidity (LQ)
The ratio of liquid assets to total assets
V19. Gross Interest Margin (GIM)
The ratio of total interest income to interest expense.
d).	 Regulatory Pressure
V20. Free Capital Ratio (FCR)
The free capital ratio as defined by the Bank of England.
V21. Minimum Capital Ratio Standard (MCRS)
A dummy variable to accommodate the announced introduction of
a minimum capital standard in 1987.
423
8.4	 RESULTS
The discriminator variable observations, numbering 11, are
listed in Table 8.3A. This also shows the issue announcement
abnormal return associated with each observation.
8.4.1	 Predictability Model
a).	 Initial Exploration
The 21 potential predictor variables are listed in Table 8.3B.
This shows in total, as well as discriminator groups terms,
the mean and standard deviations for observations of each
variable. Tests for equality of group means for each variable
are indicated by Wilks' lambda as well as the F value and its
significance (7). Generally, the most significant differences
appear among asset composition measures; le the liquidity
measure V18, and the
loan volume measure V14. The regulatory free capital ratio
measure, V20, also appears to provide one of the more
separable variables.
In order to identify "good" predictor variable a stepwise
selection process employing the minimisation of Wilks' lambda
is used; at each step the variable that results in the
smallest Wilks' lambda for the discriminant function is
selected for entry; additional criteria also apply (8).
The resulting 8 variable discriminant function is shown in
Table 8.3C. The unstandardised coefficients are the
multipliers of the variables when expressed in original units;
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the standardised coefficients are used when the variables are
standardised to a mean of 0 and a standard deviation of 1. As
the variables are correlated, it is not possible to assess the
importance of an individual variable.
Unfortunately the validity of the discriminant function cannot
be assessed; in testing for equality of group covariance
matrices the programme warns that there are not enough non-
singular group covariance matrices.
Notwithstanding this fundamental qualification to its
validity, the discriminant function's effectiveness may be
gauged from the ratio of between-groups sum of squares to
within-groups sum of squares (ie using an anova table with the
discriminant score as the dependent variable and the
discriminant variable as the independent variable); this ratio
is represented by the eigen value (which is 188.9858); a
large eigen value is associated with "good" functions.
Another gauge of the effectiveness of the discriminant
function, and one of particular interest for this
dissertation, is the percentage of cases correctly classified.
The classification output indicates that 100% of observations
are classified correctly; the programme indicates a posterior
probability of 1.0 for each observation (9). Attempting the
"jackknife" procedure (see below) on a discriminant function
comprising the forced entry of the 8 identified variables
proved unsatisfactory; le an inability to test for equality of
group covariance matrices in any of the 11 "jackknife"
process, a number of which excluded V20 due to the tolerance
criteria.
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-ALE
D:SCRir.N4NT OBSENitTIONS
J! CAc ITAL 'SUE
ISELE
BANk YEAR &ROLF 1 ROLF 2 AR
--
-lovas 1954 1 0.0055
Hewes: 1924 1 -0.0776
Ro yal Bark of Ecotlana 1985 1 -0.09:3
Staroari Crarterea 1985 1 0.019Z
Midlar c 19E6 1 0.0105
Natwest 19E6 1 -0.1095
Barclays 1997 1 0.0211
Barcla ys 195? 1 -0.1337
Llavas 1988 1 -0.0002
Royal Bet of Sootard 1955 1 0.010e
Stanzara Orarterea 1955 1 0.0736
TOTAL 6
GRIF 1 = DEFT ISSUES
EROT : = ORDNARY SHARE ISSIE
AR = TworrayAt:normal Return derived ir chapter 6.
TABLE 8.38
PREDICTOR VARIABLES
MEAN, STANDARD DEVIATION, AND TESTS FOR UNIVARIATE EQUALITY OF GROUP MEANS
WILKS'
MEAN	 STANDARD DEVIATION	 LAMBDA	 F	 SIGNIFICANCE
VARIABLE	 GROUP 1 GROUP 2	 TOTAL	 GROUP 1 GROUP 2	 TOTAL
V1 EMC	 -0.01874	 0.015	 -0.003	 0.176	 0.104	 0.142	 0.984	 0.145	 0.712
V2 STDMC	 0.95421	 0.996	 0.973	 0.132	 0.084	 0.110	 0.960	 0.378	 0.554
V3 LTDMC	 1.04095	 1.037	 1.039	 0.072	 0.084	 0.074	 0.999	 0.006	 0.938
V4 WCR	 0.07772	 0.074	 0.076	 0.007	 0.006	 0.006	 0.921	 0.776	 0.401
V5 AWCR	 0.07652	 0.077	 0.077	 0.008	 0.010	 0.008	 0.999	 0.010	 0.922
V6 DWCR	 1.49855	 1.035	 1.288	 1.283	 0.155	 0.944	 0.934	 0.634	 0.447
V7 NCR	 0.0497	 0.044	 0.047	 0.008	 0.008	 0.008	 0.889	 1.127	 0.316
V8 ANCR	 0.05191	 0.050	 0.051	 0.008	 0.011	 0.009	 0.988	 0.10E1	 0.750
V9 DNCR	 1.8059	 1.217	 1.538	 1.807	 0.244	 1.323	 0.946	 0.513	 0.492
V10 SIZE	 10.63686	 10.676	 10.655	 0.485	 0.773	 0.598	 0.999	 0.011	 0.921
V11 RC	 0.65196	 0.652	 0.652	 0.030	 0.070	 0.049	 1.000	 0.000	 0.991
V12 HIM	 0.21663	 0.179	 0.199	 0.065	 0.122	 0.092	 0.954	 0.437	 0.525
V13 OE	 0.82697	 0.922	 0.870	 0.174	 0.372	 0.270	 0.966	 0.314	 0.589
V14 LV	 0.62878	 0.574	 0.604	 0.063	 0.030	 0.056	 0.738	 3.191	 0.108
V15 ROA	 0.0036	 0.002	 0.003	 0.005	 0.008	 0.006	 0.973	 0.246	 0.632
V16 SDROA	 0.01439	 0.003	 0.009	 0.029	 0.002	 0.021	 0.926	 0.722	 0.418
' V17 RE	 0.00187	 -0.003	 0.000	 0.005	 0.009	 0.007	 0.893	 1.076	 0.327
V18 LO	 0.26638	 0.338	 0.299	 0.067	 0.045	 0.067	 0.687	 4.110	 0.073
V19 BIM	 1.45272	 1.422	 1.439	 0.057	 0.060	 0.058	 0.921-	 0.774	 0.402
V20 FCR	 5.95	 5.420	 5.709	 0.766	 0.719	 0.760	 0.867	 1.378	 0.271
V21 MCRI	 1.5	 1.400	 1.455	 0.548	 0.548	 0.522	 0.990	 0.091	 0.770
GROUP 1 = DEBT ISSUES
GROUP 2 = ORDINARY SHARE ISSUES
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TABLE 8.3C
CANONICAL DISCRIMINANT FUNCTION COEFFICIENTS: 8 VARIABLES
VARIABLE
DERIVED BY STEP-WISE SELECTION FROM TOTAL 22 VARIABLES
UNSTANDARDISED	 STANDARDISED
VI	 EMC 53.20792 7.88
V2	 STDMC -60.0718 -6.8
V4	 WCR 2376.9 14.8
V8	 ANCR 1350.308 12.8
V9	 DNCR -2.11016 -2.8
VIO SIZE 48.13879 30.3
V18 LO 260.3324 15.2
V20 FCR -26.9050 -20.
(Constant) -625.352
TABLE 8.4A
CANONICAL DISCRIMINANT FUNCTION COEFFICIENTS: 4 VARIABLES
DERIVED BY STEP-WISE SELECTION FROM 7 VARIABLES
(VI,	 V2,	 V3,	 V6,	 VIO,	 V18,	 V20)
UNSTANDARDISED
	
STANDARDISED
VARIABLE
V2	 STDMC 4.793133 0.54
VIO SIZE 1.95975 1.23
VI8 LO 29.45386 1.72
V20 FCR -1.60775 -1.1
(Constant) -25.1746
TABLE 8.4B
CLASSIFICATION RESULTS: FOUR VARIALE MODEL
:CLASSIFICATION:::(a)
Ordinary	 Total
Shares	 Debt	 Observations
Ordinary Shares 4 I 5
(80%) (20%)
:::ACTUAL:::
Debt I 5 6
(16.7X) (83.3%)
(a) Percent of observations in cell shown in parentheses
Percent correctly classified: 	 (4 + 5)! 11 = 81.8%
2	 2
Percent correctly classified by chanc(5/11) + (611= 50.4%
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TABU 3.5
PORTFOLIO AAR s: ME VARIABLE MODEL CLASS:RI:ATI%
:::CLASSIFICATIEN:::
Ordinary	 I	 Absolute
ilares	 Dent	 I	 Difference
1
Ordinary Shares	 -0.03394	 -0.13326	 I	 0.0942
(-4.0422	 (na;	 I	 (na)
(4)	 (1)
Deft	 0.021106	 0.010993	 I	 0.010105
Ina)	 (1.2791b	 I	 ;nal
(1)
	
(5)
Clas . ification Matrix:::
Each de/I shows in order from top:
The within cell AAR; and in parentheses.
- 2 value
- Number of obser;ations in the cell
Absolute Difference:::
The absolute difference in cell AR, and in parenthesis
- Z value (pooled variance method)
---------Rrom 't" tables:
Significance (twc-tail) of AAP: null hypothesis AAR=0
a: Significantly different from zero at 5% level
b: not significantly different from 0
(nal: unable to be assessed
Significance (two-tail) of difference in Ws: null hypothesis of no difference
(na): unable to be assessed
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b).	 The Schadler Approach
The philosophy of Schadler's (1987) methodology, le
emphasising the selection of variables which reflect public
information rather than the results of more exhaustive data
mining, suggests an alternative approach to the hypothesis
test. Also, this approach may circumvent the problem of too
few observations and the associated inability to gauge the
equality of group covariance matrices.
Accordingly, a potential variable list was drawn from the pool
to more closely reflect the type of variables utilised by
Marsh (1982) and Schadler (1987) as well as a regulatory
factor. The list included 7 variables: V1, V2, V3, V6, V10,
V18 and V20.
Using forced entry of these variables, the discriminant
function provided 100% correct classification with an eigen
value of 4.3812; nevertheless, once again the equality of
group covariance matrices could not be tested.
Applying stepwise entry to these 7 variables resulted in a
discriminant function of four variables; viz V2, V10, V18 and
V20, see Table 8.4A. This function provided an eigen value of
3.1938 and a 100% correct classification rate. Also equality
of group covariance matrices is suggested (10).
In order to improve the estimate of the classification rate a
"jackknife" technique is employed on forced entry of the
variables selected in the original model (ie V2, V10, V18 and
V20); le the discriminant function is calculated for 10 of the
11 observations, and the left out observation is classified on
the basis of the new function; this process is repeated in
turn for each of the 11 observations. The "jackknife" process
indicates a correct classification rate of 81.8% (incorrect
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classification of two of the 11 observations) ; see Table
8.4B. Nevertheless the jackknife assessment is
fundamentally qualified by inability to assess group
covariance equality in 5 of the 11 functions.
8.4.2	 Hypothesis Assessment
The "improved" jackknifed classification, shown in Table
8.4B, is used in the assessment of whether the predictive
ability of the market influences the issue announcement AR.
The average ARs (ie AAR - see Chapter 6 for definition) for
each cell in the classification matrix are shown in Table
8.5; eg correct classification of ordinary shares has four
observations, and the portfolio containing these
observations has an AAR of -0.03894; while the ordinary
share issues incorrectly predicted as debt have a scant
single observation of -.13326.
Prima facie, the classification matrix indicates that
ordinary share issue announcements correctly anticipated
have a lower magnitude than those (albeit one only)
incorrectly anticipated as debt. Similarly for debt,
correctly anticipated issues of debt appear to have a lower
magnitude than those incorrectly anticipated as an ordinary
share issue announcement. Nevertheless these AARs are
subject to the qualification of significance.
The table contains the Z figures for the test for the
hypothesis that the cell AAR equals zero (11); two of the
four cells could not be assessed for significance, and of
the other two, one only was significantly different from
zero at the 5% level.
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Finally, Table 8.5 also shows the differences in the
portfolio AARs. In assessing the difference between the AAR
of correctly classified versus incorrectly classified
issues, the null hypothesis is that there is no difference.
Insufficient data precludes assessment of the significance
of difference.
Rejection of the null hypothesis would imply that investors
use publicly available information to forecast the type of
security anticipated to be issued. And, common stock prices
adjust prior to the issue announcement.
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8.5	 CONCLUSIONS
While the high classification rates achieved in the
discriminant model superficially tempt the conclusion that
a successful bank capital issue security type
predictability model has been constructed, this is
qualified by several key points. Fundamentally, the
distinction of the discriminant groups is not assured.
Also, lack of observation numbers limits the testing and
integrity of the derived models.
Such flaws in the predictability model weaken the
foundation for the assessment of the hypothesis that issue
type predictability and the magnitude of announcement AR
are inversely related.
Of the two correctly classified cells, only one has an AAR
which is significantly different from zero; tests of the
other two cells were invalidated. Also, while superficially
indicating that for either issue type a correctly predicted
issue has a lower AR than an issue incorrectly predicted,
inability to provide an assessment of the significance of
their difference denies any conclusion.
Nevertheless, the foregoing provides the methodology
suitable for assessing the predictability hypothesis on a
suitable number of valid observations. More particularly, a
pool of potential predictor variables suitable for the bank
model have been defined; these are drawn from similar
industrial models and from bank failure/early warning
models.
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FOOTNOTES
(1) Taffler & Abassi (1984) comment on debate about the use of
either MDA or logit techniques. They note that the rationale
for the use of the logit model is that it does not depend on
assumptions of multivariate normality and equality of
covariance matrices, and is robust to the use of binary
independent variables. Nevertheless, they conclude that
'there is little evidence in the
literature of the superiority of such
techniques (viz logit analysis) compared
with conventional discriminant analysis
particularly with continuous explanatory
variables and where the groups are well
separated.'
Also they note that Efron (1975) shows that if the data
satisfy conventional normality and common covariance
assumptions, the logistic approach could lead to a substantial
loss in efficiency particularly with well-separated groups.
In selecting the MDA model, Schadler (1987) noted that a major
advantage was that (by taking account of the interaction among
the independent variables in deriving the discriminant
function) it reduces the problem of multicollinearity often
found in regression studies.
(2). Nevertheless, as noted in Section 1.42 of the SPSS
reference manual, citing Wahl & Kronmal (1977), if the
covariance matrices are not too dissimilar, the LDA performs
quite well, especially if the sample sizes are small.
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(3). In seeking a suitable sample of observations, the US
banking sector provides a particularly interesting source by
virtue of the potentially great number of valid observations.
Apart from the sheer number of banks this is likely because of
the nature of the post 1981 regulatory regime.
More particularly, because equity stock and non-redeemable
preference stock rank equally as capital under the post 1981
US regulatory regime, the predictability of capital issue of
either security type would be less likely simply to reflect
differential regulatory pressure. Also, such issues tend to be
less frequent than those of other security types; consequently
the identification of distinct observations which fall into
either discriminant group, namely the announcement of a single
such security issue in a year by a bank, is more readily
ascertained.
Although work was undertaken on suitable US predictor
variables, adequate US data on security issue details and
announcement dates proved unavailable; see Chapter 6, Footnote
1.
(4). Industrial Predictor Variable Types
Deviations from Target Leverage:
Marsh (1982) uses the difference between historical (10 year
average) and current ratios of long term debt plus preference
shares to capital employed as a measure of the deviation. The
short term deviation from target leverage is similarly
calculated using short term debt to total debt.
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Schadler (1989) uses a target leverage based on the past 5
years (bar the last) divided into the last years leverage as a
gauge for deviations from the target. He defines target
leverage in terms of long term and short term; respectively,
long term debt (over one year maturity) to total assets (less
depreciation), and short term debt to total assets. As well as
the two deviation measures, Schadler also incorporates the two
target leverage measures as predictor variables in his model.
Proxies for Target Leverage:
i. Size in terms of total assets (expressed as a natural log).
ii. Asset composition; Marsh (1982) uses fixed assets to total
assets (on a net of depreciation basis) and Schadler (1987)
uses fixed asset financing with long term debt (long term debt
to net property, plant and equipment).
iii. Financial Risk: Previous models consider
financial/bankruptcy risk; Marsh (1982) considers several
measures relating earnings to fixed charges and the
distribution of earnings changes as well as market factors;
Schadler (1987) considers average earnings cover over five
years previous to the last year divided by that of the last
year.
Market Conditions:
i. Equity: Schadler (1987) includes a variable for favourable
market performance. This is represented for each observation
as the cumulative return on the market portfolio prior to the
issue announcement (calculated over days -60 to -2 inclusive).
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ii. Debt: Schadler (1987) uses the ratio of the average yield
on a portfolio of AAA corporate bonds over 36 months preceding
the issue announcement divided by the most recent month's AAA
portfolio bond yield.
Marsh (1982) considered three market conditions and timing
variables. To reflect bond and equity market conditions,
variables used were the total amounts of equity and debt which
would be raised by all UK companies during the quarter in
question. These were derived from a simple forecasting model
using data and forecasting coefficients available prior to the
current quarter. The third variable provides a measures of the
issuing company's share price performance, adjusted for the
market, over the year preceding the issue; this is simply
calculated as the difference between the share return and the
return on the market.
(5).	 In identifying the financial characteristics of
problem-nonproblem banks, Sinkey (1979) identifies a seven
variable early-warning system. This allowed examiner-
determined problem-nonproblem situations to be reclassified
with about 75% accuracy using a quadratic equation. These
variables include, ...
i). Revenue Concentration: interest and fees on loans as a
percentage of total operating income.
ii). Operating Efficiency: total operating expense as a
percentage of total operating income.
iii. Liquidity and Asset Composition: US government securities
as a percentage of total assets.
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iv. Asset Composition: state and local securities as a
percentage of total assets.
v. Loan Volume: total loans as a percentage of total assets.
vi. Federal Funds Activity and Aggressiveness of Liability
Management: net federal funds (sales minus purchases) as a
percentage of total assets.
vii. Capital Adequacy: capital and reserves for bad debt
losses on loans as a percentage of total assets.
(6). Sinkey et al (1987) apply a successful, non-financial
firm bankruptcy prediction (zeta) model to bank failure
prediction in order to test the model's cross-industry
validity. The model successfully identifies bank failure in
about three out of four cases; but this is less accurate than
the original model. The model utilises seven variables.
i. Return on Assets: net income divided by total assets.
ii. Standard Deviation of Return on Assets: over the previous
five years.
iii. Interest Margin: total interest income divided by total
interest expense.
iv. Retained Earnings divided by total assets.
v. Asset Composition-Liquidity: liquid assets divided by total
assets; liquid assets are defined as the sum of cash and due,
US Treasury securities, and net federal funds (sales minus
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purchases).
vi. Leverage: total assets divided by total equity capital.
vii. Size: the natural log of the bank's total assets.
(7). A small F significance indicates rejection of the
hypothesis that group means are equal. Also, Wilks' lambda is
the ratio of the within-groups sum of squares to the total sum
of squares; a lambda of 1 indicates that all observed group
means are equal, while values close to 0 when within-groups
variability is small compared to total variability - ie most
of the total variability is attributable to differences
between the means of the group.
(8). Selection criteria used in SPSSPC include,
Minimum Tolerance: A check against independent variables that
are linear combinations of other independent variables.
Tolerance is a measure of the degree of linear association
between the independent variables; for variable "i" it is 1-
.111 , where RI is the squared multiple correlation coefficient
when the ith independent variable is considered the dependent
variable and the regression between it and the other
independent variables is calculated.
The significance of the change in Wilks' lambda when a
variable is entered or removed from the model can be based on
an F statistic; more particularly, either the actual value of
"F" or its significance level can be used.
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The specific criteria set in the application of the SPSSPC
programme include a F-to-enter (and F-to-remove) of 1.0. And a
minimum tolerance level of .001; variables with small
tolerances (less than .001) are not permitted to enter the
model; nor if their inclusion would cause the tolerance of a
variable already in the model to drop below .001.
(9). The SPSSPC+ programme, using the discriminant score
classifies observations into one of the two groups on the
basis of Baye's rule. The probability that a case with a
discriminant score of D belongs to group "i" is estimated by,
P(D1Gi) P(Gi)
P (Gilt))	 =
Z P(D)Gi) P(Gi)
1..r..1
where,
P(Gi) = Prior Probability: estimate of the likelihood that an
observation belongs to a particular group when no information
about is known. This is set at .5 (equal likelihood) in this
dissertation.
P(DiGi) = Conditional Probability; ie of D given the group
membership. The probability is calculated by assuming the case
belongs to a particular group, and the probability of the
observed D score given group membership is estimated.
P(GilD) = Posterior Probability; when group membership is
unknown, the estimate of likely group membership from the
available information. It can be estimated from P(D Gi) and
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P(Gi) using Baye's rule.
(10). The SPSSPC programme records a Box's M test figure,
based on the determinants of the group covariance matrices, of
25.648; (the test is not defined).
The significance probability is based on an F transformation;
this is measured at .2608 (based on an approximate F of 1.2452
with degrees of freedom of 10 and 347.6). A small probability
may indicate rejection of the null hypothesis that the
covariance matrices are equal. Nevertheless this test is
sensitive to departures from multivariate normality - it tends
to suggest matrices are unequal if the normality assumption is
violated.
(11). As in Chapter 6, the Z figure is derived from,
z . 5 (AA.R )t o ti
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CHAPTER 9
CONCLUSION
9.1	 SUMMARY
This dissertation explores bank capital and its regulation
in both historical and contemporary terms, and in the UK
and US contexts. The analysis focuses on a critical
assessment of bank capital regulation, and the evidence of
bank capital issue announcement effects.
Major themes and hypotheses considered include,
a. The Historical Efficacy of Bank Capital Regulation.
In a "free" market context, regulation may be justified to
prevent market failure; nevertheless, other rationales such
as industry trade with government have been suggested, eg
Stigler (1971).
Bank prudential regulation, including bank capital
regulation, is fundamentally justified by the market's
inability to account for the cost of systemic market
failure but focuses on regulation of the individual bank.
Nevertheless, in the banking context, Benston (1991)
concludes that regulation tends to disrupt financial
stability.
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The historical efficacy of bank capital regulation is
difficult to assess, in part due to the problems of
defining and isolating the influences of other bank
regulation. Bank capital regulation may be viewed as
possessing two forms; absolute and structural.
Historical examples of "free" banking are a matter of
definition and lack any strong conclusions as to the
influence of untrammeled absolute capital levels; although,
controversially, arguments of the 1820s for joint stock
banking (ie abolishing a minimum absolute capital limit) in
England & Wales were based on the contrasting experience of
"free" Scottish banking during common economic exigencies.
Absolute capital regulation (in terms of maximum and/or
minimum levels) was used to control the competitive nature
of the banking industry (ie monopoly control); developments
in bank capital regulation facilitated the establishment of
greater market efficiency through share or common stock
democratisation and a shift from uncertainty to risk
through the evolution of limited liability. Bank cost
structure also may have been influenced by the shift from
private owner managed to professionally managed banks; viz
improved management skills, economies of scale and new
agency (management) monitoring costs.
Relative, or structural, capital regulation has a long
established formal history in the US but has been
established in the UK in recent years only. The efficacy of
structural capital regulation in terms of failure risk
control is controversial; particularly in the light of US
experience in the Depression era.
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b. Contemporary Efficacy of Bank Capital Regulation.
In recent years formal regulatory attempts have been made
to re-define capital in a manner which better recognises
the complex risk capacities it carries, and set a minimum
level of capital matched against an assessed (credit) risk
potential. Nevertheless, the patent deficiencies of such a
regulatory regime may result in costs running contrary to
the intended benefits.
Under the auspices of the Basle Committee, and the EEC,
structural capital regulation provides the current focus of
a common international bank capital regulation in the form
of a capital to risk-asset weighted ratio (RAR) set at a
minimum level.
Nevertheless this methodology is subject to much criticism.
This includes the arbitrariness of measures such as capital
definition, risk weights, and the minimum capital ratio
level. Also the use of a minimum capital ratio
operationally sterilises capital for loss absorbing
purposes; and few risks are recognised; moreover the simple
additivity of risk denies the basic tenet of portfolio
theory. And elements of national supervisory discretion may
continue to frustrate the objective of equitable
international competition; some observers claim that such a
regime imposes a competitive advantage to the developed
countries in the North-South context.
The risk weight assignation of the RAR may also have
ramifications for bank management; failure to reflect true
risk may lead to distortions in business policy and
resource allocation.
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c. Market Assessments of Bank Capital Regulation
The phenomenon of bank common stock abnormal price reaction
to the announcement of capital issues (ie issue
announcement effects), found in the US, similarly is found
in the UK. Available evidence gives some indication of a
reduction in the magnitudes of common stock issue
announcement effects following the imposition of a minimum
RAR regime.
d. Regulatory Versus Market Views of Capital Adequacy
The analysis of common stock announcement effects in the US
by Keeley (1989) suggests that from a regulatory
perspective, capital inadequate banks experience a negative
announcement effect while capital adequate banks experience
a positive effect.
Consideration of the market view of capital adequacy
suggests that Keeley's results may be further disaggregated
and challenged by the capital structure relevance
hypothesis; ie the assumed voluntary, or coerced, nature of
the issue in regard to the regulatory view may be qualified
by the market's assessment of the adequacy, or inadequacy,
of capital. More particularly, the negative announcement
effects for regulatory capital inadequate banks discovered
by Keeley may represent conflict with the market's view of
the banks' capital adequacy.
Conflict, and/or harmony, between market and regulatory
views of capital's adequacy is examined by assessing the
market view of the adequacy of groups of banks deemed as
either capital adequate, or inadequate, under minimum
capital standard regulation. Evidence of conflict is
observed in some years.
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e. Security Type Issued Predictability and Announcement
Effects
A range of potential bank security type issued, predictor
variables was defined; and notwithstanding certain
challenges to its validity, a predictability model
constructed. Superficially, the classification results
suggest that investors use publicly available information
to forecast the security type issued, and prices
accordingly adjust prior to announcement. Nevertheless the
hypothesised relationship between the predictability of
security type issued and the magnitude of the announcement
effect was unable to be tested fully due to lack of data.
9.2	 CONCLUSIONS
The preceding quantitative and qualitative research has
focused on diverse yet inter-related matters and allows a
number of conclusions.
a. Capital Issue Announcement Effect Evidence
US evidence of common stock abnormal returns coincident
with capital issue announcements has been strengthened in
the banking sector, and extended to the UK context.
Similarly, the pattern of abnormal returns based on
security type to be issued has been confirmed. In the UK,
change in bank capital regulation appears to have some
degree of influence on the announcement effects.
Following the work of Shome et al (1986) in the US, it has
been demonstrated that the market's view of banks' equity
capital adequacy appears to vary in the UK. Also, in the
US, the market's view of the adequacy of regulatory defined
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capital appears to vary; at times it appears to conflict
with the regulatory assessment of adequacy.
This extended evidence of bank capital issue announcement
effects provides varying support for a number of
hypotheses.
b. Relative Announcement Effects
The evidence of relative announcement effects based on
security type provides a limited support for the signalling
hypothesis of Myers and Majluf (1984) which otherwise has
been qualified and diminished by Dybvig & Zender (1988) who
reassert the irrelevance of capital structure; but the non-
zero evidence contributes further to a considerable body
which challenges capital structure irrelevance.
The explanatory power of the predictability hypothesis
remains untested in the banking sector, although the
methodology for such a test has been specifically
developed.
c. The Influence of Capital Regulation Pressure
US evidence tends to support the hypothesis that increased
bank capital regulation rigour (the imposition of a minimum
capital ratio regime) reduces information asymmetry and the
signal content of capital issue announcements. This
hypothesis finds some degree of support in the UK.
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d. Market View of Capital Adequacy
The suggestion that banks' regulatory capital adequacy
status (in a minimum capital regime) influences the sign of
their (common stock) issue announcements effects has been
explained in terms of capital structure relevance and
information hypotheses; Keeley (1989).
Drawing further on the capital structure relevance
hypothesis, this dissertation hypothesises that the
coincident views of the regulator and the market on banks'
capital adequacy status may provide further explanation.
Encouragingly, evidence of both agreement and conflict in
views has been assessed.
e. Free Banking and Prudential Arguments for Capital
Regulation
A survey of current bank capital regulation methodology
reveals wide ranging deficiencies; a potential source of
cost has been suggested by the above evidence of
intermittent conflict with market discipline (ie
conflicting views on capital adequacy).
Historical research indicates that bank capital regulation
has been used to directly influence bank market
competition. No strong conclusions can be drawn about a
relationship between bank capital failure and the existence
or absence of capital regulation, nor its form. This lends
no support to the justification for capital regulation as a
form of prudential regulation, at least prior to the
introduction of formal deposit insurance. The development
of bank capital regulation has also influenced bank costs,
risk and capital market efficiency.
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9.3	 RECOMMENDATIONS FOR FURTHER RESEARCH
The foregoing analysis suggests a number of avenues for
further research into the cost of bank capital regulation
and explanations for capital issue announcement effects.
Some of these require access to appropriate bank data;
namely access to US sources. This would facilitate a more
complete assessment of the predictability hypothesis
considered in Chapter 8. Also, the potential for
assessment of the hypothesised issue announcement effects
in Chapter 7 appear potentially rewarding in the light of
the evidence of conflicting regulatory and market views of
bank capital adequacy; such evidence may be pertinent to
the validity of the capital structure relevance hypothesis.
Also, evidence supporting the Chapter 7 hypothesis would
highlight potential costs of conflict between market and
regulatory views about the adequacy of bank capital.
The theme of costly conflict between market and regulatory
views of capital adequacy, may be further refined by
considering capital in terms of its functional definitions.
Answers to the question of whether regulatory views of
capital adequacy conflict with the market's assessment of
the adequacy of some form of functionally defined capital
(eg floating charge capital, dated capital etc) may provide
a means of monitoring costs stemming from the regulator's
particular definition of capital.
The influence of the imposition of more objective bank
capital regulation regimes may be more fully considered by
also assessing the impact on bank market risk.
The use of bank case study methodology may also complement
the foregoing analysis.
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